### Political transformation

During the review period, Guinea and Kyrgyzstan underwent the transition from autocratic rule to democracy. In Guinea, a turbulent transitional phase following a military putsch was concluded – for the time being – with relatively free and fair presidential elections. However, a putsch attempted against the elected President Condé in July 2011 points to a fragile political situation.

In Kyrgyzstan, following President Bakiyev’s overthrow in April 2010 and initially massive outbreaks of violence that were in part driven by ethnic tensions, the interim government managed to hold a largely peaceful constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections (the latter in October 2010). The vote offered all political forces adequate opportunities for an active campaign that was free and with fair access to the media. Conversely, three countries – Haiti, Madagascar and Thailand – can no longer be designated as democracies. Haiti was classified as an autocracy in part because of its manipulated elections of November 2010, even though the March 2011 runoff for the presidency – from which Michel Martelly emerged as the clear victor – was considered reasonably free and fair (the runoff took place after the end of the review period). In addition, the country is classified as a failing state due to inadequate guarantees of the state monopoly on the use of force and the virtually complete collapse of basic administrative structures following the severe earthquake of January 2010.

In Madagascar, President Ravalomanana was forced to resign by the military after violent demonstrations in late March 2009. The military installed as his successor Andry Rajoelina, the former mayor of the capital Antananarivo. This relatively non-violent putsch was condemned by the African Union and the international community as an unconstitutional change of government, and sanctions were imposed. However, parliamentary and presidential elections are planned for March 2012.

Finally, the quality of the electoral system and the rule of law in Thailand are theoretically sufficient for the country to be considered a defective democracy. However, the elected political decision makers lack effective power to govern because the military and other institutions without democratic legitimation (such as the Privy Council) have extensive power to intervene politically. Moreover, the military’s brutal suppression of demonstrators in Bangkok in early 2010 constituted a massive violation of human and civil rights.

The BTI 2012 classifies 75 countries as democracies and 53 as autocracies – one less democracy and one more autocracy than in 2010. Only 23 democracies can be considered well-governed countries. Over two-thirds of the democratically governed countries display more or less serious deficiencies in the areas of political participation, the rule of law and the stability of their institutions. Even so, the number of highly defective democracies within this group fell from 16 (in the BTI 2010) to 13, as in the case of Venezuela, as the state of political transformation in Colombia, Kenya and the Philippines improved enough for them to move up to the group of defective democracies.

The group of 53 autocracies includes 48 countries that are undemocratic simply because either elections are not held or they are insufficiently free. They are joined by five countries whose deficits in other areas of the political system are so severe that they cannot be classified as democracies. In Bhutan and Pakistan, as in Thailand, the elected political decision makers have insufficient effective power to govern. Additionally, civil rights in Pakistan are hardly guaranteed at all. In Venezuela, the separation of powers has been abrogated. Finally, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, both administrative structures and the state’s monopoly on the use of force are insufficient. These

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**Table: BTI 2012 Changes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Change 2010-12</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Change 2010-12</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Philippines</td>
<td>–0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>–1.55</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Changes of at least 0.5 points in comparison to the BTI 2010.

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**Figure:**

A map of the world showing the distribution of autocracies and democracies in 2012.
shortcomings are severe enough to land the Democratic Republic of Congo within the category of undermanned states on the basis of weak state autonomy. Therefore, the country is classified along with Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Haiti and Somalia as a failing state in the BTI 2012. The Republic of Congo

The number of fragile states is on the decline

Stateness – in the sense of securing the state’s monopoly on the use of force and adequate basic administration – represents an essential precondition for political transformation. In this respect, the BTI 2012 offers a positive finding that the problem of state fragility – and thus a pronounced lack of stateness – has declined somewhat over the past years. The number of countries for which the BTI attests more serious deficits fell from a good quarter (30 of 119 countries in the BTI 2006) to just under a fifth (24 of 128 countries in the BTI 2012). Regarding recent developments, however, one must distinguish between the two aspects of stateness mentioned above. While the state’s monopoly on the use of force was better enforced in nearly all regions (except for Latin America, where it is undermined by the drug trade and organized crime), scores for basic administrative structures fell in nearly all regions for the first time since 2006.

Countries in sub-Saharan Africa display the strongest improvements on the core elements of stateness. Eighteen of the 37 countries studied in this region show a stronger state monopoly on the use of force compared to the BTI 2010. Thus, apart from Colombia, the rest of the seven countries no longer regarded as having fundamental deficits in stateness compared to the BTI 2010 all come from sub-Saharan Africa (Burundi, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Mauritania and Zimbabwe). In Asia, finally, strong stateness in the Northeast Asian area and in most Southeast Asian countries (except for Myanmar and a regressive trend in Thailand) is countered by greater state fragility in South Asia, which features Afghanistan as a failing state and Pakistan as a fragile state with declining scores, especially for the state’s monopoly on the use of force. The quality of electoral processes is sinking

An essential aspect in determining the quality of a country’s democracy is national elections, which, however, conducted in a completely fair and fair manner in a shrinkin- ning number of countries. Where the BTI 2008 found fairness and fairness in voting to be either not restricted or merely margin- ally so in 40 countries (9 or 10 points), only 30 countries were listed as having a clean electoral process in the BTI 2012. This is one reason why the average score for free and fair elections has fallen from 6.22 in the BTI 2008 to 5.98 at present. Latin American and African countries predominated among those who dropped out of the top group. In these regions, losses in the quality of the electoral process often went hand in hand with a general decline in the state of democ- racy. Apart from Madagascar (now rated as an autocracy), this was most pronounced in Senegal (+1.25 points in comparison to 2006), South Africa (-0.95), Mexico (-0.60) and Ecuador (-0.50).

While for years the number of autocrat- ies without adequately free elections has remained relatively stable, at just under 50, the number of borderline countries – where elections just meet minimum requirements for free elections (6 points) but have serious deficits regarding voter registration, the con- duct of campaigns or media access and, in some instances, are characterized by irregu- larities in casting and tabulating votes – has tripled, from six (in the BTI 2006) to 18 today. Among them are a few countries that are moving up, having just recently embarked on a path of democratization (Guinea, Ky- guystan), but these are mainly countries in decline as the quality of their elections has dropped in the past years, sometimes drasti- cally (Kenya, Nicaragua, recently Burundi).

The quality of elections deteriorated most significantly in Southeast Europe and Cen- tral America, where nearly every country was downgraded in the current BTI. With the exception of Serbia, the quality of the elec- toral process declined in all of the Southeast European countries. While Macedonia was already downgraded in the last Transforma- tion Index, seven more states now score lower than in the BTI 2010. The December 2010 parliamentary elections in Kosovo, in particular, were overshadowed by manipula- tion and fraud. But other elections in South- east Europe, too, were marred by rule viola- tions, vote buying, intransparent campaign financing and accusations of fraud.

Among the Central American and Car- ibbean countries, only the top and bottom performers – Costa Rica and Cuba – and El Salvador have maintained the same scores. In all of the region’s other countries, the qual- ity of electoral processes has diminished over the past four years. This has been most true in Nicaragua as far back as 2007, where the government has used control of the Supreme Electoral Council to exercise partisan influ- ence over the registration procedure, cam- paign rules and the process of vote counting and, more recently, in Honduras, which lacked fair campaign conditions in the elections fol- lowing the patches against President Zelaya due to human rights violations and restric- tions on the freedom of press and assembly. Other political participation rights are subject to increasingly tight restrictions

These declines in the quality of democratic processes in precisely the regions that are still by far the most advanced raise ques- tions about the prospects for consolidating democracies under the rule of law. This is even more evident when one looks at partici- pation rights apart from elections: freedom of association and assembly as well as free- dom of expression and the press. Here – in contrast to the right to vote – backsliding in European countries is not limited to the Southeast European states. With respect to freedom of assembly, it includes Latvia and Slovakia along with the problem cases of Ukraine and Hungary. Hungary was drasti- cally downgraded due to the Orbán govern- ment’s restrictive new media legislation. In Ukraine, industrialists close to the gov- ernment have major media holdings, two oppositional television broadcasters were stripped of their frequencies, and critical journalists face physical threats up to and including abduction.

In many European countries, the media are exposed to increasing pressure from gov- ernments and economic interests. For one thing, governments are intervening more in the programming of public broadcast- ers and using lawsuits (as in Slovakia and Albania) to intimidate critical journalists with libel actions and the prospect of ruin- ous fines. For another, in countries such as Latvia, the economic crisis and the trend to- ward monopolization have made journalists more dependent on media companies whose business and political interests influence the reporting. Payola journalism – which interests groups and politicians to use secure favorable coverage – is undermining the political dis- course. Independent journalists are defamed or threatened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo.

In light of the multitude of restrictions on freedom of expression, average regional scores for East-Central and Southeast Eu- rope have fallen dramatically, plunging dras- tically from 9.27 in 2006 to 7.82 today. This trend among other countries is turned into the BTI after 2006 are excluded: Number of countries showing a decline in economic performance in BTI 2012: 38 Number of countries showing an improved economic performance: 21

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Montenegro (2008) and Kosovo (2010). The current average score for freedom of expression would then be 8.07, still a dramatic drop of 1.20 points.

A clearly regressive regional trend for freedom of expression can also be observed in North Africa and the Middle East over the past two years. From Morocco to Iran, eight countries that were mostly already at a very low level were downgraded again. On the eve of the Arab Spring (still during the period included in BTI), many regimes under mounting pressure tried to silence oppositional voices. Journalists in Sudan were subjected to especially harshly escalating repression. They were physically attacked or arbitrarily imprisoned, particularly when they did not tow the government’s line on the Darfur question or South Sudan’s referendum on independence. These negative regional trends of increasing restrictions on freedom of expression are countered by almost completely positive recent developments in West Africa, with nine countries in this region scoring higher. Niger deserves special attention because, beginning in February 2010, its military government lifted key restrictions on freedom of the press, began facilitating independent reporting, liberalized its media legislation and made the media oversight agency more pluralistic in its composition.

Freedom of association and assembly is increasingly restricted, as well. Backsliding is most evident in East-Central and South-East Europe, even though the regional average score of 9.47 (versus 9.76 in the BTI 2010) remains excellent. Downward trends can be observed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary and, in particular, Macedonia, where the governing party is targeting critical civic organizations for intimidation.

However, long-term regressive trends in South and East Africa and in post-Soviet Eurasia are significantly more serious. In the past six years, oppositional political organizations’ room to maneuver has been massively restricted in 11 of the 18 countries surveyed in the region of South and East Africa – especially in Madagascar, but also in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zambia, causing the regional average score to fall from 6.72 (in the BTI 2006) to its current 5.83 (excluding Lesotho, which was first included in the BTI in 2010). In post-Soviet Eurasia, the scope of action available to political groups narrowed compared to that identified in the BTI 2006 in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia – and recently in Belarus and Ukraine. The regional average score sank from 5.23 (in the BTI 2006) to 4.62 (in the BTI 2012).

Ukraine is the only country out of the 128 surveyed that was downgraded on every individual score for political participation, ranging from elections to effective power to govern and freedom of assembly and expression. Its decline was particularly drastic for freedom of association and assembly. Human rights activists are increasingly pressured, civic organizations are harassed by the state security service and foreign foundations and organizations are restricted in their ability to carry out their activities. The country’s courts deny permits to demonstrations on spurious grounds, while security forces prevent authorized gatherings from being conducted or use violence to break them up.

These developments reflect the resoluteness with which President Yanukovych and his Party of Regions (elected in early 2010) are deliberately eroding democratic standards in order to consolidate their own power. Apart from Madagascar (which was classified based on the first time in the current BTI and lost 2.25 points on political transformation), the defective democracy of Ukraine experienced the steepest devaluation with regard to participation rights, declining by 1.75 points.

In regional comparison, political participation is weakest – as one might expect – in the regions characterized by authoritarianism. North Africa and the Middle East once again constitute the lowest-scoring region, although the events of recent months raise hopes for clear gains in the BTI 2014.

Apart from the sometimes dramatic deterioration in the predominantly democratically governed regions of Europe and South America, the divergent trends in sub-Saharan African are especially striking. While governments throughout South and East Africa have continuously increased restrictions on participation rights for the past four years, West Africa in particular now shows a positive development, fostered primarily by trends toward democratization in Guinea and Mauritania, but also by the expansion of democratic participation in Benin, Ghana, Niger and Senegal.

Weakening rule of law in effective democracies

The present study confirms the observation that the undermining of participation rights and a decline in the rule of law mutually reinforce each other. The three regions where political participation declined most significantly – East Central and Southeast Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and South and East Africa – also experienced major losses in key aspects of the rule of law. This is less evident if one only considers the aggregated results of all four questions on the rule of law – separation of powers, judicial system, prosecution of abuse of office and civil rights. The aggregate perspective only reveals erosion of the rule of law in South and East Africa, which has been underway for years and is now pronounced. Of the region’s 19 countries, eight have declined by at least half a point since the BTI 2010 – including Brazil, which jumped from a relatively high level South Africa, along with the problematic cases of Madagascar and Eritrea. During the same period, only Angola and Burundi showed similarly clear-cut improvements in the rule of law, which nonetheless remains very weak in both countries.

The regional deficits emerge much more clearly when one considers the individual indicators. With respect to the separation of powers, a clear downward trend can be seen in a good third of the European and Latin American countries, even though both regions still have by far the best average scores in interregional comparison. In 10 countries, declines in the quality of elections went hand in hand with a weakening of the rule of law. Overall, the fairness – and sometimes even freedom – of elections deteriorated in 18 of 38 countries in these two regions.

This parallelism is not a coincidence; in most cases, it is accompanied by a strengthening in populist tendencies. Despite all differences specific to region and country, there are common characteristics that promote authoritarian regression under the guise of populism. For one thing, there is pronounced dissatisfaction with the socioeconomic performance of democratic systems in many Latin American states (continuous high degree of inequality and East-Central and Southeast Europe (dramatic wealth gap vis-à-vis Western Europe, social stresses due to shocks from the global economic crisis). For another, a loss of trust in existing parties and democratic institutions is being reinforced by the hostility to reform found among large numbers of the political elite in many Latin American countries and by the limited scope of action available to governments in EU member states and accession candidates. In interplay with the weak social grounding of existing parties, this facilitates the rapid rise of populist movements and parties.

Aspirations to power and disrespect for democratic processes among populist heads of government further erode standards for the rule of law already weakened by informal deals, clientelistic politics, corruption and (in Latin America) repression. This, in turn, undermines political participation rights. In by far the most common situation – erosion of checks and balances by a strong executive that seize the power of the other branches – the government can curtail the independence of election commissions, manipulate the regulation and conduct of elections to their benefit, restrict rights of association and assembly, or exert influence on public and private media.

In East-Central and Southeast Europe, the countries mainly responsible for the negative trend in the separation of powers are Hungary, Macedonia and Slovakia. Hungary was drastically downgraded from 10 to 7 points because Prime Minister Orbán, supported by a two-thirds parliamentary majority, is deliberately working to bring institutions independent of the government under his party’s control. The government appointed loyal minions to the chief prosecutor’s office, audit office, cartel office, financial supervisory authority and the new media regulatory agency. It also curtailed the oversight power of the Constitutional Court.

In Latin America, the mostly negative trends already diagnosed in the BTI 2010 have not been reversed. During the past six years, the separation of powers has been weakened in 10 of the 21 countries surveyed – most recently in Jamaica, Mexico and Peru.

In South and East Africa, one can observe an even more comprehensive deterioration of the rule of law, which was at a much lower standard to begin with. This includes not just the separation of powers, but also the prosecution of abuse of office and the protection of civil rights. The putch in Madagascar merely represented the nadir of a continuous erosion of the rule of law in that country. In Mozambique, the ruling party Frelimo, led by President Guebuza, has monopolized all positions of political and economic power. The dictatorial regime in Eritrea has further intensified repression and coercion. In Ethiopia, civil rights have become even more restricted under a fig leaf of anti-terrorism policy. Finally, civil rights – especially
women – are increasingly being violated in Zambia.

Over the longer term, it is striking that personal liberties, such as equality under the law and protection from torture or arbitrary imprisonment, are more weakly defended in eight of the region’s countries, with particularly strong regressive trends observed in Madagascar and Zambia. Compared to the BTI 2010, a decline in combating political corruption and abuse of office can be seen in seven countries, especially Eritrea. In South and East Africa, the regional average for the prosecution of abuse of office dropped below Asia’s unchanged low level for the first time.

The quality of democracy is eroding in Latin America and East-Central and Southeast Europe

A breakdown of the scores for the rule of law in all 128 BTI countries according to political system (democracy versus autocracy) reveals that backsliding in this area has been significantly worse in democratically governed countries. This is illustrated by divergent trends in autocracies and democracies for prosecution of abuse of office. While moderate autocracies – such as Armenia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Togo and the United Arab Emirates – are now prosecuting officeholders’ illegal and corrupt practices somewhat more vigorously than in the past, 13 democracies have eased up on the prosecution of abuse of office. This is especially consequential in Benin, Croatia, Ukraine and Zambia because these countries have now been downgraded on this question for the second time in six years.

On average, democracies continue to prosecute political corruption and abuse of office more strictly than do autocracies (C.52 versus 3.68 points). But it is striking that the 20 moderate autocracies now average better on prosecuting abuse of office than does the homogeneous group of 52 defective and highly defective democracies. Especially noteworthy here are the United Arab Emirates’ continuous advances in disclosing and energetically pursuing cases of abuse of office. The Emirates improved from 4 (BTI 2006) to 5 (BTI 2008) and now 7 points. It thus decisively leads the other Gulf states, which – with the exception of Kuwait (5 points) – all languish at the low level of a mere 4 points. With this, the United Arab Emirates joined the top group of just 22 countries that achieved 7 points or more for prosecuting political corruption, which includes 19 democracies along with the autocracies of Bhutan and Singapore.

In light of the marked losses in participatory rights and quality of the rule of law, it is hardly surprising that the stability of democratic institutions has further declined in East-Central and Southeast Europe as well as Latin America. In the European region, this has less to do with the functionality and efficiency of institutions than with their acceptance, which has long been clearly weakest in Bosnia and Herzegovina – and which now also affects Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia and Slovakia.

In the Latin American region, the negative trend applies to both the acceptance and the performance of democratic institutions, which were already on the decline in past years. That the region’s average scores have decreased again is primarily attributable to declines in Haiti’s scores, which resulted from the earthquake and the chaotic, manipulated elections that followed. Democratic institutions suffered definite losses in legitimacy after the fall of President Zelaya in Honduras. Their performance and acceptance were weakened in Argentina in part as a result of the concentration of power in the executive and informal governance practices. Centrifugal forces arising from the combination of strong provincial governments and deficits in the national party system also account for weakened institutional performance in Argentina.

Scores for stability have risen strikingly in West and Central Africa, buttressed decisively by the improved situation in Guinea. However, in the long-term trend, these gains only cancel out previous losses that resulted from the weakening of democratic institutions in Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Senegal and for which purposes in Ghana and Liberia cannot wholly compensate.

Party systems worsen, social cohesion improves

With the criterion for political and social integration, the BTI examines how well the concerns of the populace are politically represented by parties and interest groups, and how well the political culture of each country promotes democracy. It assesses consent to democratic norms and values, as well as the creation of social capital based on the extent of solidarity and trust within the populace and the capacity for self-organization in civil society. Over the past six years, only marginal changes are perceptible in the aggregate of these factors, the most obvious of which is the positive trend in West and Central Africa. Here, six countries managed to clearly strengthen political and social integration, with especially impressive advances in Liberia (+2.83 points), Togo (+2.67) and Niger (+1.33), as well as gains in Benin, Guinea and the Democratic Republic of Congo (each +1.00).

While consent to democratic systems, its institutions and its performance remained basically unchanged, revealing shifts in scores have appeared over the past six years for the other three questions. While stability and the degree to which party systems are rooted in society was assessed somewhat more negatively on global average (and now represents the lowest scoring democracy indicator in the entire BTI), the representative and mediation capacities of interest groups were rated as somewhat better. The quality of party systems in especially Latin America and the Arab world saw a sharp decline, while it lacked the trend in the Arab world and made perceptible advances in East-Central and Southeast Europe, especially in Latvia and Serbia.

The ability of interest groups to mediate between civil society and the political systems in a balanced and cooperative manner increased in East-Central and Southeast Europe. North and East Africa, the Middle East, and West and Central Africa. The countries of South and East Africa depart noticeably from this trend, especially Rwanda (–3 points) and Eritrea, Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania (each –2 points).

Finally, a promising trend is the apparent increase in social cohesion in many societies. An impressive 16 countries left behind the lowest-scoring range of the BTI and now boast at least average scores for trust, solidarity and the resulting capacity of civil society for self-organization. Apart from Arab countries, average scores for social capital rose in all regions during the past six years.

Dimming prospects for consolidation in many democracies

After analyzing all criteria, selected questions and the regions, the state of political transformation on the global level appears significantly more problematic – especially in long-term perspective – than the slight drop in the average score for all 128 countries, from 5.80 to 5.76, would suggest. A stable top group of 23 democracies in consolidation, together with a decrease from 16 to 13 in the number of countries classified as highly defective democracies (with the trin of Colombia, Kenya and the Philippines moving up as well), as a mere handful of reform initiatives (three to the camp of autocracies and two to the group of democracies) suggest a certain stasis in the state of political transformation. However, this assessment does not hold up in the context of scores that are falling – sometimes dramatically – for the core democratic areas of political participation and the rule of law.

Instead, a (in some cases pronounced) loss in the quality of democracy is registered precisely in the democratically governed regions of East-Central and Southeast Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean. This affects fundamental participation rights, such as elections and freedom of expression, as well as core components of the rule of law, such as the separation of powers and the protection of civil rights. Even though these declinations are taking place within the context of an advanced state of transformation, their wide scatter is noteworthy. Compared to the BTI 2010, average
region scores for political transformation fell in East-Central and Southeast Europe by 0.16 points and in Latin America by 0.14 points. The greatest gains, by contrast, were booked by West and Central Africa (+0.25 points), mainly in the areas of political participation and the stability of democratic institutions.

It is thus not surprising that the slight depreciation in the state of democracy on global average is primarily attributable to losses of quality in democratically governed countries. Among the 16 countries with the heaviest declines are seven countries – Albania, Argentina, Hungary, Macedonia, Mexico, Slovenia and Slovakia and Ukraine – whose state of political transformation in democracies has fallen in recent years from 7.41 (BTI 2006) to 7.19 points (BTI 2012). By contrast, autocracies have managed to raise their political transformation scores moderately and continuously from 3.56 (BTI 2006) to 3.73 today – for instance, in the areas of securing the state's monopoly on the use of force (+0.61 points), expanding basic administrative structures (+0.49) and stronger prosecution of abuse of power (+0.22).

On the positive side, it should be noted that the slight erosion of the rule of law and the instability of democratic institutions scores moderately and continues (BTI 2012). By contrast, autocracies have managed to raise their political transformation in democracies has fallen of political transformation: Guinea, Kenya, Mauritania and Zimbabwe.

The biggest weak points here are again resistance to basic administration (+0.49) and stronger prosecution of abuse of power (+0.22). It is thus not surprising that the slight erosion of the rule of law and the instability of democratic institutions scores moderately and continues (BTI 2012). By contrast, autocracies have managed to raise their political transformation in democracies has fallen of political transformation: Guinea, Kenya, Mauritania and Zimbabwe.

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