Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2006

– Manual for Country Assessments –

Der Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) ist Teil des Projekts „Den Wandel gestalten – Strategien der Entwicklung und Transformation“, das die Bertelsmann Stiftung in Kooperation mit dem Münchner Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung (C·A·P) durchführt.
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Guidelines for country assessments

This manual contains and explains all the criteria and questions guiding the country assessments for the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2006. The aim of the manual is to ensure a common understanding of the BTI’s criteria, questions and concepts. This shall facilitate comparable assessments, reliable and objective ratings and a transparent review process. The manual provides

(1) the research questions and evaluation levels structuring the country reports;
(2) the questionnaire and evaluation sheets for the numerical country ratings.

What is the Bertelsmann Transformation Index?

The BTI aims to analyze how and to what extent developing and transition countries steer societal change toward constitutional democracy and a socially responsible market economy. The BTI consists of two rankings and a trend indicator that are based on in-depth analyses of 119 individual countries. The rankings show the state of the development of democracy and a market economy in a given country (‘Status Index’) as well as the management performance of the country’s political leadership (‘Management Index’). The Trend Indicator describes the direction of a country’s democratic and economic development. The country sample comprises 119 developing and transition countries that can not (yet) be considered consolidated democracies and market economies (criterion: no donor status in the OECD), have populations of more than three million (except for ten smaller states with interesting transformation prospects) and are recognized as sovereign states.

The BTI has been developed in the framework of a project that seeks to compile and improve the strategies and skills of managing development and transformation processes. This project is jointly managed by the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Center for Applied Policy Research. More information on the project and the index is available at www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de.

Concepts of analysis and measurement

The construction of the BTI and the questions set out in this manual are based on specific normative-analytic concepts of democracy, a market economy and management. In contrast to minimal-ist definitions of electoral democracy, the BTI’s understanding of ‘constitutional’ democracy includes the rule of law and the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers with checks and balances. Moreover, our notion of democracy also reflects the extent to which a democratic order is consolidated in terms of interest representation and political culture. The concept of a ‘socially responsible’ market economy underlying the BTI comprises not only free markets and property rights, but also principles of social justice, responsibility and sustainability. As we consider democracy and a market economy empirically and functionally interlinked, we aggregate democracy and market economy ratings into a single Status Index and use the term ‘market-based democracy’.

A constitutional democracy and a socially responsible market economy are goals but not necessarily direct priorities in complex processes of development and transformation. Development in our understanding entails not only economic growth, but also overcoming poverty while extending freedoms of action and choice to the largest possible share of the population. Transformation refers to a comprehensive, politically managed social change from an authoritarian system toward a market-based democracy.
Since the BTI views leading political actors as crucial for development and transformation, their management performance is analyzed in more depth and is compared in a separate ranking, the Management Index. Management is defined as the performance, capacity and accountability of the ‘political leadership’, i.e. of those political actors who have the power and responsibility to shape or determine the political affairs of a society. These actors include not only governments and political elites, but also non-governmental organizations, insofar as these organizations play an important role in transformation. The political leadership demonstrates ‘good’ governance in terms of the BTI when it orients its policies toward the goals of a market-based democracy, manages development and transformation effectively, uses resources efficiently, builds a broad consensus about reform in society and cooperates with international partners.

This is only a brief summary of these concepts. For a more detailed discussion, please consult our first volume “Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2003”.

The concepts guiding the BTI are operationalized in the dimensions, criteria and questions described in the present manual. We distinguish four dimensions:

1. democracy;
2. market economy;
3. management; and
4. trend of development.

Each dimension is divided into criteria (19 in total), and each criterion is subdivided into questions (55 in total).

**How to write the analysis**

The country report should provide a detailed and concise analysis of the state of the market-based democracy, the management performance and the trend of development in a country. The analysis should

(1) sketch a holistic view of the country’s situation and perspectives; and

(2) substantiate, explain and justify why particular ratings are given to a country.

To fulfill this purpose, the analysis should be as standardized as possible and as country-specific as necessary. This approach serves to enable both a worldwide cross-country comparison and an in-depth study of governance in a particular country. The following instructions shall guide your writing.

- Total length of the country report: approximately 6500 words (19 pages, 1.5-spaced, Times New Roman 12 pt)
- To write the report, please use the template that is included with this manual. The template contains the proper formats for the headings and tables of the reports.
- Please follow the manual carefully when you draft the report.
- You can draw on the country reports for the BTI 2003 (available at: www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de), but you should be aware that this manual entails a number of important changes.
- Do not insert footnotes or bibliographic references, as your report is not an academic article. All necessary information about sources should be integrated into the text.
Guidelines for Country Assessments

- Please structure the report as follows:

A. Executive summary (approx. 400 words)
   *Summarizes the main findings of the report, reflecting its structure (sections C and D). The summary should be comprehensible without prior knowledge of the full report.*

B. History and characteristics of transformation (approx. 600 words)

C. Assessment
   *Sections 1-4 must address all the questions of the manual, following the structure of manual. The manual provides four different evaluation levels for each question. Assessments can reflect the wording of the most suitable evaluation, should be adjusted to the empirical situation in a country and should be substantiated by empirical evidence wherever possible. Please focus your efforts on the management assessment, as this assessment constitutes the distinctive feature of the BTI. Try to provide more and richer evidence for the management section than for the democracy and market economy sections.*

1. Democracy (approx. 1000 words)
   *The size of subsections may vary, depending on the specifics of a given country.*
   - Stateness
   - Participation
   - Rule of law
   - Institutional stability
   - Political and social integration

2. Market economy (approx. 1000 words)
   - Level of socioeconomic development
   - Organization of the market and competition
   - Stability of currency and prices
   - Private property
   - Welfare regime
   - Economic strength
   - Sustainability

3. Management (approx. 2000 words)
   *The assessment refers to the period from 1 January 2003 to 31 January 2005. Ratings and analysis should refer to the country’s political leadership during this period and should cover all acting governments during the period.*
   - Level of difficulty
   - Steering capability
   - Resource efficiency
   - Consensus-building
   - International cooperation

4. Trend of democratic and economic development (approx. 500 words)
   *The assessment refers to the period from 1 January 2001 to 31 January 2005. Please address all three questions.*
   - Democratic development
   - Market economy development

D. Strategic Perspective (approx. 500 words)
   *Assesses potential future developments and makes strategic recommendations for external supporters of the country’s development.*
How to rate a country

The manual provides 55 questions for numerical rating. The rating scale ranges from 1 to 4, i.e. comprises 10 levels, with 1 representing the worst, and 4 representing the best rating. For each question, wordings of different answers are suggested, covering the scope of possible assessments. These ‘evaluation levels’, which are coded with respective numerical ratings, give a feeling for what sort of empirical assessment would correspond to a particular rating. The meaning of each question is explained by one or several paragraphs in italics.

The questions are grouped into criteria such as stateness, participation, rule of law etc. For each criterion, the best international practice or the normative assumption made by the BTI is expressed in a box below the name of the criterion. This provides an additional guide for the individual questions and ratings.

In January 2005, we will also provide you with exemplary country reports and ratings that will allow you to assess your country in comparison with a ‘benchmark country’ from your region of the world. The ratings and analyses of these benchmark countries are currently developed and will be adjusted and calibrated across regions of the world. Once established, the benchmark assessments and ratings will simplify your task and reduce possible country or regional bias.

Please insert your rating in the box at the bottom right corner of the question box (see the example below). To determine the rating, you should proceed as follows:

- consider which evaluation level best approximates the situation in your country;
- relate and compare your rating with the rating given to the benchmark country;
- assign one of the two or three possible scores represented by the chosen evaluation level. You can enter either full numbers (1-4) or express nuances by adding a + (better than…) or – (worse than…).

We will transform these ratings into a scale ranging from 1 to 10 (i.e. 1 = 1; 1+ = 2; 2- = 3;…) that are used for aggregation. We have not chosen a 1-10 scale because we think a 1-4 scale with graduations is easier to apply.
Example for a rating question

**Criterion:** Political Participation

**Question:** The populace decides who rules, and it has other political freedoms.

**Normative assumption**

**Best practice**

**Ratings corresponding to evaluation levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent are rulers determined by general, free and fair elections?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No democratic elections at the national level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections or partial elections are held, but they actually have only limited influence over who rules.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General elections are held and accepted in principle as the means of filling leadership positions. However, there are some restraints on the principle of equality. These may include withholding suffrage or the right to campaign for office <em>de jure</em> or <em>de facto</em> from part of the population, inconsistent assurance of free and fair elections, unelected officeholders, or elections that have perceptible but only minor influence on political outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No restraints on free and fair elections.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Suggested evaluation levels**

**Rating example**

**Your rating:** 2-

There are three special sets of questions in the manual.

First, for the trend dimension (questions 18.1-19.2), we ask you to rate countries on a scale ranging from −2 to +2, where −2 means substantial backward steps, 0 means no change, and +2 means substantial progress.

Second, we ask you to assess structural difficulties that constrain the governance capacity of the political leadership (questions 13.1-13.3). These ratings are used as a weighting factor that favours good governance under difficult conditions. Three additional quantitative data will be provided by the BTI-project team (13.4-13.6).

Third, in the final section of this manual, we pose questions about the political system of your country. The purpose of these questions is to compile basic and comparable information on features of the political system that will be added as a table to the management assessment section of your report.

**Submitting your report**

After you have elaborated your analysis and inserted the ratings for all questions, please email the report and the manual back to your regional coordinator and to Olaf Hillenbrand, managing director of the BTI project at the Center for Applied Policy Research (C·A·P). Regarding the ratings, you can also fill out the summary evaluation sheets at the end of the manual and fax them (together with the political system data) to Olaf Hillenbrand. The final deadline for this submission is **15 February 2005**. Earlier submissions are very welcome as we will process the reports on a rolling basis.
Review and final submission of your report
Your country report will be reviewed by a second country expert and by the coordinator responsible for your region of the world. To ensure an independent second assessment, the review will be anonymous, and we will not disclose the names of the country experts during the rating period. As a rule, you will receive detailed comments on your report within three weeks after submission. Please consider these comments and try to adjust your report accordingly. If necessary, you may also adjust your ratings in view of the comments. Send the final report and ratings to your regional coordinator and to Olaf Hillenbrand.

Please note that the regional coordinators and the BTI editors will revise and eventually modify your report more substantially than in the case of conventional scholarly publications. This is due to the comparability requirements of such a standardized assessment with a worldwide scale.

Measurement and aggregation
Your country ratings form the basis of the final country ratings and the BTI rankings. Each of the 55 numerical ratings (scores) for 119 countries is reviewed and adjusted three times (see the figure below for a schematic description of the process). First, a second country expert rates the questions independently from the author of the country analysis. Second, two regional experts discuss these ratings and agree on scores that reflect the differences among countries of the same world region. Third, a board of renowned social scientists and development practitioners, who advise and guide the BTI exercise, reviews and calibrates the ratings in a cross-regional comparison.

If such a calibrated rating differs by more than two points from the score suggested by you (based upon the 10 point scale), we will inform you and request your opinion. This enables you to defend your rating and to influence the final rating. The responsibility for establishing the final ratings lies, however, with the BTI Board.

We aggregate the scores by calculating the mean of the individual scores (which have been transformed into a 1-10 point scale). While individual questions and criteria are, in principle, weighted equally, the aggregation process assigns different weights to the individual scores. In a first aggregation step, we calculate scores for the 19 criteria. Then we calculate the means of the 2-7 criteria scores constituting the respective dimensions (democracy; market economy; management; development trend).

The Status Index represents the mean value of the democracy and market economy scores. The Trend Indicator is the mean value of the two criteria measuring the trend of development. For the Management Index, we weight the mean value of the four management criteria by a ‘level of difficulty’ that reflects the structural difficulties a political leadership faces. We believe that good governance under difficult conditions should be more appreciated than an equivalent performance under auspicious conditions. Because structural problems such as high poverty, a history of violent conflict or the absence of civil society influence all aspects of governance, the difficulty level can be assumed to affect all management criteria. For this reason we use the difficulty level as a multiplying factor that is constructed partly from your ratings, partly from available quantitative indicators.
Comparative assessment of benchmark countries from all world regions: Chile, Korea; Egypt; Mali; Serbia and Montenegro; Ghana; Russia

Schematic overview of the rating and aggregation process (examples of questions and criteria highlighted)

I. Country rating informed by benchmark ratings
II. Review by second country expert
III. Inter- and intraregional review and calibration

Calibrated ratings for all manual questions

| 1.1… |
| 1.2… |
| 13.1. Strategic priorities |
| 13.2 Effective implementation |
| 13.3 Flexibility and learning |
| … |
| … |
| … |
| … |
| 18.3… |

Criteria ratings, aggregated from individual ratings

| … |
| … |
| … |
| … |
| 13. Steering Capability |
| 14. Resource efficiency |
| 15. Consensus-building |
| 16. International cooperation |
| … |

Dimensions, aggregated from criteria ratings

| State of democratization |
| State of market economy development |
| Governance performance |
| Level of difficulty |
| Trend of democratic and economic development |

Analysis of manual items by country experts
Country expert consultation in case of major changes of ratings

Status Index
Management Index
Trend Indicator
I. Democracy

The guideline in this dimension of the study, as well as the next, is the distinction between (a) the establishment of adequately observed rules of the game for democracy or a market economy, and (b) the degree to which they are ingrained and accepted within the society in question. For methodological reasons, despite the fact that they interact, democracy and a market economy are dealt with separately.

Here the range reaches from authoritarian regimes, through semi-authoritarian systems and defective democracies to consolidated democracy. Two sets of questions are used to measure the quality of political freedoms that approximate an ideal-type progression of democratization. The first set asks about the fundamental functional elements, the minimum requirements for a democracy. The second asks about how deeply the democratic system is ingrained and established, and thus how stable it is. Consequently, the second measurement of quality ("patterns of political behavior and attitudes") is only partially applicable to non-democratic regimes.

Political regime

Questions regarding the political regime are directed to the basic rules of how governance is exercised at the time of the observation. Because the entire study is concerned with evaluating countries “on the way to stable democracy,” the observational criteria are oriented around the concepts of democracy used in transformation research. However, the degree of political freedom in authoritarian systems should also be included and evaluated. Here it should be borne in mind that under such regimes these freedoms usually represent informal rules.

1. Stateness

There is clarity about the nation’s existence as a state, with adequately established and differentiated power structures.

Here we refer to state and nation building and focus on specific problems which might occur in processes of political transformation. Underlying this approach is a notion of the state in the tradition of Max Weber.

It should be mentioned that stateness is not a defining criterion for democratic or for authoritarian regimes, but refers to a necessary condition for their functioning. This criterion is maintained in the BTI 2006. There are mainly two reasons for that: (1) Stateness is too important to be left out when evaluating processes of political transformation, and above all their potential for internal and external crises; (2) The stateness criterion allows us to distinguish between democracies (as well as among authoritarian regimes as a group). Thus, the only problem results from the numerical evaluation, when democratic and authoritarian regimes are ranked or compared. For example, because the authoritarian regime of Singapore has a high score in 'stateness', in the index of political transformation, it is ranked better than Colombia, which is considered a (weak) democratic regime. Of course, this has to be considered when comparative analysis is made.
## I. Democracy

### To what extent does the state’s monopoly on the use of force cover the entire territory?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is no state monopoly on the use of force. Instead, there is anarchy, civil war, a clan oligopoly, etc.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The state’s monopoly on the use of force is established in central parts of the country, but there are functional organizations (guerrillas, paramilitaries, clans) that can credibly lay claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The state’s monopoly on the use of force is established nationwide in principle, but does not function completely (guerrillas, mafias, clans in isolated territorial enclaves).</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is virtually no competition with the state’s monopoly on the use of force.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**

### Is there fundamental agreement about which people qualify as citizens of the state?

Here “citizens” refers to the demos, in other words, political citizenship, rather than a “people” in an ethnic or cultural sense. The question seeks to assess (1) the constitutional and legal definition and granting or denying citizenship status and (2) the state’s de facto policy of citizenship with respect to ethnic, religious or cultural minorities. The question focuses on the extent of discrimination against such groups. This includes discrimination against individuals and violations of civil rights, but if such forms of discrimination are observed and appear to be a problem of the rule of law rather than of citizenship, they should be assessed under 3.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A variety of population groups compete for titular status as the “nation” and deny citizenship to others.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant aspects of citizenship are withheld from entire population groups.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic, religious or other minorities are denied certain civic rights.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All citizens have the same civic rights (after a reasonable transitional phase, in the case of immigrants). The preponderant majority fundamentally acknowledges the state’s constitution.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**
## I. Democracy

### Are the state’s legitimacy and its legal order defined without interference by religious dogmas (‘separation of church and state’)?

This question refers to the problem of the functionality of the state’s norms and basic order in the process of transformation. If the legal order which defines the state is derived from religious dogmas, there will be fundamental barriers to the development of individual beliefs, capacities, and choices.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious dogmas define fundamental rules of the state, society and economy.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular and religious norms are in conflict about the basic constitution of the state, or lead to a hybrid system.</td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basically, the state is defined as a secular order. However, religious dogmas have considerable influence on (regional or functional) segments of politics or law.</td>
<td>3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The state is largely defined as a secular order. Religious dogmas have no noteworthy influence on politics or law.</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Do working administrative structures exist?

This question refers to the fundamental administrative structures without which no state can survive for long (in contrast to question 4.1, which refers to the functioning of democratic institutions). It includes structures that exist above and beyond the military or police protection of the monopoly on the use of force—for example, basic administration of justice and taxation. Under some circumstances such functions may be taken over by the military.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The state infrastructure and its powers extend to keeping the peace and maintaining law and order, but do not include broad segments of the population, or of the territory.</td>
<td>1-1+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The state infrastructure and its powers are beginning to extend beyond maintaining law and order, but either do not include the entire population, or work rather defectively.</td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The state’s fundamental infrastructure extends to the entire territory of the country (administrative institutions, office-holders, fundamental administration of justice, making and implementing political decisions), but its operation is to some extent deficient.</td>
<td>3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The state has a differentiated administrative structure throughout the country, making it possible to extract and allocate state resources on a broad basis.</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Your rating:
I. Democracy

2. Political participation

The populace decides who rules, and it has other political freedoms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent are rulers determined by general, free and fair elections?</th>
<th>2.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No democratic elections at the national level.</td>
<td>1+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections or partial elections are held, but they actually have only limited influence over who rules.</td>
<td>2-2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General elections are held and accepted in principle as the means of filling leadership positions. However, there are some restraints on the principle of equality. These may include withholding suffrage or the right to campaign for office de jure or de facto from part of the population, inconsistent assurance of free and fair elections, unelected officeholders, or elections that have perceptible but only minor influence on political outcomes.</td>
<td>3-3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No restraints on free and fair elections.</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your rating:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do democratically elected rulers have the effective power to govern, or are there veto powers and political enclaves?</th>
<th>2.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elected rulers de facto have no power to govern, or rulers are not elected.</td>
<td>1+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected rulers have the power to govern in important matters, but the fundamental orientation of the constitution can be curtailed or rendered ineffective by strong veto groups.</td>
<td>2-2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected rulers have the power to govern in principle, but individual power groups can set their own domains apart or enforce special-interest policies against the state.</td>
<td>3-3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected rulers have the effective power to govern.</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your rating:
I. Democracy

**To what extent can independent political and/or civic groups associate and assemble freely?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-1+</td>
<td>No freedom of association for political and social groups. No freedom of assembly. Politically relevant civic organizations do not exist, or are as a rule suppressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2+</td>
<td>Opposition parties with any relevance for governance are prohibited or systematically disabled. Freedom of assembly is not assured everywhere by the state. Civic organizations can act if they support the regime or are not outspokenly critical of it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-3+</td>
<td>Partial restraints—not consistent with democratic principles—on the freedom of association, but as a rule there are no prohibitions on parties or social organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-4</td>
<td>Unrestricted freedom of association and of assembly within the basic democratic order.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**

**To what extent can citizens, organizations and the mass media express opinions freely?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-1+</td>
<td>No freedom of opinion or of the press.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2+</td>
<td>The core elements of a public sphere and of public debate exist but are vulnerable to massive intervention for distortion and manipulation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-3+</td>
<td>Some intervention in freedom of opinion and of the press, which is contrary to democratic principles, but outright prohibitions on the press are limited to a few isolated cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-4</td>
<td>Unrestricted freedom of opinion and of the press framed by the basic democratic order.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**
### I. Democracy

#### 3. The rule of law

State powers check and balance one another and ensure civil rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is there a working separation of powers (checks and balances)?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>This question refers to the basic configuration and operation of the separation of powers (institutional differentiation, division of labor according to functions and, most significantly, checks and balances).</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>However, it does not consider the tendency toward convergence and fusion of powers that can be observed in parliamentary systems. It does include the subjection of state power to the law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation of powers is nonexistent or exists only on paper.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An ongoing and either informally or formally confirmed monopoly position, especially of the executive branch, which may include colonization of other powers even though these are institutionally differentiated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation of powers is restricted partially and temporarily, for example to ensure governability. Fundamentally, though, a restoration of balance is sought, especially by the other branches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No restraints on the basic functions involved in the separation of powers, especially mutual checks and balances.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does an independent judiciary exist?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>An independent judiciary refers first and foremost to how far the courts can interpret and review norms, and pursue their own reasoning, free from the influence of the rulers or powerful groups and individuals. This requires an institutional differentiation of the legal system, including administration of justice, jurisprudence, regulated appointment of the judiciary, rational proceedings, professionalism, channels of appeal and court administration.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The judiciary is not institutionally differentiated, or is significantly subordinated to religious or political authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The judiciary is institutionally differentiated, but its decisions and doctrine are subordinated to political authorities, or severely restricted by functional deficits such as territorial penetration, resources or severe corruption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The judiciary is established as a distinct profession and operates relatively independently, but its functions are partially restricted by facets such as corruption and insufficient territorial or functional penetration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The judiciary is free both from unconstitutional intervention by other institutions and from corruption. There are mechanisms for judicial review of legislative or executive acts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**
I. Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are there legal or political penalties for officeholders who abuse their positions?</th>
<th>3.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit, without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrupt officeholders are not prosecuted adequately under the law, but occasionally attract adverse publicity.</td>
<td>2-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a rule, corrupt officeholders are prosecuted under established laws, but also slip through political, legal or procedural loopholes.</td>
<td>3-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a rule, corrupt officeholders are severely prosecuted under established laws.</td>
<td>4-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent do civil liberties exist and to what extent can citizens seek redress for violations of these liberties?</th>
<th>3.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil rights have no protection even in principle, or are systematically violated.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil rights are violated massively over protracted periods of time, or are protected only within limited enclaves.</td>
<td>2-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil rights are violated partially or temporarily, or are not implemented in some parts of the country.</td>
<td>3-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No restrictions on civil rights.</td>
<td>4-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**
Patterns of political behavior and attitudes

The following categories and evaluation levels are intended primarily to observe the stability of democracies and thus assess differences in quality among this group of states. The selection of categories thus follows pertinent concepts from consolidation research. However, some performance indicators may be applicable to non-democratic systems. The guideline is that the performance indicated must secure achieved freedoms, and not (1) serve to stabilize the authoritarian regime itself, or (2) represent a potential threat to future democracy. Where applications such as these come (or cannot come) into play, they are explained in more detail.

4. Institutional stability

Democratic institutions are capable of performing, and they are adequately accepted.

Are democratic institutions, including the administrative system and the system of justice, capable of performing?

This question is aimed at establishing to what extent democratic institutions, including the judiciary and administration, are not only present and fundamentally functional, but also perform their functions effectively and are free from extensive, counterproductive friction.

Please note that non-democratic countries – though they might have formally established some ‘democratic’ institutions like Chile under Pinochet or nowadays in Iran – have their own institutional logic. So in most cases they will have to be evaluated with (1) or (1+). The criteria for assessing a country as democratic are if the government has come to power by (mostly) free and fair elections and if there is a minimum of checks and balances to control the executive.

In case of a non-democratic regime, please evaluate briefly the working of the central political institutions (constitutional powers) and their potential for future democratization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Your rating:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There are no democratic institutions as such (authoritarian regime). Or: ‘democratic’ institutions are part of an authoritarian regime.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic institutions exist but have neither stability nor continuity, either internally or between organizations.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic institutions fundamentally perform their functions, but much waste occurs because of friction between institutions.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ensemble of democratic institutions works effectively and efficiently. As a rule, political decisions are prepared, made, implemented and reviewed in legitimate procedures by the appropriate authorities.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. Democracy

To what extent are democratic institutions accepted or supported by the relevant actors?

The relevant actors are all organizations that can concentrate political power and thus are potential veto players. They include not only government bodies, parties, associations and civic organizations, but groups with potential veto powers, such as the military, the clergy, etc.

See item 4.1 concerning non-democratic countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There are no democratic institutions as such (authoritarian regime). Or: ‘democratic institutions’ are part of an authoritarian regime.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only individual institutions are accepted, strong actors hold vetoes, and acceptance remains unstable over time.</td>
<td>2-2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual institutions of the democratic state are not fully accepted by all relevant players.</td>
<td>3-3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All relevant political and social players accept democratic institutions as legitimate.</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your rating:
I. Democracy

5. Political and Social Integration

Stable patterns of representation exist for mediating between society and the state; there is also a consolidated civic culture.

To what extent is there a stable, moderate, socially-rooted party system to articulate and aggregate societal interests?

This question can be answered meaningfully only for those countries where the party system plays an autonomous role in the process of forming opinions and political will, and thus in mediating between society and the state. The 'effective number of parties' reflects the number and political weight of parties. It is calculated as follows: effective number of parties = 1/\(\sum \frac{p_i}{1}\); \(p_i\) is the share of parliamentary mandates controlled by party \(i\) (Laakso/Taagepera Index). High values indicate a fragmentation of the party system if they are combined with high electoral volatility, polarized and weakly rooted parties.

Note that systems with few, dominant parties are not necessarily better in aggregating and articulating societal interests. The fragmentation, polarization and volatility of party systems should be interpreted in view of these functions.

In countries where the democratic system is underpinned or overlaid by marked clientelism, consider what effects such networks might exert to promote or inhibit stability.

| Fragile party system: extensive fragmentation (effective number of parties more than five), extensive polarization, high voter volatility, scantily rooted in society. | 1 |
| Unstable party system: extensive fragmentation (effective number of parties more than five), moderate polarization, high voter volatility, rather shallowly rooted in society. | 2 |
| Party system fundamentally established but still somewhat shaky: moderate fragmentation (effective number of parties less than five), moderate polarization, moderate voter volatility, substantially rooted in society. | 3 |
| There is a stable, moderate, socially rooted party system: moderate fragmentation, low polarization, low voter volatility, broad consent by the population and stable connections with civil society. | 4 |

Your rating:
I. Democracy

To what extent is there a network of cooperative associations or interest groups to mediate between society and the political system?

This question addresses the representation of societal interests in the political system. It does not evaluate a self-organizing civil society that operates independently of the state (see below question 5.4). Moreover, it does not concern rights of participation per se (question 2.1), but rather the systemic nature and quality of representative patterns.

This intermediate level is also present in many authoritarian systems, especially those that have been somewhat liberalized. In these cases it can also be taken into account. Consideration should be given to whether the system of associations is relatively autonomous, or is a part of authoritarian corporatist structures.

Consideration of potential threats should especially address how far the “dark side” of civil society comes into play—in other words, where social, communicative and political power is organized with the intention of undermining democracy or civil society especially, for example, in cases of ethnic and/or nationalistic mobilization.

| Interest groups are present only in isolated social segments, cooperate little, and on the whole are poorly balanced. A large number of social interests remain unrepresented. | 1 |
| The topography of interest groups is meager, important social interests are underrepresented, the system of interest groups is dominated by only a few players, and there is a risk of polarization. | 2- |
| The network of interest groups is relatively closely knit, but dominated by a few strong interests, producing a latent risk of pooling conflicts. | 3- |
| There is a closely-knit network of interest groups that are fundamentally cooperative, reflect competing social interests, and tend to balance one another. | 4- |

How strong is the citizens’ consent to democratic norms and procedures?

This should be based on survey data on attitudes toward democracy or individual institutions, in contrast to authoritarian attitudes.

In principle, consent to democracy as a form of government may also be assessed in authoritarian systems if reliable data is obtainable. As a rule, this is rather likely to be the case in liberalized authoritarian regimes.

| Consent to democracy (as form of government) is very low (less than 30%), and political protests quickly tend to call the constitutional framework into question. | 1 |
| Consent to democracy is low (30-50%), and political protests occasionally tend to call the constitutional framework into question. | 2- |
| Consent to democracy is moderate to high (50-70%), and political protests do not tend to call the constitutional framework into question. | 3- |
| Consent to democracy is high (more than 70%). | 4- |
I. Democracy

| To what extent have social self-organization and the construction of social capital advanced? |

| Civic self-organization is only rudimentary. There is very little trust among the population. | 1 | 1+ |
| Self-organization in civil society encounters political, cultural, socioeconomic and other barriers, is unevenly distributed or spontaneous and temporary; there is relatively low trust among the population. | 2- | 2+ |
| There is a robust but heterogeneous web of autonomous, self-organized groups, associations and organizations, and solid trust among the population. | 3- | 3+ |
| There is a closely-knit web of autonomous, self-organized groups, associations and organizations, and a high level of trust among the population. | 4- | 4 |

Your rating:
II. Market Economy

The criteria for evaluating the transformation to a market economy must also be able to reflect the high variability of conditions and developments.

6. LEVEL OF SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are significant parts of the population fundamentally excluded from society due to poverty, gender, education, religion or ethnicity?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deep social exclusion fundamentally impedes participation in otherwise potentially functional market economies. For orientation, consult the UNDP’s Gender-related Development Index (GDI), the absolute poverty ratio, and the Gini coefficient. Please take into account the scope of the subsistence economy, as the population share dependent on subsistence production tends to be excluded from market-based socioeconomic development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social exclusion is quantitatively and qualitatively extensive and structurally ingrained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social exclusion is quantitatively and qualitatively rather marked and to some degree structurally ingrained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social exclusion is quantitatively and qualitatively limited and structurally not very ingrained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social exclusion is quantitatively and qualitatively minor and not structurally ingrained.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your rating: 

---

In principle, the country’s level of development permits adequate freedom of choice for all citizens.
II. Market Economy

7. Organization of the Market and Competition

There are clear rules of the game for stable market-based competition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what level have the fundamentals of market-based competition developed?</th>
<th>7.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market competition is present only in segments and has little institutional framework. There are no uniform rules of the game for market participants, along with strong state intervention, regulation and definition of the economy. The informal sector is large and substantial.</td>
<td>1 1+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market competition operates under a weak institutional framework. Apart from strategic sectors it rather takes the form of “spontaneous” barter capitalism (bazaar capitalism, the informal sector), and there are only sporadically uniform rules of the game for all market participants, along with substantial state intervention and control of strategic sectors.</td>
<td>2-2 2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market competition has a strong institutional framework, but the rules of the game are not consistent or always uniform for all market participants. The informal sector exists but plays a minor role.</td>
<td>3-3 3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macroeconomically and microeconomically clearly defined, and state-guaranteed rules of the game for market competition, with largely equal opportunities for all market participants (no discrimination); the role of the state is limited to guaranteeing compliance with the rules.</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are monopolies avoided or combated?</th>
<th>7.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formation of monopolies and oligopolies is neither regulated nor impeded.</td>
<td>1 1+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation of monopolies and oligopolies is regulated only occasionally.</td>
<td>2-2 2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation of monopolies and oligopolies is regulated inconsistently.</td>
<td>3-3 3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a coherent and effective anti-monopoly policy supported by trade policies which are consistent with non-discrimination principles.</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**
II. Market Economy

### To what extent has the liberalization of foreign trade evolved?

*Slower liberalization of foreign trade can be taken into account in the assessment if a shock policy would otherwise annihilate domestic industries or companies.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Your rating:</th>
<th>7.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign trade is largely state-supervised or controlled—extensive dissociation from the world market.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign trade follows non-discrimination principles (Most Favored Nation treatment, national treatment) in form, but is greatly distorted by state regulation, special rules, tariff barriers, etc.—selective integration into the world market.</td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign trade is liberalized in principle, but there are still significant exceptions including differentiated tariffs and special rules for individual companies or sectors.</td>
<td>3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign trade is mostly liberalized, with uniform, low tariffs and no fundamental state intervention in free trade.</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Are the foundations laid for a banking system and a capital market?

*International standards of banking systems are defined by the Basel Accords ([http://www.bis.org](http://www.bis.org)).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Your rating:</th>
<th>7.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banks are largely state-owned or state-controlled; there is no capital market.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The banking system and capital market are poorly differentiated, with inadequate regulation and supervision.</td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The banking system and capital market are differentiated, internationally competitive and oriented in principle to international standards, but they are vulnerable to severe fluctuations due to extreme dependence on outside factors and a de facto lack of supervision.</td>
<td>3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The institutional foundations are laid for a solid banking system oriented toward international standards, with functional banking supervision, minimum capital requirements, and market discipline. Capital markets are open to domestic and foreign capital, with sufficient resilience to cope with speculative investment.</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II. Market Economy

8. Stability of currency and prices

There are institutional or political precautions to control inflation sustainably, together with an appropriate foreign-exchange policy.

Does the country pursue a consistent inflation policy and an appropriate foreign-exchange policy? Is there an independent central bank?

*Note on inflation control:* Account should be taken not only of the absolute level of inflation, but also of its volatility over time, which in some cases may trigger greater uncertainty in expectations among economic players.

*Foreign-exchange policy:* Local currencies are still frequently pegged to a foreign currency (USD). In such cases, monetary policies are determined by exchange rate targeting and therefore the sustainability of an exchange-driven monetary policy should be evaluated. The same will then apply to the role of the central bank.

Controlling inflation is not one of the parameters of the economic order, system or policy; foreign-exchange policy is subject to manipulation for state or political reasons.

Controlling inflation is a component of the economic system in principle, but is subordinated to other goals both institutionally and politically. Foreign-exchange policy is essentially used for political purposes.

Controlling inflation and an appropriate foreign-exchange policy are recognized goals of economic policy, but have not been consistent over time and do not have an adequate institutional framework.

Inflation and foreign-exchange policies are brought into concert with other goals of economic policy, and are institutionalized in a largely independent central bank.

Your rating:

Do government authorities give signals to preserve macroeconomic stability, especially in fiscal and debt policy?

There are neither political nor institutional elements of a state policy for stability.

There are serious problems with setting objectives and achieving a consistent policy for stability.

There is a form of "culture" of a policy for stability, but without institutional safeguards for the future and thus with the risk of populist policy changes.

There is a consistent policy for stability, supported in part by institutional (self-) constraints. States may accept voluntary limits under the constitution or through international treaties, and tie their hands in regard to domestic lobby groups.

Your rating:
II. Market Economy

9. Private property

There are adequate conditions to support a functional private sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do government authorities ensure well-defined rights of private property and regulate the acquisition of property?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Property rights and the regulation of the acquisition of property are not defined in law and are extremely vulnerable to the whim of the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property rights and the regulation of the acquisition of property are defined formally in law, but not consistently implemented and not adequately safeguarded by law, especially against state intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property rights and the regulation of the acquisition of property are well defined in principle, but there are problems with implementation under the rule of law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property rights and the regulation of the acquisition of property are well defined in terms of acquisition, benefits, use, sale; they are limited solely by basic liberal rights.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your rating:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are private companies permitted, and are state companies undergoing a process of privatization consistent with market principles?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private companies are permitted at most as exclusive enclaves. Otherwise the state dominates the economic system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private companies can act freely in principle, but encounter economic, political or social barriers to development; state companies or monopolies dominate the strategic business sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private companies represent the backbone of the economy, but there are still state companies, and strong market concentrations such as oligopolies; concentration of market power is tolerated by the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private companies are viewed institutionally as the primary engines of economic production, and are given appropriate legal safeguards. Any pending privatization of state companies proceeds under criteria of medium-term profitability to the national economy, and consistently with other market principles, especially the avoidance of oligopolies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your rating:
10. WELFARE REGIME

Viable arrangements to provide adjustments to compensate for the social effects of the capitalist economic system.

Do social safety nets exist to compensate for poverty and other risks such as old age, illness, unemployment or disability?

Social safety nets may be organized by the state or by society (private welfare institutions), and comprise a variable welfare mix. They are ultimately intended to ensure inclusion of almost everyone in economic life. Pension systems may be organized as pay-as-you-go and/or capital funded schemes. International best practice is characterized by a comprehensive pay-as-you-go scheme combined with an increasing scope of funded schemes.

The concept of a social safety net is also used here to include functional equivalents to more formal compensation for social risk in countries that do not or cannot have rudimentary or advanced versions of a welfare state such as exists in the industrialized nations or advanced transformation countries. Thus, the social safety net may also comprise family, clan or village structures if these can provide viable compensation on a broad scale for risks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>There are no state or societal measures for inclusion or compensation. Poverty is combated hardly at all, only ad hoc. Health care is deficient for broad segments of the population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Rudimentary measures to avert social risks exist, but are extremely segmented in terms of territory, social stratum and sector. The country cannot combat poverty systematically on its own.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Social networks are well developed in part, but do not cover all risks for all strata of the population. Considerable portions of the population are still at risk of poverty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>There is a solid network to compensate for social risks, especially nationwide health care and well-focused prevention of poverty.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your rating:

To what extent does equality of opportunity exist?

The question about equal opportunity is directed at finding out to what extent individuals have equal job opportunities regardless of their social background. State initiatives - such as access to public services, especially education, and assistance mechanisms - play a central role.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>There are no institutions to compensate for gross social differences. Women have only very limited access to education, public office, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>There are institutions to compensate for gross social differences, but they are limited in scope and quality. Women have limited access to education, public office, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>There are a number of institutions to compensate for gross social differences, however insufficient. Women have significant access to higher education, public office, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>There are sufficient institutions to compensate for gross social differences. Women have equal access to higher education, public office, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your rating:
## 11. Economic Strength

The strength of the economy points to solid growth.

**How does the economy, as measured in quantitative indicators, perform?**

The output strength of the economy should be evaluated using pertinent economic data in relation to the economy’s level of development (GDP growth per capita; inflation; employment; budget balance; debt; trade balance).

Where possible, data should also take into account the economy’s potential for growth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Growth of per-capita GDP</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per-capita GDP is stagnant. It is associated with strongly negative macroeconomic data spinning out of control. These may include inadequate employment levels, high inflation, large budget deficits, unreasonably high debt and an extremely unfavorable trade balance.</td>
<td>1+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stagnant</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per-capita GDP is stagnant. It is associated with continuing negative macroeconomic data which on the whole are apparently only under shaky control. These may include relatively moderate employment levels, low price stability, an inadequately balanced budget, rising debt and an unfavorable trade balance.</td>
<td>2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth of per-capita GDP is low. It is associated with only moderately positive macroeconomic data, but these seem, on balance, controllable. The data may include unsatisfactory employment levels, relative price stability, problems balancing the budget, a tendency toward debt and a fluctuating trade balance.</td>
<td>3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth of per-capita GDP is relatively high. It is associated with positive or controllable macroeconomic data. These may include relatively high employment levels, price stability, balanced budget, reasonable debt and a favorable trade balance.</td>
<td>4+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Your rating:*
12. **Sustainability**

Economic growth is balanced, ecologically compatible and oriented to the future. High priority is attached to education, research and development, and environmental protection.

**To what extent are environmental concerns taken into account macro- and micro-economically?**

"Sustainability" here assesses the avoidance or restraint of specific forms of market failure such as externalization of costs, inadequate time horizons or exclusion from market processes. It should be borne in mind that also a deeply ingrained awareness of the environment or nature may serve also as a functional equivalent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Ecological concerns are entirely subordinate to growth efforts and have no institutional framework.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-</td>
<td>Ecologically compatible growth receives only sporadic consideration and has almost no institutional framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-</td>
<td>Ecologically compatible growth is taken into account in important portions of economic life, but tends to be subordinated to growth efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-</td>
<td>Ecologically compatible growth, especially avoiding the externalization of costs, is taken institutionally into account in both macro- and micro-economics, and by complying with international agreements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**

**To what extent are there solid institutions for basic and advanced education, as well as for research and development? Is there a modern infrastructure?**

Apart from quantitative parameters (in percentage of GDP), quality of spending on education should also be taken into account, as should the available long-term infrastructure and its quality. Consideration should be given to the possible combination of state, private and possibly international forms of organization. Unlike question 10.2 above, this question is concerned not with individual opportunities for equal education, but with the factor of human capital in general.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Only the lower levels of institutions for education, training and research and development exist; private institutions are weak. Quantitatively and/or qualitatively, investment in education and training, research and development is very low.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-</td>
<td>Institutions for education, training and research and development are present in significant segments, but remain very inconsistent on the whole, with important deficits in research and development. Quantitatively and/or qualitatively, investment in education and training, research and development is rather low.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-</td>
<td>Both state and private institutions for education, training and research and development are strong and in some cases quite advanced. Quantitatively and/or qualitatively, investment in education and training, research and development is average.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-</td>
<td>The state and private sector ensure a nationwide system of education and training, a dynamic research and technology sector, and a viable infrastructure. Quantitatively and/or qualitatively, investment in education and training, research and development is above average.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**
III. Management

Please substantiate your assessments with empirical evidence.

The term “political leadership” refers to the political elite, i.e. to those politicians or political actors who have the power and responsibility to shape or determine the political affairs of a society. Where necessary, questions refer to more specific actors such as the government or the reformers.

Your analysis and ratings should refer to the country’s political leadership during the period from 1 January 2003 to 31 January 2005. This implies that ratings should reflect the performance of different governments if there was a change of government during the period of investigation.

13. LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY

**Are there severe structural difficulties that constrain the political leadership’s governance capacity?**

Management performance may be limited by given structural constraints that do not result from the current political leadership’s actions and can not be swiftly overcome by the current leadership. Among these constraints are extreme poverty, the lack of an educated labor force, severe infrastructural deficiencies, natural disasters or pandemic HIV/AIDS infections.

While the level of difficulty will also be calculated from quantitative indicators reflecting these constraints, you should describe the country-specific profile of structural constraints.

| The structural constraints on governance are low. | 1 1+ |
| The structural constraints on governance are moderate. | 2 2+ |
| The structural constraints on governance are high. | 3 3+ |
| The structural constraints on governance are massive. | 4 4+ |

**Your rating:**

---

**Are there traditions of a civil society?**

Indicators of civil-society traditions are the long-term presence of public or civic engagement, numerous and active NGOs, trust in institutions, social trust, and a civic culture of moderate participation in public life.

| Strong traditions of civil society | 1 1+ |
| Moderate traditions of civil society | 2 2+ |
| Weak traditions of civil society | 3 3+ |
| No traditions of civil society | 4 4+ |

**Your rating:**
III. Management

### How serious are ethnic, religious and social conflicts?

*Indicators of conflict intensity are the confrontational nature of politics, the polarization and split of society along one or several cleavages, the mobilization of large groups of the population and the use and spread of violence.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No irreconcilable ethnic, religious or social cleavages.</td>
<td>1+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society and political elite are polarized along ethnic, religious or social differences. Radical political actors are increasingly successful in mobilizing ethnic, religious or social groups.</td>
<td>2-2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society and political elite are deeply split into social classes, ethnic or religious communities. Mobilized groups and protest movements dominate politics, violent incidents occur.</td>
<td>3-3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socially, ethnically or religiously based, widespread violent conflicts, civil war.</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your rating: 

---

### Per capita GNI PPP (2003)

13.4

### UN Education Index as a measure of a country’s education level

13.5

### Stateness and Rule of Law (Average of BTI Criteria Scores)

13.6

---

#### 14. Steering capability

The political leadership manages reforms effectively and can achieve its policy priorities.

### Does the political leadership set and maintain strategic priorities?

*This question measures three aspects of steering capability: first, whether the political leadership can prioritize and organize its policies according to strategic aims, i.e. whether policy-making is informed by a longer-term perspective going beyond immediate concerns of political competition; second, whether policy aims and objectives correspond to the normative points of reference guiding the BTI: constitutional democracy and socially responsible market economy; and third, whether strategic priorities are maintained over periods of crisis and stalemate.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership is not able to act with a long-term perspective or in the country’s prospective interests. The leadership’s activities are characterized by <em>ad hoc</em> measures, a lack of guiding concepts, and maximization of short-term political benefit, with no recognizable prioritization.</td>
<td>1+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership claims to pursue long-term aims, but these are regularly replaced by short-term interests of political bargaining and office-seeking. If long-term goals are pursued, they do not correspond to democracy and/or a market economy.</td>
<td>2-2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership pursues long-term aims, but it sometimes postpones them in favor of short-term political benefits. The leadership seeks to build democracy and a market economy, but its strategic aims are not related to the country’s situation, problems and needs.</td>
<td>3-3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership is committed to constitutional democracy and socially responsible market economy. Its policies give these goals priority over short-term expediency.</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your rating: 

---
### III. Management

#### Does the government implement its reform policy effectively?

This question examines the extent to which the government has been able to achieve its own reform goals. “Reform” means activities by the executive that aim at structural, qualitative changes in the political, economic or social system in order to make progress in development and transformation on the way to democracy and a market economy. Reforms refer to policy areas that are crucial for the functioning of democracy and a market economy, as understood by the BTI. The question focuses on the government, i.e. the executive including the administration and the cabinet.

If an autocratic government implements market reforms effectively but refrains from implementing democratic reforms, it should be rated with scores between 2- and 2+.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1+</td>
<td>No reform policy exists, nor are there plans for any.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-</td>
<td>The government seeks to achieve reforms, but fails to implement most of them. Or: Reforms are effective but limited to either a market economy or democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2+</td>
<td>The government is committed to democracy and a market economy, but has had only limited success in implementing its announced reforms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-</td>
<td>The government can largely achieve its reform goals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your rating: 

#### Does the political leadership act flexibly? Are leading political actors capable of learning and policy innovation?

Flexibility, learning and policy innovation presuppose that leading political actors are able to recognize when (and to concede that) their previous policy has failed. A change in policy might have to be imposed against the interests of stakeholders who profited from the former policy.

Innovative policies are understood as the result of a learning process that extends beyond mere changes in policy outputs to include basic beliefs that guide policy formulation. These beliefs are part of an actor’s identity, and shape the routines of policy perception and policy formulation.

Flexibility means the ability of political actors to appraise their own political leeway accurately, and to recognize and utilize the developmental opportunities inherent in a given political situation. This ability is to be evaluated by assessing how reformers choose their tools and strategies, and how they organize and sequence reforms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1+</td>
<td>The political leadership insists on an obviously mistaken and harmful policy, whether for reasons of ideology or to stay in power. Reforms are not undertaken or blocked regardless of their effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-</td>
<td>The political leadership shows little willingness and ability to learn. Policies are rigidly enforced, and the routines of policy making do not enable innovative approaches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2+</td>
<td>The political leadership responds to mistakes and failed policies with changes, but its policy frequently remains stuck in the same routines. Learning processes occur, but rarely affect the knowledge base or cognitive framework on which policies are based.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-</td>
<td>The political leadership demonstrates its ability of complex learning, acts flexibly and can replace failed policies with innovative ones.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your rating: 

---

Your rating:
III. Management

15. Resource efficiency

The government makes optimum use of available resources.

Does the government make efficient use of available economic and human resources?

Resources mean personnel, funding and the organizational and legal tools of the state. Evaluations should be based on as many of the following individual indicators as possible, which should also be used in the explanations.

Indicators of efficient use of government administrative personnel include personnel expenses relative to the services offered by the state, the number of politically motivated dismissals and new appointments of public servants, and the existence of competitive recruiting procedures protected against political influences.

Indicators of efficient use of budget resources include balanced state budgets, a manageable level of state debt, effective auditing, and transparent planning and implementation of the state budget. Low deviation of actual budget expenditures from the associated planned expenditures is a possible quantitative indicator.

Indicators of efficient administrative organization include public administration that enables effective management under criteria of professional rationality; "responsible" decentralization, i.e., establishing local self-government with legal and financial autonomy, backed by arrangements for public review of its activities, and the presence of procedures and institutions to reform and modernize public administration.

The government wastes state resources (human, financial and organizational), or the elites consume most state resources themselves.

The government uses only some of the available resources efficiently.

The government uses most available resources efficiently.

The government generally makes efficient use of available human, financial and organizational resources.

Your rating:
### Can the government coordinate conflicting objectives into a coherent policy?

Policy coordination constitutes a key task of leading politicians and officials in government. As many policies have conflicting objectives, reflect competing political interests and affect other policies, the government leadership has to ensure that its overall policy is coherent. Trade-offs between policy goals should be well-balanced and the functional segmentation of the state administration should be moderated by horizontal forms of coordination.

Coordination also entails avoiding redundancies (overlap among different government branches) and lacunae. Various coordination styles – hierarchic-bureaucratic, informal-network, personalist, centralized, decentralized etc. – are possible and may be functionally equivalent. What matters is their impact on policy coherence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The government does not care about policy coordination or fails to coordinate its conflicting objectives and interests. Its policies thwart and damage each other; policy incoherence causes substantial problems. The executive is fragmented into rival fiefdoms that counteract each other.</td>
<td>1-1+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government frequently fails to coordinate between conflicting objectives or interests. Different parts of the government tend to compete among each other, and some policies have counterproductive effects on other policies.</td>
<td>2-2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government tries to coordinate conflicting objectives and interests, but it has only limited success. Intra-governmental friction, redundancies and lacunae are significant.</td>
<td>3-3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government coordinates its policies effectively and acts in a coherent manner.</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Can the government curb corruption successfully?

An important indicator of the effective use of resources is a successful fight against corruption. Success is made possible because the government performs and ensures the following tasks to improve integrity (“integrity mechanisms”): review of state spending policies by parliament and independent institutions; regulation of party financing and of citizens’ access to information; accountability of officeholders (asset declarations, conflict of interest rules, codes of ethical conduct) and a transparent public procurement system; effective prosecution of corruption.

Large portions of the state are controlled by private interest groups (state capture); resources of the state are distributed on the basis of patronage networks; corruption is a fundamental characteristic of the administrative and state culture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large portions of the state are controlled by private interest groups (state capture); resources of the state are distributed on the basis of patronage networks; corruption is a fundamental characteristic of the administrative and state culture.</td>
<td>1-1+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some mechanisms ensuring integrity are effective; others do not work. The government does not attempt to provide those that are lacking.</td>
<td>2-2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government seeks to provide all integrity mechanisms. Most integrity mechanisms are functioning.</td>
<td>3-3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All integrity mechanisms are working and are supported or respected by the government.</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 16. Consensus-building

The political leadership establishes a broad consensus about reform with other actors in society, without sacrificing its reform goals.

### Do the major political actors agree on a market economy and democracy as strategic, long-term aims?

This question is intended to check whether there is a basic consensus about the goal of development and transformation. The major political actors are parties, politicians, interest groups and economic actors with political clout, whose power and importance (number of voters, jobs, financial resources, authority, influence, etc.) are relevant to the course of the political process. This question also reflects the experience that many successful transformations are based on agreements reached by reform-minded political actors with old elites or potential opponents of reform.

| 16.1 | There are no major political actors who want to build a market-based democracy. | 1 + |
|  | The major political actors have differences of principle about the goal of development/transformation. There is a fundamental conflict over both a market economy and democracy as goals. | 2 - 2+ |
|  | The major political actors agree on at least one of the goals (market economy or democracy). Or: there is a rudimentary consensus about both goals, but it appears fragile or does not include major elements of a market-based democracy. | 3 - 3+ |
|  | All major political actors agree on building a market-based democracy. | 4 - 4+ |
| **Your rating:** | | |

### Can the reformers exclude or co-opt anti-democratic veto actors?

This evaluation is directed at anti-democratic actors with veto power among the potential opponents of reform—in other words, those actors who can cause the democratization process to stall or fail. These might include the military, large landowners, powerful opposition groups, or anti-democratic economic actors.

Reformers can often be located in or close to the government, but may also be in opposition to a government or a ruling elite. A successful reform policy is able to eliminate the veto power of anti-democratic actors, induce them to comply permanently with constitutional rules, or develop a basic consensus with them.

| 16.2 | There are no relevant political actors who would advance economic, political and social reforms. | 1 + |
|  | Reformers have no control over the actors with veto powers, who can terminate the reform process at any time or make active use of their influence to stall it. | 2 - 2+ |
|  | Reformers cannot control all veto actors, but can at least significantly limit the use of their powers. | 3 - 3+ |
|  | The reformers can successfully and permanently exclude or co-opt all veto actors. | 4 - 4+ |
| **Your rating:** | | |
III. Management

Can the political leadership manage political cleavages so that they do not escalate into irreconcilable conflicts?

Cleavages are significant and protracted divisions of society that are often, but not necessarily reflected in the party system. Cleavages may be manifested in ethnic, class, regional or religious conflicts. Good governance must prevent society from falling apart along these cleavages, depolarize structural conflicts, and establish as broad a consensus as possible across the dividing lines.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The political leadership exacerbates existing cleavages to split society or the state.</th>
<th>1+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership does not undertake anything to reduce existing divisions or to prevent cleavage-based conflicts from escalating.</td>
<td>2-2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Although the political leadership is trying to prevent cleavage-based conflicts from escalating, it cannot reduce existing divisions.</td>
<td>3-3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership successfully depolarizes conflict and expands consensus across the dividing lines.</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does the political leadership develop social capital among citizens and social groups?

Social capital is based upon the willingness of individual citizens and groups to perform services for others without making their own services dependent on direct and equivalent reciprocation. Such inter-personal trust can be considered a prerequisite for the accumulation of social capital, civic-mindedness and citizen engagement. These resources are important for sustainable development and transformation.

The stock of social capital is not predetermined by culture, but can be increased or decreased by political actors who actively encourage civic engagement and solidarity e.g. by decentralization or by supporting voluntary associations. The question is focused on the impact government policies and elite strategies exert on social capital in society.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The political leadership actively destroys social trust among groups and individuals. Its policies reject and suppress civic engagement; clientelist networks dominate politics and society.</th>
<th>1+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership does nothing to promote social capital and is indifferent with respect to the role of civic engagement and solidarity.</td>
<td>2-2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership tries to promote social capital, but fails to attain or strengthen inter-personal solidarity and civic engagement.</td>
<td>3-3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership successfully promotes and develops social capital among social groups and citizens.</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your rating:
### Does the political leadership enable the participation of civil society in the political process?

This question asks whether the political leadership involves civil society actors in the political debate, the identification of political goals/priorities and the formulation of policies. Civil society actors include civic, economic and professional interest associations, intellectuals, scientists, journalists and local political representatives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership suppresses and excludes civil society actors from the political process.</td>
<td>1+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership frequently ignores civil society actors and formulates its policy autonomously.</td>
<td>2-2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership takes into account and accommodates the interests of civil society actors.</td>
<td>3-3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership assigns a key role to civil society actors in deliberating and determining policies.</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**

### Can the political leadership bring about reconciliation between the victims and perpetrators of past injustices?

This question examines the extent to which a country’s leading political actors are able to address or overcome a conflict-laden past that is experienced as unjust, or at least to achieve moral justice for past acts of injustice. The goal of coping with the past is to obtain justice or reconciliation between former victims and perpetrators.

If a country has not experienced major historical injustices or has already achieved reconciliation prior to 2003 (e.g., Costa Rica), this question can not be answered meaningfully and is therefore not taken into account for the aggregate rating.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership manipulates memories of historical injustices as a weapon against political opponents.</td>
<td>1+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership does not address past acts of injustice and does not initiate a process of reconciliation.</td>
<td>2-2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership recognizes the need to deal with historical acts of injustice, but the process of reconciliation fails.</td>
<td>3-3+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership achieves reconciliation for historical acts of injustice.</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**
17. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The country’s political actors are willing to cooperate with outside supporters and organizations.

**Does the political leadership use the support of international partners to improve its domestic reform policies?**

This question evaluates the extent to which the political leadership make use of international assistance—major projects involving technical or personal cooperation—in their reform policies. The focus is on the ability to learn from international know-how, to adapt external advice to domestic realities and to integrate international assistance into the domestic agenda of reforms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The political leadership rejects cooperation with bilateral or multilateral international donors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+</td>
<td>Although the political leadership cooperates with individual bilateral or multilateral international donors, it considers external advice as undesired political interference and does not use international aid to improve its policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2+</td>
<td>The political leadership works with bilateral or multilateral international donors and tries to make use of international assistance, but this does not facilitate significant policy learning and improvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-3+</td>
<td>The political leadership makes well-focused use of international aid for the needs of transformation, and demonstrates a substantial ability to learn or to utilize international assistance for its domestic policy agenda.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**

**Does the government act as a credible and reliable partner in its relations with the international community?**

This question asks whether the government is able to increase confidence in its country and to build confidence for its reform policies on the way to a market-based democracy. Credibility and reliability should be assessed in view of such policies, whereas policies not related to democratic and market reforms (e.g. a reliable cooperation in international military alliances or peace missions) should not be considered. Apart from the government’s confidence-building activities, one should examine the extent to which the government is considered a reliable partner by international organizations, other states, foreign investors or international NGOs. Commercial risk ratings may be used to answer this question.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The government acts unpredictably, without regard for the international community. Cooperating with the state entails major risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+</td>
<td>The government tries to present itself as a credible partner, but it is not trusted by the international community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2+</td>
<td>The government tries to act as a credible and reliable partner, but major international actors still express doubts regarding its reliability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-3+</td>
<td>The government is considered credible and reliable by the international community.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**
Is the political leadership willing to cooperate with neighboring countries in regional and international organizations?

*This concerns domestic political actors’ willingness to develop good neighborly relations, to cooperate with neighbors in international and regional organizations and to support regional or international integration.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The political leadership rejects all international cooperation or destroys existing cooperative relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-</td>
<td>The political leadership cooperates selectively or sporadically with individual neighboring states and is reluctant to accept the rules set by regional and international organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-</td>
<td>The political leadership cooperates with many neighboring states and complies with the rules set by regional and international organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-</td>
<td>The political leadership actively and successfully builds and expands as many cooperative international relationships as possible. It promotes regional and international integration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your rating:
IV. Trends in Development

In this dimension, the trajectory of democracy and market economy over the past four years (2001-2004) is assessed. The questions have been intentionally kept general, and are based closely on the criteria in sections I and II of the manual. Since this dimension covers only the evolution in the past four years, countries that have begun the process and still have a long transformation ahead will tend to have greater relative achievements, and therefore somewhat better evaluations, than advanced transformation countries.

18. Democratic development

The political regime increasingly meets the minimum requirements for a democracy under the rule of law, or is moving in that direction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have stateness, political participation and the rule of law changed significantly?</th>
<th>18.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stateness, political participation and the rule of law have on the whole deteriorated sharply.</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateness, political participation and the rule of law have deteriorated significantly in some segments (erosion of the state’s monopoly on the use of force, curtailment of free and fair elections, curtailment of rule of law, and the like).</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateness, political participation and the rule of law have remained at their former levels of quality.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateness, political participation and the rule of law have improved substantially in some segments.</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateness, political participation and the rule of law have improved sharply across a broad front.</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your rating:
### IV. Trends in Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have institutional stability as well as political and social integration improved appreciably, thus further stabilizing the overall democratic framework and leading to its consolidation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy has grown far less consolidated in terms of both institutional stability, and political and social integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy has grown substantially less consolidated in some segments in terms of stability and integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The level of consolidation of democracy has not changed significantly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy has become substantially more consolidated in some aspects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy has become much more consolidated on the whole.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**

### 19. Market economy development

The country has made progress concerning its level of development, its economic order, and/or its economic performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has the country’s level of socioeconomic development changed appreciably?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The country’s level of development has declined drastically in the past five years (HDI change below −0.025).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The country’s level of development has declined in the past five years (HDI change −0.025 &lt; x &lt; 0.000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The country’s level of development has not changed in the past five years (HDI change 0.000 &lt; x &lt; +0.010).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The country’s level of development has improved slightly in the past five years (HDI change 0.010 &lt; x &lt; +0.030).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The country’s level of development has improved greatly in the past five years (HDI change &gt; 0.030).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**
### IV. Trends in Development

**Has the institutional framework for market-based action improved or deteriorated overall?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The institutional framework has deteriorated severely, affecting the entire economic regime (e.g., severe restriction of important segments of the economic order).</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The institutional framework has deteriorated appreciably in some segments of the economic order (restriction of some segments).</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The institutional framework has not changed significantly.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The institutional framework has improved (e.g., safeguards of property rights and similar factors).</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The institutional framework has improved sharply in a number of segments of the economic order.</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**

---

**Have there been quantitative and/or qualitative leaps in economic development?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall economic development has deteriorated severely, both quantitatively and qualitatively (declining growth, sustainability compromised).</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall economic development has deteriorated quantitatively or qualitatively.</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall economic development has essentially stagnated during the period, both quantitatively and qualitatively (growth below 0.5%, no changes in status of sustainability).</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall economic development has improved both quantitatively (growth more than 1%) and qualitatively.</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall economic development has improved greatly, both quantitatively (growth more than 4%) and qualitatively.</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Your rating:**
### Summary of scores

#### Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 To what extent does the state’s monopoly on the use of force cover the entire territory?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Is there fundamental agreement about which people qualify as citizens of the state?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Do the state and its legal order function without interference from religious or church authorities (‘separation of church and state’)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Do working administrative structures exist?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 To what extent are rulers determined by general, free and fair elections?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Do democratically elected rulers have the effective power to govern, or are there veto powers and political enclaves?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 To what extent can independent political and/or civic groups associate and assemble freely?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 To what extent can citizens, organizations and the mass media express opinions freely?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Is there a working separation of powers (checks and balances)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Does an independent judiciary exist?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Are there legal or political penalties for officeholders who abuse their positions?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.4 To what extent do civil liberties exist and to what extent can citizens seek redress for violations of these liberties?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Are democratic institutions, including the administrative system and the system of justice, capable of performing?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 To what extent are democratic institutions accepted or supported by the relevant actors?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 To what extent is there a stable, moderate, socially-rooted party system to articulate and aggregate societal interests?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 To what extent is there a network of cooperative associations or interest groups to mediate between society and the political system?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 How strong is the citizens’ consent to democratic norms and procedures?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 To what extent have social self-organization and the construction of social capital advanced?</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Market economy

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<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Are significant parts of the population fundamentally excluded from society due to poverty, gender, education, religion or ethnicity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>To what level have the fundamentals of market-based competition developed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Are monopolies avoided or combated?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>To what extent has the liberalization of foreign trade evolved?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Are the foundations laid for a banking system and a capital market?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Does the country pursue a consistent inflation policy and an appropriate foreign-exchange policy? Is there an independent central bank?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Do government authorities give signals to preserve macroeconomic stability, especially in fiscal and debt policy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>Do government authorities ensure well-defined rights of private property and regulate the acquisition of property?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>Are private companies permitted, and are state companies undergoing a process of privatization consistent with market principles?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>Do social safety nets exist to compensate for poverty and other risks such as old age, illness, unemployment or disability?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>To what extent does equality of opportunity exist?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>How does the economy, as measured in quantitative indicators, perform?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>To what extent are environmental concerns taken into account macro- and micro-economically?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>To what extent are there solid institutions for basic and advanced education as well as for research and development? Is there a modern infrastructure?</td>
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### Management

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<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>Are there severe structural difficulties that constrain the political leadership’s governance capacity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>Are there traditions of a civil society?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>How serious are ethnic, religious and social conflicts?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>Per capita GNI PPP (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>UN Education Index as a measure of a country’s education level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>Stateness and Rule of Law (Average of BTI Criteria Scores)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>Does the political leadership set and maintain strategic priorities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>Does the government implement its reform policy effectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>Does the political leadership act flexibly? Are leading political actors capable of learning and policy innovation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>Does the government make efficient use of available economic and human resources?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>Can the government coordinate conflicting objectives into a coherent policy?</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>Can the government curb corruption successfully?</td>
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### Summary of Scores

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<tr>
<td>16.1 Do the major political actors agree on market economy and democracy as strategic, long-term aims?</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.2 Can the reformers exclude or co-opt anti-democratic veto actors?</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.3 Can the political leadership manage political cleavages so that they do not escalate into irreconcilable conflicts?</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.4 Does the political leadership develop social capital among citizens and social groups?</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.5 Does the political leadership enable the participation of civil society in the political process?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.6 Can the political leadership bring about a reconciliation between the victims and perpetrators of past injustices?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.1 Does the political leadership use the support of international partners to improve their domestic reform policies?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.2 Does the government act as a credible and reliable partner in its relations with the international community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.3 Is the political leadership willing to cooperate with neighboring countries in regional and international organizations?</td>
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### Trends in development

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<table>
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<tr>
<td>18.1 Have stateness, political participation and the rule of law changed significantly?</td>
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<tr>
<td>18.2 Have institutional stability as well as political and social integration improved appreciably, thus further stabilizing the overall democratic framework and leading to its consolidation?</td>
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<tr>
<td>19.1 Has the country’s level of socioeconomic development changed appreciably?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.2 Has the institutional framework for market-based action improved or deteriorated overall?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.3 Have there been quantitative and/or qualitative leaps in economic development?</td>
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Questions on the political system

The following questions serve to collect basic and comparable information on the political system of the country you have analyzed. Your data will be published in a table that is added to the management assessment of the country report. These data will enable readers to better contextualize the management assessments you have made.

Please mark the right column with y (‘yes’) or n (‘no’), if not stated otherwise.

**DEMOCRACY vs. AUTOCRACY**

1. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?  
   - y

2. Is the executive subject to a minimum of democratic checks and balances?  
   - y

**PRESIDENTIAL – SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL – PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT**

3. Is the head of government also head of state?  
   - y

   *If question 3 = ‘y’, continue with question 4-5; if question 3 = ‘n’, go to question 6-7*

4. Is the head of government and state popularly elected?  
   - y

5. Is the head of government and state accountable to the legislature?  
   - y

   *Go to question 8*

6. Is the head of state popularly elected?  
   - y

7. Is the head of government accountable to the legislature?  
   - y

**LEGISLATURE**

8. Please give the distribution of votes and parliamentary mandates  
   (based upon the most recent elections, first chamber, national list, descending according to size)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of parliamentary election</th>
<th>Name of party (in English)</th>
<th>acronym</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
<th>% of mandates</th>
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</table>
9. Please list the changes of cabinets between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2004

A cabinet is defined by the same prime minister continuously in office, the same party or parties in government and the same legislative period. The following modes of termination should be distinguished: elections = 1; resignation of the prime minister = 2; death of prime minister = 3; dissension within cabinet (coalition breaks up) = 4; lack of parliamentary support = 5; intervention by head of state = 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>parties in government (acronyms)</th>
<th>name of prime minister</th>
<th>mode of termination</th>
<th>duration (m/y – m/y)</th>
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10. How many ministries existed on 1 January 2005?

11. How many ministers participated in the cabinet on 1 January 2005?

---

**Institutional Constraints on Executive Authority**

12. Is the state organized as a federation?  
   y

13. Do subnational governments have substantial power and autonomy?  
   y

14. Does a second chamber have an equal role in legislation?  
   y

15. Is constitutional reform difficult (e.g. requiring a qualified majority)?  
   y

16. Are referenda on political issues frequent and influential for the political process?  
   y

17. Is legislation reviewed by a constitutional or other courts?  
   y