Transformation Index
of the Bertelsmann Stiftung 2010

BTI 2010 Manual for Country Assessments

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Foreword

Welcome to the Transformation Index (BTI) 2010, the fourth survey of political, social and economic transformation around the world. Our goal is to contribute to the development of successful strategies for peaceful and sustainable transformation. Comprehensive in its approach, and with an emphasis on the quality of governance, the BTI has become a trusted and well-known measure of good governance for scholars and decision makers alike.

As experts on countries in transition, you are our most valuable asset; your knowledge is key to understanding and mapping the complex processes of transformation. We are glad to cooperate with you and highly appreciate your contribution to the BTI.

For those of you familiar with the BTI, there are only a few minor changes to note. With the addition of Kosovo and Lesotho, two more countries are included in the survey, so that 127 developing and transformation countries will be assessed in the BTI 2010. Furthermore, there have been some slight modifications in the wording of questions and criteria which will help to improve clarity and avoid misunderstandings.

As in the past, the BTI divides the world into seven regions. Each region is supervised by a regional coordinator with significant experience in his or her respective region. As your point of contact, your regional coordinator can provide support and answer any questions you might have about the BTI.

This manual contains and explains all the criteria and questions that will guide the country assessments for the BTI 2010. The aim of the manual is to ensure a common understanding of the BTI’s criteria, questions and concepts. This will facilitate comparable assessments, reliable and objective ratings and a transparent review process. The manual provides:

- Information on how to write your contribution and evaluate countries
- The research questions and evaluation levels structuring the country reports
- The questionnaire and evaluation sheets for the numerical country ratings.

This manual is intended to support you in your work as much as possible. Please do not hesitate to contact us or your regional coordinator with any questions you might have.

The BTI Team
Country assessment procedure

1 Assessment preparation

Please review this manual, which provides not only an overview of the BTI and its components, but also reference material essential to writing the country reports and assigning country ratings. The manual defines key concepts, explains the methodology and clarifies procedures. For more details regarding the BTI and its results, go to www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de. Material relevant to the assessment process (including this manual, a model country report, a style guide and other documents) is also available for download there. More information on assessment preparation can be found on page 6.

2 Writing your country report

The country report is intended to provide both a comprehensive narrative and substantive analysis of the state of transformation and management performance of political elites in your country. More on writing your report on page 7.

3 Assigning country ratings

Once you have written your country report, you will need to give scores that correlate to your assessments. There are a total of 49 questions requiring ratings; they are delineated in the questionnaire. More on ratings on page 11.

4 Submitting your assessment

Once you have completed the country report, the country ratings and the additional questions, please send them to your regional coordinator and to BTI Coordinator Olaf Hillenbrand. More on submission on page 13.

5 What happens after submission?

Assessments undergo a review and calibration process before going to print. For more on how individual assessments are processed to create the BTI, go to page 13.
**BTI Workflow**

**Country assessments**
2. Country ratings—numerical assessments of the state of transformation and management performance

**First review**
1. Each country report undergoes a process of blind review by a second country expert. The second expert also provides ratings for the country independent of the first expert’s ratings.
2. The regional coordinator reviews both experts’ ratings, the original report and the second expert’s review and comments.
3. Adjustments to the report and ratings may be made in consultation with the first country expert.

**Edit**
Country reports are entered into the database by the regional coordinators; report edits begin

**Intra-regional review & calibration**
Each regional coordinator reviews ratings in his or her region. Scores are calibrated to reflect differences among countries of the same region.

**Inter-regional review & calibration**
The regional coordinators convene and review ratings across regions. Scores are calibrated to reflect international differences and ensure global comparability.

**Ratings aggregated**
Ratings given for each question are aggregated to calculate the following scores for each country criteria individually: democracy status, market economy status, and management performance.

**Final review & calibration**
Final ratings are reviewed, calibrated if necessary and adopted by the BTI Board.

**Publications**
Dissemination of Status and Management Indices, country reports, further analyses and visualisation of the BTI results through:
- Book
- Internet
- Transformation Atlas
Assessment preparation

What is the Transformation Index?

Throughout the world, democracy and a market economy have become increasingly powerful models for societal sustainability. Successful processes of reform can be observed in every region of the globe. There are, however, no guarantees of success; many countries undergoing transformation face stagnation and power struggles or violence and even state failure. Good governance is pivotal to reform policies that work. What are the key decisions? What are the lessons to be learned from past experience? What strategies are likely to succeed? Under which conditions? The Transformation Index 2010 puts development and transformation policies to the test.

Advocating reforms aimed at supporting the development of a constitutional democracy and a socially responsible market economy, the BTI provides the framework for an exchange of best practices among agents of reform. Within this framework, the BTI publishes two rankings, the Status Index and the Management Index, both of which are based on in-depth assessments of 127 countries. The Status Index ranks the countries according to the state of their democracy and market economy, while the Management Index ranks them according to their respective leadership’s management performance. Distributed among the dimensions of democracy, market economy and management, a total of 17 criteria are subdivided into 49 questions.

BTI countries are selected according to the following criteria: They have yet to achieve a fully consolidated democracy and market economy, have populations of more than two million (excepting five states chosen as particularly interesting cases), and are recognized as sovereign states.

The Transformation Index project is jointly managed by the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Center for Applied Policy Research. More information is available at www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de.

Concepts of analysis and measurement

Constitutional democracy

The construction of the BTI and the questions set out in this manual are based on specific normative analytic concepts of democracy, a market economy and management. In contrast to minimalist definitions of electoral democracy, the BTI’s understanding of democracy includes the rule of law and the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers with checks and balances. Our concept of democratic transformation reflects the extent to which a democratic order is consolidated in terms of acceptance, interest representation and political culture. Thus we seek to assess the extent to which the ground rules of democracy are both established and accepted within society. Assessing these elements of democracy may be difficult or impossible in an authoritarian political system, which we define as lacking free and fair elections and/or a minimum of checks and balances to control executive power. Individual democracy questions indicate whether and how to assess elements of democracy under authoritarian conditions.

Because we consider the cohesion and identity of a state a necessary condition for the sustainability of democracy, the BTI combines the democracy assessment with an assessment of the country’s stateness. Transformation can be shaped profoundly by issues of stateness such as a contested state monopoly on the use of force, disputed nationhood, interfering religious dogmas or the absence of basic administrative infrastructures.
The underlying BTI concept of a market economy flanked by socio-political safeguards implies not only the existence of free markets and property rights, but also the principles of social justice, responsibility and sustainability. Because we consider democracy to be empirically and functionally interlinked with a market economy, we aggregate democracy and market economy ratings into a single Status Index and use the term market-based democracy. Constitutional democracy and a socially responsible market economy are goals but not necessarily direct priorities in the complex processes of development and transformation. In our understanding, development entails not only economic growth, but also the process of overcoming poverty while extending freedoms of action and choice to the largest possible share of the population. Transformation refers to comprehensive, politically managed social change from an authoritarian system toward a market-based democracy.

Since the BTI views leading political actors as crucial to development and transformation, their management performance is examined and compared more closely in a separate ranking, the Management Index. Management here is defined as the performance, capacity and accountability of the political leadership, i.e., of those political actors who have the power and responsibility to shape or determine public policy in a society. These actors include not only governments and political elites, but also nongovernmental organizations that can play an important role in transformation. Political leadership demonstrates good governance in BTI terms when it orients its policies toward the goals of a market-based democracy, manages development and transformation effectively, uses resources efficiently, builds a broad consensus on reform and cooperates with international partners.

2 Writing your country report

The country report needs to provide: (1) a comprehensive analysis of the state of transformation and its management in your country, and (2) a detailed but concise substantiation of this analysis. Authors are asked to provide as much country-specific detail as possible within a framework designed for standardization. Doing so allows for an in-depth analysis of governance within a specific country as well as international and longitudinal comparability.

Please sketch a holistic view of the state of affairs in the profile texts Executive Summary, History and Characteristics of Transformation, and Strategic Outlook. Substantiate, explain and justify why particular ratings are given to a country in your responses to the individual criteria and questions.


2. Please consult the model report on Peru. You can also draw upon the BTI 2008 country reports at www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de. Please make sure that your BTI 2010 report is carefully updated and reflects current developments.

3. The total length of your country report should be approximately 6500 words (20 pages, single-spaced, Times New Roman 12 pt).

4. Do not insert footnotes or bibliographical references.

5. Please use the template “CountryReport2010.doc”.
### Executive Summary
Identifies the key developments affecting your country’s democratic and economic transformation from 2007 to 2009.

### History and Characteristics
Maps the trajectory of transformation.

### Criteria Texts
Criteria texts should provide a precise overview of the state of transformation and management at the end of January 2009.

#### Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria Text</th>
<th>1.1</th>
<th>1.2</th>
<th>1.3</th>
<th>1.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stateness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability of Democratic Institutions</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and Social Integration</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Market Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria Text</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7.1</th>
<th>7.2</th>
<th>7.3</th>
<th>7.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of Socioeconomic Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of the Market/Competition</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency and Price Stability</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Property</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Regime</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Performance</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria Text</th>
<th>13.1</th>
<th>13.2</th>
<th>13.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of Difficulty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steering Capability</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Efficiency</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus-Building</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Cooperation</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Strategic Outlook
Identifies strategic policy recommendations for advocates of reform, domestic and external.
Executive Summary

Snapshot of current failures and successes. This text identifies the key developments within the period under review affecting the country’s course of democratic and economic reform. It should provide the reader with a vivid image of transformation in your country. There is no need to summarize all 17 criteria and 49 questions; focus instead on what you consider most important to the development of democracy and a market economy in your country from 2007 to 2009. Often the most difficult text to write, this one is best saved for last.

1. Start with key, illustrative points and show how they affect transformation and why they are so important.

2. Introducing too many points at the start will overwhelm and confuse most readers.

3. If you can condense several key issues into three or four concepts (e.g., talk about state failure rather than list a series of discrete points without context such as deficiencies in stateness, rule of law and the monopoly on the use of force) your reader is likely to read more.

History and Characteristics

Mapping the trajectory of transformation. This text outlines past developments in democratic and economic reform, beginning with the liberalization of the country’s past authoritarian regime. For countries that are currently autocracies, past regime changes or major political developments shaping the present situation may be described. Past market reforms and structural economic changes shaping the current state of affairs should also be sketched. The purpose here is not to provide a history of the country per se, but to set the scene for the Executive Summary and Strategic Outlook.

1. Where appropriate, you can use the entire text provided in the BTI 2008.

2. Key figures, parties, events or developments should be introduced here.

3. Be strategic about where to start your timeline. There is rarely a need to recapitulate a century of history.

Criteria Texts

The backbone: 17 criteria made up of 49 questions that measure the extent to which a country has transformed and its leadership manages transformation.

Your responses to the questions provided in the questionnaire should reflect the situation in your country at the end of January 2009. To ensure international and longitudinal comparability, responses must explain in concrete terms why or how a given aspect is (partially) met or not (e.g., How do state powers check and balance each other?). Exceptions, limiting circumstances or otherwise relevant information not explicitly addressed by the question are also appropriate here.

1. Most important: You must address each question of the questionnaire. Please follow this carefully when you draft the report. You are welcome to provide a short text at the start of each criterion that either introduces or summarizes the questions addressed.

2. The questionnaire provides four different response options for each question. You can use the wording of the most suitable option and adjust it to the situation in your country. Please substantiate your ratings with empirical evidence wherever possible.
3. Try to provide particularly rich evidence for the management dimension, as it is a distinctive feature of the BTI.

4. Level of detail: be judicious. Each question should warrant at least one salient example.

5. Avoid generalizations such as “a weak rule of law is one of the most important shortcomings in good governance.”

6. Refer to events, policies or decisions made during the period under review.

7. Do not substitute a response with a reference to another question.

Strategic Outlook

The Strategic Outlook text should facilitate dialogue on key challenges by suggesting policy strategies for actors (domestic and international). You are not expected to forecast trends, but make suggestions on how to confront or handle main problems. If your country is successfully advancing transformation, provide a suggestion on how to sustain and promote good strategies currently underway. There is no need to recap key problems or successes in detail; state these succinctly at first, moving quickly to your suggestions. Please avoid:

1. Talking about the past.

2. Generalizations such as “future trends are difficult to establish at this point.”

3. Stand-alone generalizations such as “reducing poverty is crucial to sustained economic transition”; follow this up with a suggestion for at least one aspect of poverty reduction.
Assigning country ratings

The questionnaire is made up of 49 questions for numerical rating. The rating scale for each question ranges from 10 (best) to 1 (worst) and is subdivided into four response options, each of which describes an empirical assessment that corresponds to a particular rating. In most cases, the question is further clarified with an accompanying text.

The questions are grouped into criteria such as Stateness, Political Participation, etc. Directly below the criterion title, the best practice or normative assumption made by the BTI is provided as an additional guide to the questions and ratings (see example below). Please give your rating by:

1. Considering which response option best approximates the situation in your country.
2. Relate and compare your rating with that given to your country in the BTI 2008.
3. Assign one of the two or three possible scores within the selected option.

The following example illustrates questionnaire components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3</th>
<th>Criterion: Rule of Law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State powers check and balance one another and ensure civil rights.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.1</th>
<th>Separation of powers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent is there a working separation of powers (checks and balances)?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- There are no constraints on the basic functions involved in the separation of powers, especially mutual checks and balances.  
  - 10 |
  - 9 |
- The separation of powers is restricted partially and temporarily (e.g., to ensure governability). Fundamentally, though, a restoration of balance is sought, especially by the other branches.  
  - 8 |
  - 7 |
  - 6 |
- One branch, generally the executive, has an ongoing and either informally or formally confirmed monopoly on power, which may include the colonization of other powers even though they are institutionally differentiated.  
  - 5 |
  - 4 |
  - 3 |
- The separation of powers is nonexistent or exists only on paper.  
  - 2 |
  - 1 |
There are two special sets of questions in the questionnaire. First, with the Level of Difficulty criterion, we ask you to assess structural difficulties that constrain the governance capacity of the country’s political leadership (questions 13.1–13.3). These ratings are used as weighting factors that favor good governance under difficult conditions. Second, we pose questions about your country’s political system. The purpose of these questions is to compile basic and comparable information on features of the political system that will be added as a table to the management dimension of your report.

Excel template

BTI_Questionnaire_2010.xls is a dynamic template for your evaluation ratings. The template provides a structured interface that integrates your data easily into the BTI database.

1. Microsoft Excel is required for your work with the BTI 2010.

2. Copy the file to your hard drive. You do not have to complete BTI_Questionnaire_2010.xls in a single session. We recommend strongly that you save versions periodically on your hard drive.

3. Once BTI_Questionnaire_2010.xls is opened, you will see several sheet tabs at the bottom of the window. BTI_Questionnaire_2010.xls contains 19 sheets. The first sheet, Score Summary, is followed by 17 criteria sheets, and ends with Questions on the Political System as the last sheet.

A limited number of sheets is visible at the same time. In the bottom left corner you will find four arrows that function as scroll buttons. Activate the first sheet, Score Summary. This sheet displays each criterion’s title, number and its respective questions. This sheet will automatically mirror the scores you have assigned, thus providing a summary of your progress.

Aggregation: Status Index and Management Index

Your country ratings form the basis of the final country rankings and the BTI’s Status and Management Indices. Scores are aggregated by calculating their arithmetic mean. First, we calculate scores for the 17 criteria individually, then we calculate the means of the criteria scores for each dimension—democracy, market economy, management—respectively.

Status Index scores represent the mean value of the democracy and market economy scores. Both values are, however, displayed separately in the table. Management Index scores represent the mean value of four management criteria that are weighted by a fifth criterion, Level of Difficulty. We believe good governance under difficult conditions should be appreciated more than an equivalent performance under promising conditions. The Level of Difficulty criterion measures the structural difficulties faced by a political leadership. Structural problems such as high levels of poverty, a history of violent conflict or the absence of civil society influence all aspects of governance and therefore affect all management criteria. The Level of Difficulty criterion is calculated by combining your ratings with the following quantitative indicators: GNI p.c., the U.N. Education Index and the mean of the Stateness and Rule of Law criteria scores.
4 Submitting your assessment

After you have completed your report and assigned ratings for each question, please send your assessment via email to:

– Your regional coordinator, who is responsible for all BTI countries in your region, and
– BTI Coordinator Olaf Hillenbrand, Center for Applied Policy Research, Olaf.Hillenbrand@lrz.uni-muenchen.de

There are two means of submitting your report and ratings. To expedite processing and minimize errors, we suggest you use the template BTI_Questionnaire_2010.xls to submit your scores. However, should you have problems with Excel, the BTI team will provide you with a Score Summary as a Word document or you can complete a hard copy and fax it to BTI Coordinator Olaf Hillenbrand at ++49 89 2180 1329.

5 What happens after submission?

Your country report will be reviewed by a second country expert and by the coordinator responsible for your region. To ensure an independent second assessment, the review will be conducted anonymously, and we will not disclose experts’ names during the rating period.

As a rule, you will receive detailed comments on your report within three weeks after submission. Please consider these comments and adjust your report accordingly. Where necessary, you may also adjust your numerical ratings in view of the comments. Please send your revised report and ratings to your regional coordinator.

Please note that the regional coordinators and the BTI editors will revise and modify your report more substantially than is usual for conventional scholarly publications. Given the scale of the BTI and the need for international comparability of standardized assessments, such modifications are necessary.

Ratings review and calibration

The 49 numerical ratings for each of the 127 countries are reviewed and adjusted three times (see page five). First, a second country expert gives ratings in response to the 49 questions provided in the questionnaire independently of the first expert. Two regional experts then discuss these ratings and agree on ratings that reflect the differences among countries of the same region. To ensure global comparability, the regional coordinators and the BTI Team then convene and review ratings across regions and calibrate the scores. During the final review phase, ratings are reviewed and calibrated by the BTI Board, a team of esteemed development professionals who counsel the BTI project (see www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de for a complete list of board members). Should a calibrated rating differ significantly from that suggested by you, we might consult you and request your opinion, which will influence the final rating. Final rating decisions, however, are made by the BTI Board.
Democracy
Your responses should reflect the situation at the end of January 2009.

1. Stateness
2. Political Participation
3. Rule of Law
4. Stability of Democratic Institutions
5. Political and Social Integration

Market Economy
Your responses should reflect the situation at the end of January 2009.

6. Level of Socioeconomic Development
7. Organization of the Market and Competition
8. Currency and Price Stability
9. Private Property
10. Welfare Regime
11. Economic Performance
12. Sustainability

Management
Your responses should refer to the country’s political leadership during the period under review (January 2007–January 2009). If there was substantial change of policy during this period that can be assessed already, please rate the political leadership as of January 2009.

13. Level of Difficulty
14. Steering Capability
15. Resource Efficiency
16. Consensus-Building
17. International Cooperation

Score Summary

Questions on the Political System

- System of government
- Executive (parliamentary & semipresidential systems)
- Legislature
- Executive (presidential systems)
- Institutional constraints on executive authority
Democracy

1 Stateness
2 Political Participation
3 Rule of Law
4 Stability of Democratic Institutions
5 Political and Social Integration
**Criterion: Stateness**

There is clarity about the nation’s existence as a state with adequately established and differentiated power structures.

### 1.1 Monopoly on the use of force

**To what extent does the state’s monopoly on the use of force cover the entire territory?**

- There is virtually no competition with the state’s monopoly on the use of force throughout the entire territory. 10
- The state’s monopoly on the use of force is established nationwide in principle, but it is threatened (or challenged) by organizations in territorial enclaves (guerrillas, mafias, clans). 8
- The state’s monopoly on the use of force is established in key parts of the country, but there are organizations (guerrillas, paramilitaries, clans) able to usurp the state’s monopoly on the use of force in large areas of territory. 5
- There is no state monopoly on the use of force. Instead, there is anarchy, civil war, a clan oligopoly, etc. 2

### 1.2 State identity

**To what extent do all relevant groups in society agree about citizenship and accept the nation-state as legitimate?**

The question seeks to assess the extent to which (1) major groups in society accept and support the official/dominant concept of the nation-state and (2) ruling groups de jure or de facto exclude ethnic, religious or cultural minorities from political citizenship (membership in the political nation).

The question focuses on the extent of discrimination against groups. This includes discrimination against individuals and civil rights violations, but if such forms of discrimination are observed and appear to be a problem of the rule of law rather than of citizenship, they should be assessed in question 3.4.

- All citizens have the same civic rights (after a reasonable transitional phase, in the case of immigrants). The preponderant majority fundamentally acknowledges the state’s constitution. 10
- Ethnic, religious or other minorities are denied certain civic rights. The legitimacy of the nation-state is not questioned in principle. 8
- Significant aspects of citizenship are withheld from entire population groups. The legitimacy of the nation-state is questioned somewhat. 5
- A variety of population groups compete for titular status as the “nation” and deny citizenship to others. The legitimacy of the nation-state is questioned fundamentally. 2

16 | BTI 2010 Democracy
### Criterion: Stateness

There is clarity about the nation’s existence as a state with adequately established and differentiated power structures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.3</th>
<th>No interference of religious dogmas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>To what extent are the state’s legitimacy and its legal order defined without interference by religious dogmas?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This question refers to the problem of the functionality of the state’s norms and basic order in the process of transformation. If the legal order defining the state is derived from religious dogmas, there will be fundamental barriers to the development of individual beliefs, capacities and choices.

Churches or religious groups that act as interest groups influencing politics and policies are not to be seen as such an interference, though they might play an important role in some issues like abortion or divorce. Their influence, however, should not lead to the direct transfer of religious norms into laws.

| The state is largely defined as a secular order. Religious dogmas have no noteworthy influence on politics or the law. | 10 | 9 |
| The state is defined in principle as a secular order. However, religious dogmas have considerable influence on (regional or functional) aspects of politics or the law. | 8 | 7 | 6 |
| Secular and religious norms are in conflict about the basic constitution of the state or are forming a hybrid system (i.e., each type of norm determines significant regional or functional aspects of politics or the law). | 5 | 4 | 3 |
| Religious dogmas define fundamental rules of the state, society and economy. | 2 | 1 |

### 1.4 Basic administration

| **To what extent do basic administrative structures exist?** |

This question refers to the fundamental structures of a civilian administration without which no state can survive for long (in contrast to question 4.1, which refers to the functioning of democratic institutions). It includes structures that exist beyond the protection of the monopoly on the use of force by the military and/or police—for example, basic systems of courts and tax authorities. Under some circumstances (civil war, breakdown of public order in a failing state), these functions of a civilian administration may be taken over by the military or external actors.

This question does not refer to the quality of the administration (professionalism, meritocratic administration etc.). However, the state administration must fulfill its functions at least minimally to maintain the presence of a civilian state apparatus (e.g., for the basic provision of jurisdiction and law enforcement or the implementation of policies such as food programs, emergency measures and the like).

| The state has a differentiated administrative structure throughout the country (administrative institutions, officeholders, basic jurisdiction, making and implementing political decisions). | 10 | 9 |
| The state’s basic infrastructure extends throughout the territory of the country, but its operation is to some extent deficient. | 8 | 7 | 6 |
| The state infrastructure and its powers are beginning to extend beyond maintaining law and order, but either do not include the entire population or are unable to implement policies effectively. | 5 | 4 | 3 |
| The state infrastructure and its powers extend to keeping the peace and maintaining law and order but do not include broad segments of the population or all of the territory. | 2 | 1 |
2.1 Free and fair elections

To what extent are rulers determined by general, free and fair elections?

No constraints on free and fair elections.

- General elections are held and accepted in principle as the means of filling leadership positions. However, there are some constraints on the principle of equality. These may include withholding suffrage or the right to campaign for office de jure or de facto from part of the population, inconsistent assurance of free and fair elections, unelected officeholders or elections that have perceptible but only minor influence on political outcomes.
- Elections or partial elections are held but have de facto only limited influence over who rules.
- No democratic elections at the national level.

To what extent do democratically elected rulers have the effective power to govern, or to what extent are there veto powers and political enclaves?

The elected rulers to be assessed here are primarily the president and/or parliament or the head of government who is empowered by the parliament. States where rulers are not selected through elections that fulfill minimum standards of free popular choice and fair process (i.e., autocracies) should be given a rating of 1 or 2 depending on whether autocratic rule is more despotic-fragmented or legal-bureaucratic.

Veto powers can be the military, the clergy, landowners, business elites, etc., with the power to defect partially from democratic procedures without questioning the system as such. They can veto the results of democratic decisions or retain prerogatives that cannot be touched by democratic decision makers (e.g., nominating the commander-in-chief of the armed forces). This point is distinct from the stateness criterion; guerrillas, paramilitaries, state-free regions (in slums, or in rural areas) are not the veto powers meant here.

- Elected rulers have the effective power to govern.
- Elected rulers have the power to govern in principle, but individual power groups can set their own domains apart or enforce special-interest policies against the state.
- Elected rulers have the power to govern in important matters, but the fundamental orientation of the constitution can be curtailed or rendered ineffective by strong veto groups.
- Elected rulers de facto have no power to govern, or rulers are not democratically elected.
Criterion: Political Participation
The populace decides who rules and it has other political freedoms.

2.3 Association/assembly rights

To what extent can independent political and/or civic groups associate and assemble freely?

This question refers to the degree of freedom to organize politically that is needed to influence political decision-making processes “from the bottom up.” It also includes groups that mobilize along ethnic and similar cleavages.

It should be borne in mind that these freedoms are not manifest as formal rules under authoritarian regimes; rather, political parties and/or civic organizations—by their very existence—implicitly or explicitly dare to anticipate rights that can only be guaranteed in a democratic system.

This question is not meant to assess the quality of the country’s political and/or civil society with regard to either the functioning of the political system as a whole or democratic development (see questions 5.2–5.3).

The freedom of association and assembly is unrestricted within the basic democratic order. 10 □
9 □

There are partial constraints—not consistent with democratic principles—on the freedom of association, but as a rule there are no prohibitions on parties or social organizations. 8 □
7 □
6 □

Opposition parties with any relevance for governance are prohibited or systematically disabled. Freedom of assembly is not ensured everywhere by the state. Civic organizations can act if they support the regime or are not outspokenly critical of it. 5 □
4 □
3 □

No freedom of association for political and social groups. No freedom of assembly. Politically relevant civic organizations do not exist or are, as a rule, suppressed. 2 □
1 □

2.4 Freedom of expression

To what extent can citizens, organizations and the mass media express opinions freely?

Apart from evaluating to what extent freedom of opinion and the press are generally guaranteed, please also consider whether the structure of the mass media system provides for a plurality of opinions.

There are unrestricted freedoms of opinion and the press framed by the basic democratic order. 10 □
9 □

 Freedoms of opinion and the press are subject to some intervention that undermines democratic principles, but outright prohibitions on the press are limited to a few isolated cases. 8 □
7 □
6 □

The core elements of a public sphere and of public debate exist but are vulnerable to distortion and manipulation through massive intervention. 5 □
4 □
3 □

No freedom of opinion or of the press. 2 □
1 □
### 3.1 Separation of powers

**To what extent is there a working separation of powers (checks and balances)?**

This question refers to the basic configuration and operation of the separation of powers (institutional differentiation, division of labor according to functions and, most significantly, checks and balances). However, it does not refer to the tendency toward convergence and a fusion of powers that can be observed in parliamentary systems. It does include the subjection of state power to the law.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There are no constraints on the basic functions involved in the separation of powers, especially mutual checks and balances.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The separation of powers is restricted partially and temporarily (e.g., to ensure governability). Fundamentally, though, a restoration of balance is sought, especially by the other branches.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One branch, generally the executive, has an ongoing and either informally or formally confirmed monopoly on power, which may include the colonization of other powers even though they are institutionally differentiated.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The separation of powers is nonexistent or exists only on paper.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2 Independent judiciary

**To what extent does an independent judiciary exist?**

An independent judiciary refers first and foremost to how far the courts can interpret and review norms and pursue their own reasoning free from the influence of rulers or powerful groups and individuals. This requires a differentiated organization of the legal system, including legal education, jurisprudence, regulated appointment of the judiciary, rational proceedings, professionalism, channels of appeal and court administration.

Whereas question 3.1 is concerned with the mutual checks of state powers (esp. the executive), this question refers explicitly to the proper functioning of the judiciary as a whole (i.e., concerning public as well as civil law).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The judiciary is free both from unconstitutional intervention by other institutions and from corruption. There are mechanisms for judicial review of legislative or executive acts.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The judiciary is established as a distinct profession and operates relatively independently, but its functions are partially restricted by factors such as corruption and insufficient territorial or functional penetration.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The judiciary is institutionally differentiated, but its decisions and doctrine are subordinated to political authorities or severely restricted by functional deficits such as territorial penetration, resources or severe corruption.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The judiciary is not institutionally differentiated or is significantly subordinated to religious or political authorities.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Criterion:** Rule of Law
State powers check and balance one another and ensure civil rights.

### 3.3 Prosecution of office abuse

**To what extent are there legal or political penalties for officeholders who abuse their positions?**

This question addresses how the state and society hold public servants and politicians accountable and whether conflicts of interest are sanctioned. In contrast to question 15.3, this question is to determine to what extent the rule of law is undermined by political corruption.

- As a rule, corrupt officeholders are prosecuted rigorously under established laws.  
  - 10
  - 9
- As a rule, corrupt officeholders are prosecuted under established laws but also slip through political, legal or procedural loopholes.  
  - 8
  - 7
  - 6
- Corrupt officeholders are not prosecuted adequately under the law but occasionally attract adverse publicity.  
  - 5
  - 4
  - 3
- Officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.  
  - 2
  - 1

### 3.4 Civil rights

**To what extent are civil rights guaranteed and protected, and to what extent can citizens seek redress for violations of these liberties?**

The civil rights in question refer to the protection of personal liberty against state and non-state actors, including the right to life and security of person; freedom from slavery; equality before the law and due process under the rule of law; freedom of movement; access to justice, bans on discrimination and freedom of religion. This also includes the question of how violations of human rights under previous authoritarian regimes can be prosecuted in court and should be incorporated within your response.

Please also bear in mind that discrimination against women, ethnic or religious groups should be evaluated explicitly in qualitative terms and reflected in the quantitative assessment. Discrimination here refers to the aforementioned rights, i.e., the protection of physical integrity against abuse by state and non-state actors (violence, terror, torture), writ of habeas corpus and due process rights, equal treatment before the law and non-discrimination by law (no denial of equal rights).

- There are no restrictions on civil rights.  
  - 10
  - 9
- Civil rights are violated partially or temporarily or are not implemented in some parts of the country.  
  - 8
  - 7
  - 6
- Civil rights are violated massively over protracted periods of time or are protected only within limited enclaves.  
  - 5
  - 4
  - 3
- Civil rights have no protection even in principle, or are systematically violated.  
  - 2
  - 1
Criterion: Stability of Democratic Institutions

Democratic institutions are capable of performing, and they are adequately accepted.

4.1 Performance of democratic institutions

Are democratic institutions, including the administrative system and the system of justice, capable of performing?

This question aims to establish the extent to which democratic institutions, including the judiciary and administration, not only exist and function at a fundamental level, but also perform their functions effectively and are free from extensive, counterproductive friction.

Please note that nondemocratic countries—though they might formally establish some “democratic” institutions (e.g., Chile under Pinochet or nowadays in Iran)—have their own institutional logic. They have to be evaluated with (1) or (2). A country is to be considered democratic if the government came to power by (mostly) free and fair elections and if there is at least a minimum of checks and balances in place to control the executive.

For nondemocratic regimes, please evaluate briefly how central political institutions (executive, legislative, judiciary, public administration) operate and their potential for future democratization.

The ensemble of democratic institutions is effective and efficient. As a rule, political decisions are prepared, made, implemented and reviewed in legitimate procedures by the appropriate authorities.

Democratic institutions perform their functions in principle, but there is much waste due to friction between institutions.

Democratic institutions exist but have neither stability nor continuity, either internally or between organizations.

There are no democratic institutions as such (authoritarian regime). Or: “democratic” institutions are part of an authoritarian regime.

4.2 Commitment to democratic institutions

To what extent are democratic institutions accepted or supported by the relevant actors?

The relevant actors are all organizations able to concentrate political power, and which are indispensable to the democratic process and therefore potentially able to obstruct it. This includes government bodies, parties, associations and civic organizations, as well as groups with potential veto powers, such as the military, the clergy, etc.

Non-democratic countries will have to be evaluated with (1) or (2).

All relevant political and social players accept democratic institutions as legitimate.

Individual institutions of the democratic state are not fully accepted by all relevant players.

Only individual institutions are accepted, strong actors hold vetoes, and acceptance remains unstable over time.

There are no democratic institutions as such (authoritarian regime). Or: “democratic” institutions are part of an authoritarian regime.
**Political and Social Integration**

Stable patterns of representation exist for mediating between society and the state; there is also a consolidated civic culture.

### 5.1 Party system

**To what extent is there a stable and socially rooted party system able to articulate and aggregate societal interests?**

This question is meaningful only where the party system plays an important role in forming opinions and political will, and thus in mediating between society and the state. To answer this question, please consider the degree of voter volatility, the fragmentation of the party system, the level of ideological polarization and the extent to which parties are rooted in civil society. Note: Systems with a few dominant parties are not necessarily better at aggregating and articulating societal interests. Fragmentation, polarization and volatility should be interpreted in view of these functions. Where the democratic system is influenced by marked clientelism, consider what effects this has in promoting or inhibiting stability. Note: Party system fragmentation can be evaluated considering the "effective number of parties" in parliament, which reflects their number and political weight. Effective number of parties = \(1/\left(\sum p_i^2\right)\); \(p_i\) is the share of parliamentary mandates controlled by party \(i\) (Laakso/Taagepera Index). High values (>5) indicate high fragmentation, values less than 5 indicate moderate or low fragmentation. As an example, consider the case of Germany in 2006: though there were five parties in parliament, their effective number was 3.44, which indicates only moderate fragmentation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is a stable, moderate, socially rooted party system: moderate fragmentation, low polarization, low voter volatility, broad consent among the population and stable linkages with civil society.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Though fundamentally established and socially rooted, the party system is somewhat shaky: moderate fragmentation, moderate polarization, moderate voter volatility.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is an unstable party system with shallow roots in society: high fragmentation, moderate polarization, high voter volatility.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a fragile party system with few roots in society: high fragmentation, extensive polarization, high voter volatility.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.2 Interest groups

**To what extent is there a network of cooperative associations or interest groups to mediate between society and the political system?**

This question addresses the representation of societal interests in the political system. It does not evaluate a self-organizing civil society operating independently of the state (see 5.4) nor rights of participation per se (2.1), but rather the systemic nature and quality of representative patterns. Many authoritarian systems, especially those that have liberalized somewhat, have a system of associations that serve an intermediary function. In such cases, consider the system of association’s degree of autonomy or whether it is integrated within authoritarian corporatist structures. If potential threats are considered, please address how far the “dark side” of civil society comes into play, i.e., where organized social, communicative and political power aims to undermine democracy or civil society (e.g., mobilization of ethnic or nationalist interests).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is a close-knit network of interest groups that are fundamentally cooperative, reflect competing social interests, and tend to balance one another.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The network of interest groups is relatively close-knit, but dominated by a few strong interests, producing a latent risk of pooling conflicts.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The topography of interest groups is meager, important social interests are underrepresented, the system of interest groups is dominated by only a few players, and there is a risk of polarization.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest groups are present only in isolated social segments, cooperate little, and on the whole are poorly balanced. A large number of social interests remain unrepresented.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Consent to democracy is high (more than 70%), and the constitutional framework is fully accepted.

Consent to democracy is moderate to high (50-70%), and political protests do not tend to call the constitutional framework into question.

Consent to democracy is low (30-50%), and political protests occasionally tend to call the constitutional framework into question.

Consent to democracy (as a form of government) is very low (less than 30%), and political protests quickly tend to call the constitutional framework into question.

How strong is the citizens’ consent to democratic norms and procedures?

This should be based on survey data on attitudes toward democracy or individual institutions in contrast to authoritarian attitudes. In principle, consent to democracy as a form of government may also be assessed in authoritarian systems if reliable data are available. Please indicate if you have doubts about the reliability of available survey data. If there are no data available, please try to estimate the support for democracy or skip this question.

Consent to democracy is high (more than 70%), and the constitutional framework is fully accepted.

Consent to democracy is moderate to high (50-70%), and political protests do not tend to call the constitutional framework into question.

Consent to democracy is low (30-50%), and political protests occasionally tend to call the constitutional framework into question.

Consent to democracy (as a form of government) is very low (less than 30%), and political protests quickly tend to call the constitutional framework into question.

To what extent have social self-organization and the construction of social capital advanced?

Social self-organization refers to the voluntary association of citizens for purposes of self-help, rather than primarily to further political objectives. Social capital means that there is a significant level of trust between citizens, which fosters cooperation and mutual support. Social capital may also be based on cultural patterns of interaction characterizing traditional societies.

In some cases, social capital may also include the extent to which redress and reconciliation are being or have been sought for human rights violations under authoritarian regimes.

Since these factors may develop independently from the political system, they should also be included in the analysis and assessment of authoritarian regimes.

There is a close-knit web of autonomous, self-organized groups, associations and organizations, and a high level of trust among the population.

There is a robust but heterogeneous web of autonomous, self-organized groups, associations and organizations, and solid trust among the population.

Self-organization in civil society encounters political, cultural, socioeconomic and other barriers; it is unevenly distributed or spontaneous and temporary; there is relatively low trust among the population.

Civic self-organization is rudimentary. There is very little trust among the population.
Market Economy

6 Level of Socioeconomic Development
7 Organization of the Market and Competition
8 Currency and Price Stability
9 Private Property
10 Welfare Regime
11 Economic Performance
12 Sustainability
### Level of Socioeconomic Development

In principle, the country’s level of development permits adequate freedom of choice for all citizens.

**To what extent are significant parts of the population fundamentally excluded from society due to poverty and inequality combined (income gaps, gender, education, religion, ethnicity)?**

Poverty combined with inequality leads to a deep social exclusion that fundamentally impedes participation in otherwise potentially functional market economies. Your evaluation should consider both poverty and inequality. Please consult the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI), the absolute poverty ratio and the Gini coefficient for orientation.

Please take into account the scope of the subsistence economy, as the share of the population dependent on subsistence production tends to be excluded from market-based socioeconomic development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and social exclusion are quantitatively and qualitatively minor and not structurally ingained.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and social exclusion are quantitatively and qualitatively limited and structurally not very ingained.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and social exclusion are quantitatively and qualitatively pronounced and to some degree structurally ingained.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and social exclusion are quantitatively and qualitatively extensive and structurally ingained.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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26 | BTI 2010 Market Economy
Organization of the Market and Competition

There are clear rules for stable, market-based competition.

To what level have the fundamentals of market-based competition developed?

Market competition comprises: freedom of pricing; currency convertibility; the freedom to participate in the market and especially to set up a business (no significant entry and exit barriers); the free use and transfer of profits. It also includes nondiscrimination among various forms of companies and sizes of businesses. Please consider the size of the informal sector, as a large informal sector indicates an inappropriate institutional framework of economic policy.

Market competition is clearly defined both macroeconomically and microeconomically; there are state-guaranteed rules for market competition with largely equal opportunities for all market participants (no discrimination); the role of the state is limited to guaranteeing compliance with the rules.

Market competition has a strong institutional framework, but the rules are not consistent or always uniform for all market participants. The informal sector plays a minor role.

Market competition operates under a weak institutional framework. Apart from strategic sectors it takes the form of “spontaneous” barter capitalism (bazaar capitalism, informal sector). Uniform rules for all market participants are sporadic; there is substantial state intervention in and control of strategic sectors.

Market competition is present only in segments; its institutional framework is meager. There are no uniform rules for market participants, along with strong state intervention, regulation and definition of the economy. The informal sector is large and substantial.

To what extent do safeguards exist to prevent the development of economic monopolies and cartels?

For more advanced developing and transition countries, account must be taken of whether legislation on cartels exists and is enforced.

There is a coherent and effective anti-monopoly policy supported by trade policies that are consistent with nondiscrimination principles.

The formation of monopolies and oligopolies is regulated inconsistently.

The formation of monopolies and oligopolies is regulated only occasionally.

The formation of monopolies and oligopolies is neither regulated nor impeded.
## Organization of the Market and Competition

There are clear rules for stable, market-based competition.

### 7.3 Liberalization of foreign trade

**To what extent has foreign trade been liberalized?**

Slower liberalization of foreign trade can be taken into account in the assessment if a shock policy would otherwise destroy domestic industries or companies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign trade is mostly liberalized, with uniform, low tariffs and no fundamental state intervention in free trade.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign trade is liberalized in principle, but significant exceptions remain, including differentiated tariffs and special rules for individual companies or sectors.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign trade follows non-discrimination principles in form, but is greatly distorted by state regulation, special rules, tariff barriers, etc. The economy is integrated selectively into the world market.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign trade is largely state-supervised or controlled. The economy is extensively dissociated from the world market.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7.4 Banking system

**To what extent have a solid banking system and a capital market been established?**

International standards of banking systems are defined by the Basel Accords (http://www.bis.org). These standards require banks to hold a minimum share of capital in relation to their assets, to undergo a supervisory review process, and to disclose information about their economic activities.

A solid capital market is characterized by: substantial foreign ownership of banks; low shares of nonperforming loans; and hard budget constraints between companies, banks and the public sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The institutional foundations are laid for a solid banking system oriented toward international standards with functional banking supervision, minimum capital requirements and market discipline. Capital markets are open to domestic and foreign capital with sufficient resilience to cope with speculative investment.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The banking system and capital market are differentiated, internationally competitive and oriented in principle to international standards, but they are vulnerable to severe fluctuations due to extreme dependence on outside factors and a de facto lack of supervision.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The banking system and capital market are poorly differentiated; regulation and supervision is inadequate.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks are largely state-owned or state-controlled; there is no capital market.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Currency and Price Stability

There are institutional or political precautions to control inflation sustainably, together with an appropriate monetary policy and fiscal policy.

#### 8.1 Anti-inflation / forex policy

**To what extent does the country pursue a consistent inflation policy and an appropriate foreign exchange policy? Is there an independent central bank?**

Note on inflation control: Account should be taken not only of the absolute level of inflation, but also of its volatility over time, which in some cases may trigger greater uncertainty in expectations among economic players.

The viability of exchange-rate policies and their prospects should be evaluated irrespective of whether local currencies are pegged to a foreign currency or subject to a more flexible exchange rate regime.

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inflation and foreign exchange policies are brought into concert with other goals of economic policy and are institutionalized in a largely independent central bank.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling inflation and an appropriate foreign exchange policy are recognized goals of economic policy, but have not been consistent over time and do not have an adequate institutional framework.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling inflation is a component of the economic system in principle, but it is institutionally and politically subordinated to other goals. Foreign exchange policy is essentially used for political purposes.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling inflation is not one of the parameters of the economic order, system or policy; foreign exchange policy is subject to manipulation for state or political reasons.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 8.2 Macrostability

**To what extent do the government’s fiscal and debt policies support macroeconomic stability?**

There is a consistent stability policy supported in part by institutional (self-) constraints. States may accept voluntary limits under the constitution or through international treaties, and preserve relative autonomy vis-à-vis domestic lobby groups.

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<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A policy for stability is followed in principle, but it lacks institutional safeguards for the future and is thus prone to populist policy changes.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are serious problems with setting objectives and achieving a consistent policy for stability.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are neither political nor institutional elements of a state policy for stability.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9 Criterion: **Private Property**
There are adequate conditions to support a functional private sector.

### 9.1 Property rights

**To what extent do government authorities ensure well-defined rights of private property and regulate the acquisition of property?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Property rights and the regulation of the acquisition of property are well defined in terms of acquisition, benefits, use and sale; they are limited solely by basic liberal rights.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property rights and the regulation of the acquisition of property are well defined in principle, but there are problems with implementation under the rule of law.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property rights and the regulation of the acquisition of property are defined formally in law, but they are not implemented consistently nor safeguarded adequately by law, especially against state intervention.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property rights and the regulation of the acquisition of property are not defined in law and are extremely vulnerable to the whims of the state.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 9.2 Private enterprise

**To what extent are private companies permitted? Are state companies undergoing a process of privatization consistent with market principles?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private companies are viewed institutionally as the primary engines of economic production and are given appropriate legal safeguards. Any pending privatization of state companies proceeds consistently with other market principles, especially the avoidance of oligopolies.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private companies represent the backbone of the economy, but there are still state companies and strong market concentrations such as oligopolies; concentration of market power is tolerated by the state.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private companies can act freely in principle but encounter economic, political or social barriers to development; state companies or monopolies dominate the strategic business sectors.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At most, private companies are permitted as exclusive enclaves; otherwise the state dominates the economic system.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Criterion: Welfare Regime

There are viable arrangements to compensate for the social costs of the capitalist economic system.

#### 10.1 Social safety nets

**To what extent do social safety nets exist to compensate for poverty and other risks such as old age, illness, unemployment or disability?**

Social safety nets aim to ensure that all citizens are included in economic life. These nets may be organized by the state or by society (private welfare institutions), and comprise a variable welfare mix. Pension systems may be organized as pay-as-you-go and/or capital-funded schemes.

In countries that do not provide comprehensive, state-funded welfare systems, social safety nets can refer to those arrangements that are functionally equivalent to formal compensation for social risks. Social safety nets may also comprise family, clan or village structures, if these structures can provide viable compensation on a broad scale for risks.

- There is a solid network to compensate for social risks, especially nationwide health care and a well-focused prevention of poverty. **10**
  - 9
- Social networks are well developed in part but do not cover all risks for all strata of the population. Considerable portions of the population are still at risk of poverty. **8**
  - 7
  - 6
- Rudimentary measures to avert social risks exist, but are extremely segmented in terms of territory, social stratum and sector. The country cannot combat poverty systematically on its own. **5**
  - 4
  - 3
- There are no state or societal measures for inclusion or compensation. Poverty is combated hardly at all, or only *ad hoc*. Health care is deficient for broad segments of the population. **2**
  - 1

#### 10.2 Equal opportunity

**To what extent does equality of opportunity exist?**

The question about equal opportunity is directed at finding out to what extent individuals have equal access to participation in society regardless of their social background. State initiatives—such as access to public services, especially education, and assistance mechanisms—play a central role. Please bear in mind that equality of opportunity for women, ethnic or religious groups should be evaluated explicitly in your analysis.

- There are sufficient institutions to compensate for gross social differences. Women and/or members of ethnic or religious groups have equal access to higher education, public office, etc. **10**
  - 9
- There are a number of institutions to compensate for gross social differences, however insufficient. Women and/or members of ethnic or religious groups have near-equal access to higher education, public office, etc. **8**
  - 7
  - 6
- There are institutions to compensate for gross social differences, but they are limited in scope and quality. Women and/or members of ethnic or religious groups have limited access to education, public office, etc. **5**
  - 4
  - 3
- There are no institutions to compensate for gross social differences. Women and/or members of ethnic or religious groups have only very limited access to education, public office, etc. **2**
  - 1
How does the economy, as measured in quantitative indicators, perform?

The output strength of the economy should be evaluated using pertinent economic data (GDP growth per capita; inflation; employment; budget balance; tax revenue; debt; trade balance, investment). Where possible, data should also take into account the economy’s potential for growth.

Growth of per-capita GDP is relatively high. It is associated with positive or controllable macroeconomic data. These may include relatively high employment levels, price stability, balanced budget, reasonable debt and a favorable trade balance.

Growth of per-capita GDP is low. It is associated with only moderately positive macroeconomic data, but these seem, on balance, controllable. The data may include unsatisfactory employment levels, relative price stability, problems balancing the budget, a tendency toward debt and a fluctuating trade balance.

Per-capita GDP is stagnant. It is associated with continuing negative macroeconomic data, which are on the whole under shaky control. These may include relatively moderate employment levels, low price stability, an inadequately balanced budget, rising debt and an unfavorable trade balance.

Growth of per-capita GDP is negative. It is associated with strongly negative macroeconomic data spinning out of control. These may include inadequate employment levels, high inflation, large budget deficits, unreasonably high debt and an extremely unfavorable trade balance.
**Criterion: Sustainability**
Economic growth is balanced, environmentally sustainable and future-oriented.

### 12.1 Environmental policy

**To what extent are environmental concerns effectively taken into account in both macro- and microeconomic terms?**

“Sustainability” here assesses the extent to which specific forms of market failure, such as externalization of costs or inadequate time horizons are avoided or restrained by environmental regulation. Bear in mind that a deeply ingrained awareness of the environment or nature in society may serve as a functional equivalent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Environmentally compatible growth, especially avoiding the externalization of costs, is taken into account at the institutional level in both macro- and microeconomic terms; international agreements are complied with.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Environmentally compatible growth is taken into account at the institutional level in important aspects of economic life but tends to be subordinated to growth efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Environmentally compatible growth receives only sporadic consideration and has almost no institutional framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Environmental concerns are entirely subordinate to growth efforts and have no institutional framework.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 12.2 Education policy/ R&D

**To what extent are there solid institutions for basic, secondary and tertiary education, as well as for research and development?**

Apart from quantitative parameters (in percentage of GDP), quality of education spending and R&D should also be taken into account. There can be—and usually is—a combination of state and private organizations to be considered here. For a quantitative term of reference: The average education expenditure of 132 countries (with available data) was at 4.9% of GDP in 2000-2002. The average R&D expenditure in OECD countries was at 2.3% of GDP in 2003 and at 1.9% in the EU-25 in 2004. An expenditure of 2.0% of GDP is thus our quantitative term of reference.

Unlike question 10.2, this question is concerned not with individual opportunities for equal education, but with the factor of human capital in general.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The state and private sectors ensure a nationwide system of education and training, as well as a dynamic research and technology sector. Quantitatively and/or qualitatively, investment in education and training is clearly above average (more than 6% of GDP) as is investment in research and development (more than 2.0% of GDP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Both state and private institutions for education, training and research and development are strong and in some cases quite advanced. Quantitatively and/or qualitatively, investment in education and training is average (from 4% to 6% of GDP) as is investment in research and development (1.5% to 2.0% of GDP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Institutions for education, training, and research and development are present in significant segments, but remain highly inconsistent, with key deficits in research and development. Quantitatively and/or qualitatively, investment in education and training is rather low (from 2% to 4% of GDP) as is investment in research and development (clearly less than 1.5% of GDP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>There are only basic levels of institutions for education, training and R&amp;D; private institutions are weak. Quantitatively and/or qualitatively, investment is very low in education and training (below 2% of GDP) as well as research and development (below 0.5% of GDP).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Management

13 Level of Difficulty
14 Steering Capability
15 Resource Efficiency
16 Consensus-Building
17 International Cooperation
13.1 Structural constraints

To what extent do structural difficulties constrain the political leadership’s governance capacity?

Management performance may be limited by structural constraints that do not result from the current political leadership’s actions and cannot be overcome swiftly. Constraints include extreme poverty, the lack of an educated labor force, a disadvantageous geographical location (e.g., landlocked or small island states), severe infrastructural deficiencies, natural disasters or pandemic HIV/AIDS infections.

While the level of difficulty will also be calculated from three quantitative indicators reflecting these constraints (Gross National Income p.c. at purchasing power parities; U.N. Education Index; mean of the BTI 2010 stateness and rule of law scores), you should describe the country-specific profile of structural constraints.

- The structural constraints on governance are massive. 10 □
- The structural constraints on governance are high. 9 □
- The structural constraints on governance are moderate. 8 □
- The structural constraints on governance are low. 7 □

13.2 Civil society traditions

To what extent are there traditions of civil society?

Indicators of civil society traditions are the long-term presence of public or civic engagement, numerous and active NGOs, trust in institutions, social trust, and a civic culture of moderate participation (i.e., neither excessive nor non-existent) in public life.

- No traditions of civil society. 10 □
- Weak traditions of civil society. 9 □
- Moderate traditions of civil society. 8 □
- Considerable traditions of civil society. 7 □

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### How serious are ethnic, religious and social conflicts?

Indicators of conflict intensity include the following: the confrontational nature of politics; the polarization and split of society along one or several cleavages; the mobilization of large groups of the population; and the use and spread of violence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is civil war or a widespread violent conflict based on social, ethnic or religious differences.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society and the political elite are deeply split into social classes, ethnic or religious communities. Mobilized groups and protest movements dominate politics; there are violent incidents.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society and the political elite are polarized along ethnic, religious or social differences. Radical political actors show increasing success in mobilizing ethnic, religious or social groups.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are no irreconcilable ethnic, religious or social cleavages.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Criterion:** Steering Capability

The political leadership manages reforms effectively and can achieve its policy priorities.

14.1 Prioritization

**To what extent does the political leadership set and maintain strategic priorities?**

This question measures three aspects of steering capability: first, whether the political leadership can prioritize and organize its policies according to strategic aims, (i.e., whether policy-making is informed by a longer-term perspective going beyond immediate concerns of electoral competition); second, whether policy aims and objectives correspond to the normative points of reference guiding the BTI, (i.e., constitutional democracy and a socially responsible market economy); and third, whether strategic priorities are maintained over periods of crisis and stalemate.

Please also indicate the role of external influence when assessing the political leadership’s steering capability. If a state depends heavily on foreign aid—one third or a higher share of general government revenue—it is constrained in setting strategic priorities. The same holds for other forms of massive influence in which foreign actors might run the government from behind the scenes. Political elites in such states may adopt a development agenda for instrumental purposes only. In such cases, please assess whether the political elites are genuinely committed to development objectives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The political leadership is committed to constitutional democracy and a socially responsible market economy. Its policies give these goals priority over short-term expediency.</th>
<th>10 □</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership pursues long-term aims, but it sometimes postpones them in favor of short-term political benefits. The leadership seeks to build democracy and a market economy, but its strategic aims are not commensurate with the country’s situation, problems and needs.</td>
<td>8 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership claims to pursue long-term aims, but these are replaced regularly by short-term interests of political bargaining and office-seeking. If long-term goals are pursued, they do not correspond to the goals of democracy and/or a market economy.</td>
<td>5 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership is not able to act with a long-term perspective or in the country’s prospective interests. The leadership relies on ad hoc measures, lacks guiding concepts, reaps the maximum short-term political benefit and shows no recognizable prioritization.</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How effective is the government in implementing reform policy?

This question examines the extent to which the government has been able to achieve its own reform goals. “Reform” means activities carried out by the executive that aim at structural and qualitative changes in the political, economic or social system to facilitate development and transformation toward democracy and a market economy. Reforms refer to policy areas crucial to the functioning of democracy and a market economy, as understood by the BTI. The question focuses on the government, i.e., the executive including the administration and the cabinet. If an autocratic government implements market reforms effectively but refrains from implementing democratic reforms, it should be rated with scores 3–5.

The government can implement many of its reforms effectively. 10 □
9 □

The government is committed to democracy and a market economy, but has had only limited success in implementing its announced reforms. 8 □
7 □
6 □

The government seeks to achieve reforms, but fails to implement most of them. Or: Reforms are effective but limited to either a market economy or democracy. 5 □
4 □
3 □

No reform policy exists, nor are there plans for any. 2 □
1 □

How flexible and innovative is the political leadership? Does it learn from past errors?

Flexibility, learning and policy innovation presuppose that leading political actors are able not only to recognize but to concede that their previous policy has failed. A change in policy might have to be imposed in opposition to stakeholders who profited from the former policy.

Innovative policies are understood as the result of a learning process that extends beyond mere changes in policy outputs to include basic beliefs guiding policy formulation. These beliefs are part of an actor’s identity, and shape the routines of policy perception and policy formulation.

Flexibility refers to political actors’ ability to appraise their own political leeway accurately, and to recognize and utilize the developmental opportunities inherent to a given political situation. This ability is to be evaluated by assessing how policymakers choose their tools and strategies, and how they organize and sequence reforms. If an autocratic government shows flexibility and learning capability in market reforms but refrains from implementing democratic reforms, it should be rated with scores 3–5.

The political leadership demonstrates its ability of complex learning, acts flexibly and can replace failed policies with innovative ones. 10 □
9 □

The political leadership responds to mistakes and failed policies with changes, but its policy frequently remains stuck in the same routines. Learning processes occur, but rarely affect the knowledge base or cognitive framework on which policies are based. 8 □
7 □
6 □

The political leadership shows little willingness and ability in learning. Policies are rigidly enforced, and the routines of policy making do not enable innovative approaches. 5 □
4 □
3 □

The political leadership insists on an obviously mistaken and harmful policy, whether for reasons of ideology or to stay in power. Reforms are not undertaken or are blocked regardless of their effects. 2 □
1 □
Criterion: **Resource Efficiency**

The government makes optimum use of available resources.

---

**Efficient use of assets**

To what extent does the government make efficient use of available economic and human resources?

Resources mean personnel, funding and the organizational and legal tools of the state. **Evaluations should not be influenced by a government’s existing or lacking commitment to democracy and a market economy.**

Please base your assessment on some of the following indicators:

Efficient use of government administrative personnel: includes personnel expenses relative to the services offered by the state, the number of politically motivated dismissals and new appointments of public servants, and the existence of competitive recruiting procedures protected against political influences.

Efficient use of budget resources: includes balanced state budgets, a manageable level of state debt, effective auditing, and transparent budget planning and implementation. Low deviation of actual budget expenditures from the associated planned expenditures is a possible quantitative indicator.

Efficient administrative organization: includes public administration that enables effective management under criteria of professional rationality; “responsible” decentralization (i.e., establishing local self-government with legal and financial autonomy), backed by arrangements for public review of its activities, and the presence of procedures and institutions to reform and modernize public administration.

The government generally makes efficient use of available human, financial and organizational resources. 10

The government uses most available resources efficiently. 8

The government uses only some of the available resources efficiently. 5

The government wastes state resources (human, financial and organizational), or the elites consume most state resources themselves. 2
To what extent can the government coordinate conflicting objectives into a coherent policy?

Policy coordination constitutes a key task of leading politicians and officials in government. As many policies have conflicting objectives, reflect competing political interests and affect other policies, the government leadership has to ensure that its overall policy is coherent. Trade-offs between policy goals should be well balanced and the functional segmentation of the state administration should be moderated by horizontal forms of coordination.

Coordination also entails avoiding redundancies (overlap among different government branches) and lacunae. Various coordination styles—hierarchic-bureaucratic, informal-network, personalist, centralized, decentralized etc.—are possible and may be functionally equivalent. What matters is their impact on policy coherence. Your response here should not be affected by a government’s existing or lacking commitment to democracy and a market economy.

The government coordinates its policies effectively and acts in a coherent manner.  

The government tries to coordinate conflicting objectives and interests, but it has only limited success. Intra-governmental friction, redundancies and lacunae are significant.

The government often fails to coordinate between conflicting objectives or interests. Different parts of the government tend to compete among each other, and some policies have counter-productive effects on other policies.

The government does not care about policy coordination or fails to coordinate its conflicting objectives and interests. Its policies thwart and damage each other; policy incoherence causes substantial problems. The executive is fragmented into rival fiefdoms that counteract each other.

To what extent can the government successfully contain corruption?

Success in fighting corruption is a key indicator of effective resource use. Please indicate if the government implements and monitors the following “integrity mechanisms”: auditing of state spending; regulation of party financing; citizen and media access to information; accountability of officeholders (asset declarations, conflict of interest rules, codes of conduct); transparent public procurement systems; effective prosecution of corruption.

In contrast to question 3.3, this question is to determine the quality and extent of governmental policies affecting these integrity mechanisms.

All integrity mechanisms are reasonably effective. They are actively supported by the government.  

Most integrity mechanisms are functioning, albeit partly with limited effectiveness. The government provides almost all integrity mechanisms.

Some integrity mechanisms are implemented. Often, they remain ineffective; their operation is impeded by private interests. The government’s motivation and capacity to implement reforms is mixed.

Portions of the state are controlled by private interest groups; reform is impeded by private interests, rendering most integrity mechanisms nonexistent or ineffective.
**Criterion: Consensus-Building**

The political leadership establishes a broad consensus on reform with other actors in society without sacrificing its reform goals.

### 16.1 Consensus on goals

**To what extent do the major political actors agree on a market economy and democracy as strategic, long-term aims?**

This question is intended to check whether there is a basic consensus on the goals of development and transformation. The major political actors are parties, politicians, interest groups and economic actors with political clout, whose power and importance (number of voters, jobs, financial resources, authority, influence, etc.) are relevant to the course of the political process. This question also reflects the experience that many successful transformations are based on agreements reached by reform-minded political actors with old elites or potential opponents of reform.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All major political actors agree on building a market-based democracy.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The major political actors agree on at least one of the goals (market economy or democracy). Or: there is a rudimentary consensus on both goals, but it is fragile or does not include major elements of a market-based democracy.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The major political actors have differences of principle about the goals of development/ transformation. There is a fundamental conflict over both a market economy and democracy as goals.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are no major political actors who want to build a market-based democracy.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 16.2 Anti-democratic actors

**To what extent can the reformers exclude or co-opt powerful anti-democratic actors?**

This evaluation is directed at anti-democratic actors who hold veto power, and are potential opponents of reform—in other words, those actors who can cause democratization to stall or fail. These might include the military, large landowners, influential economic actors or powerful opposition groups.

Reformers can often be in or close to the government but may also be in opposition to a government or a ruling elite. A successful reform policy can eliminate or co-opt powerful anti-democratic actors, induce them to comply permanently with constitutional rules, or develop a basic consensus with them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The reformers can successfully and permanently exclude or co-opt all powerful actors with anti-democratic interests.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformers cannot control all powerful anti-democratic actors but can at least limit the use of their powers significantly.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformers have no control over powerful anti-democratic actors, who can terminate the reform process at any time or make active use of their influence to stall it.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are no relevant political actors who would advance democratic reforms.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Consensus-Building**

The political leadership establishes a broad consensus on reform with other actors in society without sacrificing its reform goals.

### 16.3 Cleavage/conflict management

**To what extent can the political leadership manage political cleavages so that they do not escalate into irreconcilable conflicts?**

Cleavages are significant and protracted divisions of society that are often, but not necessarily reflected in the party system. Cleavages may be manifested in ethnic, class, regional or religious conflicts. Good governance must depolarize structural conflicts, prevent society from falling apart along these cleavages, and establish as broad a consensus as possible across the dividing lines.

- The political leadership depolarizes conflict and expands consensus across the dividing lines. [10 □, 9 □]
- The political leadership prevents cleavage-based conflicts from escalating. [8 □, 7 □, 6 □]
- The political leadership does not reduce existing divisions or prevent cleavage-based conflicts from escalating. [5 □, 4 □, 3 □]
- The political leadership exacerbates existing cleavages to split society or the state. [2 □, 1 □]

### 16.4 Civil society participation

**To what extent does the political leadership enable the participation of civil society in the political process?**

This question asks whether the political leadership involves civil society actors in the political debate, the identification of political goals/priorities and the formulation of policies. Civil society actors include civic, economic and professional interest associations, intellectuals, scientists, journalists and local political representatives.

- The political leadership assigns an important role to civil society actors in deliberating and determining policies. [10 □, 9 □]
- The political leadership takes into account and accommodates the interests of civil society actors. [8 □, 7 □, 6 □]
- The political leadership frequently ignores civil society actors and formulates its policy autonomously. [5 □, 4 □, 3 □]
- The political leadership suppresses and excludes civil society actors from the political process. [2 □, 1 □]
Consensus-Building

The political leadership establishes a broad consensus on reform with other actors in society without sacrificing its reform goals.

To what extent can the political leadership bring about reconciliation between the victims and perpetrators of past injustices?

This question examines the extent to which a country’s leading political actors are able to address or overcome a conflict-laden past that is experienced as unjust, or at least to achieve moral justice for past acts of injustice. The goal of coping with the past is to obtain justice or reconciliation between former victims and perpetrators. If a country has not experienced major historical injustices or has already achieved reconciliation prior to 2005 (e.g., Costa Rica), this question cannot be answered meaningfully and is therefore not taken into account for the aggregate rating.

- The political leadership achieves reconciliation for historical acts of injustice.  
  - 10 □  
  - 9 □

- The political leadership recognizes the need to deal with historical acts of injustice, but the process of reconciliation fails.  
  - 8 □  
  - 7 □  
  - 6 □

- The political leadership does not address past acts of injustice and does not initiate a process of reconciliation.  
  - 5 □  
  - 4 □  
  - 3 □

- The political leadership manipulates memories of historical injustices as a weapon against political opponents.  
  - 2 □  
  - 1 □

N/A
To what extent does the political leadership use the support of international partners to implement a long-term strategy of development?

This question evaluates how the political leadership makes use of international assistance—major projects involving technical or personal cooperation—in their own reform policies. Does the government have clear aims of democratic and economic development, and is there a roadmap specifying steps to reach these aims and defining the inputs required from international partners / donors? Have the political actors made progress in implementing such steps? Or do short-term expediencies, policy inconsistencies, perhaps even rent-seeking, dominate the use of international assistance? The focus is on the ability to learn from international know-how, to adapt external advice to domestic realities and to integrate international assistance into a consistent and long-term domestic agenda of reforms.

The political leadership makes well-focused use of international aid in order to implement its long-term strategy of development. 10 □

The political leadership works with bilateral or multilateral international donors and tries to make use of international assistance for its domestic reform agenda, but has clear deficits in devising a consistent long-term strategy which allows integrating international assistance. 8 □

Although the political leadership cooperates with individual bilateral or multilateral international donors, it does not use international aid to improve its policies and might even consider external advice as undesired political interference. There is no viable long-term development strategy. 5 □

The political leadership is not interested in a cooperation with bilateral or multilateral international donors. 2 □

To what extent does the government act as a credible and reliable partner in its relations with the international community?

This question asks whether the government is able to increase confidence in its country and to build confidence for its reform policies on the way to a market-based democracy. Credibility and reliability should be assessed in view of such policies, whereas policies not related to democratic and market reforms (e.g., a reliable cooperation in international military alliances or peace missions) should not be considered.

Apart from the government’s confidence-building activities, you should examine the extent to which the government is considered a reliable partner by international organizations, other states, foreign investors or international NGOs. Commercial risk ratings may be used to answer this question.

The government is considered credible and reliable by the international community. 10 □

The government tries to act as a credible and reliable partner, but major international actors still express doubts regarding its reliability. 8 □

The government tries to present itself as a credible partner, but it is not trusted by the international community. 5 □

The government acts unpredictably, without regard for the international community. Cooperating with the state entails major risks. 2 □
17.3 Regional cooperation

**Criterion:** International Cooperation

The country’s political actors are willing to cooperate with outside supporters and organizations.

**To what extent is the political leadership willing to cooperate with neighboring countries in regional and international organizations?**

This concerns domestic political actors’ willingness to develop good neighborly relations, to cooperate with neighbors in international and regional organizations and to support regional or international integration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership actively and successfully builds and expands as many cooperative international relationships as possible. It promotes regional and international integration.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership cooperates with many neighboring states and complies with the rules set by regional and international organizations.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership cooperates selectively or sporadically with individual neighboring states and is reluctant to accept the rules set by regional and international organizations.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political leadership rejects international cooperation or obstructs existing cooperative relationships.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Score Summary

1 – 5 Democracy
6 – 12 Market Economy
13 – 17 Management
For those of you unable to use the template BTI_Questionnaire_2010.xls, please print out and fax the following Score Summary and the Questions on the Political System to:

**BTI Coordinator Olaf Hillenbrand**  
++ 49 89 21801329

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country:</th>
<th>Analyst:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Democracy

#### Criterion: Stateness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.1</th>
<th>Monopoly on the use of force</th>
<th>To what extent does the state's monopoly on the use of force cover the entire territory?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>State identity</td>
<td>To what extent do all relevant groups in society agree about citizenship and accept the nation-state as legitimate?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>No interference of religious dogmas</td>
<td>To what extent are the state's legitimacy and its legal order defined without interference by religious dogmas?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Basic administration</td>
<td>To what extent do basic administrative structures exist?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Criterion: Political Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.1</th>
<th>Free and fair elections</th>
<th>To what extent are rulers determined by general, free and fair elections?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Effective power to govern</td>
<td>To what extent do democratically elected rulers have the effective power to govern or to what extent are there veto powers and political enclaves?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Association/assembly rights</td>
<td>To what extent can independent political and/or civic groups associate and assemble freely?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Freedom of expression</td>
<td>To what extent can citizens, organizations and the mass media express opinions freely?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Criterion: Rule of Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.1</th>
<th>Separation of powers</th>
<th>To what extent is there a working separation of powers (checks and balances)?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Independent judiciary</td>
<td>To what extent does an independent judiciary exist?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Prosecution of office abuse</td>
<td>To what extent are there legal or political penalties for officeholders who abuse their positions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Civil rights</td>
<td>To what extent are civil rights guaranteed and protected, and to what extent can citizens seek redress for violations of these liberties?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Stability of Democratic Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Performance of democratic institutions: Are democratic institutions, including the administrative system and the system of justice, capable of performing?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Commitment to democratic institutions: To what extent are democratic institutions accepted or supported by the relevant actors?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Political and Social Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Party system: To what extent is there a stable and socially rooted party system able to articulate and aggregate societal interests?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Interest groups: To what extent is there a network of cooperative associations or interest groups to mediate between society and the political system?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Consent to democratic norms: How strong is the citizens’ consent to democratic norms and procedures?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Associational activities: To what extent have social self-organization and the construction of social capital advanced?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Level of Socioeconomic Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>Socioeconomic barriers: To what extent are significant parts of the population fundamentally excluded from society due to poverty and inequality combined (income gaps, gender, education, religion, ethnicity)?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Organization of the Market and Competition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Market-based competition: To what level have the fundamentals of market-based competition developed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Anti-monopoly policy: To what extent do safeguards exist to prevent the development of economic monopolies and cartels?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Liberalization of foreign trade: To what extent has foreign trade been liberalized?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Banking system: To what extent have a solid banking system and a capital market been established?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Currency and Price Stability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Anti-inflation/forex policy: To what extent does the country pursue a consistent inflation policy and an appropriate foreign exchange policy? Is there an independent central bank?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Macrostability: To what extent do the government’s fiscal and debt policies support macroeconomic stability?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Private Property

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>Property rights: To what extent do government authorities ensure well-defined rights of private property and regulate the acquisition of property?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>Private enterprise: To what extent are private companies permitted? Are state companies undergoing a process of privatization consistent with market principles?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Criterion: Welfare Regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>Structural constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>Civil society traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>Conflict intensity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11</th>
<th>Criterion: Economic Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Output strength</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12</th>
<th>Criterion: Sustainability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>Environmental policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>Education policy / R&amp;D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13</th>
<th>Criterion: Level of Difficulty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>Structural constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>Civil society traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>Conflict intensity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14</th>
<th>Criterion: Steering Capability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>Prioritization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>Policy learning</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15</th>
<th>Criterion: Resource Efficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>Efficient use of assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>Policy coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>Anti-corruption policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Consensus-Building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16.1 Consensus on goals</td>
<td>To what extent do the major political actors agree on a market economy and democracy as strategic, long-term aims?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.2 Anti-democratic actors</td>
<td>To what extent can the reformers exclude or co-opt powerful anti-democratic actors?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.3 Cleavage/conflict management</td>
<td>To what extent can the political leadership manage political cleavages so that they do not escalate into irreconcilable conflicts?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.4 Civil society participation</td>
<td>To what extent does the political leadership enable the participation of civil society in the political process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.5 Reconciliation</td>
<td>To what extent can the political leadership bring about reconciliation between the victims and perpetrators of past injustices?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### International Cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17.1 Effective use of support</td>
<td>To what extent does the political leadership use the support of international partners to implement a long-term strategy of development?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.2 Credibility</td>
<td>To what extent does the government act as a credible and reliable partner in its relations with the international community?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.3 Regional cooperation</td>
<td>To what extent is the political leadership willing to cooperate with neighboring countries in regional and international organizations?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Questions on the Political System

System of government
Executive (parliamentary & semipresidential systems)
Legislature
Executive (presidential systems)
Institutional constraints on executive authority
The following questions serve to collect basic and comparable information on the political system of the country you have assessed. This data will be used in a table in the Management section of your report that allows readers to better contextualize your assessment.

Please mark the correct column with y ('yes') or n ('no') if not stated otherwise.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System of government</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1. Is the head of government also head of state?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If question 1 = ‘no’, go to question 3ff.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Is the head of government and state popularly elected?</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>If question 2 = ‘yes’, go to question 11ff.; if question 2 = ‘no’, go to question 7ff.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3. Is the head of state popularly elected?</strong></td>
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<td><strong>4. Is the head of state determined by hereditary succession?</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>5. Can the head of state appoint members of government without the legislature’s approval?</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>6. Can the head of government be removed by the legislature?</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>If question 6 = ‘no’, go to question 11ff.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Questions on the Political System

Executive
(parliamentary & semipresidential systems)

7. **Name of head of state**
   If the head of state is determined by hereditary succession, continue with question 10ff.

8. **Date of presidential election**

9. **President’s term of office (m/y – m/y)**
   –

10. **Please list the changes of cabinets January 1, 2007 – December 31, 2008**

   A cabinet is defined by the same prime minister continuously in office, the same party or parties in government and the same legislative period. The following modes of termination should be distinguished: elections = 1; resignation of the prime minister = 2; death/illness of prime minister = 3; dissension within cabinet (coalition breaks up) = 4; lack of parliamentary support = 5; intervention by head of state = 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties in government (acronyms)</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Mode of termination</th>
<th>Duration (m/y – m/y)</th>
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</table>

Legislature

11. **Please give the distribution of votes and parliamentary mandates (based upon the most recent elections, first chamber, national list, in descending order according to size)**

   **Date of parliamentary election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of party (in English)</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
<th>% of mandates</th>
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<tbody>
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</table>
Questions on the Political System

If your system of government is parliamentary or semipresidential, go to question 16ff. If your system of government is dynastic (head of state determined by hereditary succession) and the head of government may be removed by the legislature, go to question 16ff.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Executive (presidential systems)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12. <strong>Name of head of state</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the head of (government and) state is determined by hereditary succession, continue with questions 15ff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. <strong>Date of presidential election</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. <strong>President’s term of office (m/y – m/y)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. <strong>Please list the changes of the legislature January 1, 2007 – December 31, 2008</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties permanently supporting the president (acronyms)</th>
<th>Total % of mandates</th>
<th>Duration (m/y – m/y)</th>
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<tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional constraints on executive authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16. <strong>Is the state organized as a federation?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. <strong>Do subnational governments have substantial power and autonomy?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. <strong>Does a second chamber have an equal role in legislation?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. <strong>Is constitutional reform difficult (e.g., requires a qualified majority)?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. <strong>Are referenda on political issues frequent and influential for the political process?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. <strong>Is legislation reviewed by a constitutional courts or other courts?</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>