Glimmers of Hope at the Ballot Box
The absence of new conflicts in Southern and Eastern Africa in the review period can be considered a notable achievement. Recent electoral defeats of long-dominant ruling parties offer signs of democratic renewal. Yet, in many cases, new reform efforts are stifled early. Governance across the region continues to be hampered by weak civil societies, endemic corruption and narrowly structured economies with limited diversification. At the same time, the future of international cooperation in the region appears increasingly uncertain.
In Southern and Eastern Africa, the notion of elections as engines of transformation can still seem more aspirational than real. And yet, during the BTI 2026 review period, the ballot box did offer glimmers of hope. In South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) lost its three-decade monopoly on power in 2024. That same year, Botswana, long regarded as the region’s democratic frontrunner, underwent a peaceful transfer of power after an opposition victory. By contrast, in the region’s 14 autocracies, elections remain little more than rituals of legitimation or are not held at all, as was the case in Eritrea, where the system has taken on increasingly totalitarian characteristics. South Sudan and Somalia, meanwhile, remain failed states mired in civil war.
Lesotho stands out economically as the region’s top performer in the BTI 2026. However, Mauritius remains the only country classified as undergoing an advanced stage of economic transformation. In most other countries, economic indicators have returned to pre-pandemic levels, though in cases like those of Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan and Zimbabwe, this simply means that catastrophic conditions persist for the majority of the population.
This year’s edition of the BTI registers a further deterioration in governance for Burundi and Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, after weathering multiple armed conflicts, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has responded with a narrowing of civic and political space rather than with more political inclusion. Still, it is worth noting that no new conflict lines have emerged in the region – and, in a context of overall stagnation, even that may be seen as a cautious sign of hope.
Political transformation
Democratic gains through electoral defeat
Public dissatisfaction with Botswana’s ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), in power for 58 years, had been evident in opinion polls for some time. Even so, few observers expected the opposition alliance Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) to clinch a victory in October 2024. The peaceful transfer of power further strengthened the country’s democratic consolidation. Mauritius ranks just behind Botswana in terms of political transformation, though worries remain about increased electronic surveillance and gradual authoritarian backsliding. Notably, in the November 2024 parliamentary elections, the opposition won all 60 seats with just 62.6% of the vote, a distortion enabled by the country’s first-past-the-post electoral system.
In Zambia, where power changed hands in 2022, initial optimism has given way to disappointment. Reform implementation has been sluggish, and President Hakainde Hichilema’s administration has grown increasingly repressive toward the opposition. In Tanzania, where reforms under President Samia Suluhu Hassan have remained largely symbolic, the mood is similarly sobering. Most recently, she has wielded her sweeping executive powers to suppress dissent more overtly. In Kenya, a sense of disillusionment has also taken hold. After pledging to stimulate economic growth, the government instead faced widespread protests in 2024 and 2025 over proposed tax hikes, with the demonstrations mainly being led by students and young people. The government’s response, which involved widespread police violence, sparked international outrage.
Namibia recorded the steepest decline on measures of political transformation during the review period (–0.55 points). The drop is largely attributable to the 2024 elections and reflects procedural flaws in electoral administration and political interference in the media. With the new president, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, hailing from the long-dominant SWAPO party, observers expect little change in the country’s patronage-based governance.
South Africa’s trajectory is harder to predict. After the ANC’s loss of power for the first time in three decades a Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed. This 10-party coalition, including the ANC, has yet to prove whether this it can govern effectively given its inexperience with coalition politics, the growing influence of populist parties, and internal resistance from loyalists of former President Jacob Zuma.
Mozambique, once seen as a beacon of democratic promise, now offers a cautionary tale. The ruling FRELIMO party, in power since the civil war ended 50 years ago, relied on blatant electoral fraud during elections held in October 2024. When mostly younger citizens took to the streets in protest, the police responded with force, killing some 300 people. Mozambique, ranked sixth in the region’s democracy index in the BTI 2006, has now fallen to join the ranks of hard-line autocracies, alongside Eswatini, Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia.
Economic transformation
Reform prioritization and implementation
Unsurprisingly, the countries with the weakest performance on measures of economic transformation are also among those at the bottom of the governance and political rankings. Rwanda stands out, with official economic data suggesting a textbook case of autocratic modernization. However, these macroeconomic figures should be treated with caution, as they stand in stark contrast to the country’s persistently high poverty rate (40%) and stagnation in its level of socioeconomic development. Of the 18 countries in this region included in both the BTI 2006 and BTI 2026 editions, only four have shown progress in socioeconomic development, and the once-wider regional gap with West and Central Africa has now narrowed to just 0.19 points on average.
Economic transformation across the region remains constrained by deep structural weaknesses. Despite a modest post-pandemic recovery and falling inflation rates, progress continues to be stymied by widespread corruption, elite capture of economic resources, weak institutions and fragmented social safety nets. In the authoritarian states, private-sector development is further hampered by political repression, systemic graft and, in some cases, international isolation. In the failed states of Somalia and South Sudan, basic frameworks for a functioning market economy are rudimentary.
There were a few exceptions during the review period, as Lesotho showed notable improvement, along with Djibouti, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe. In Djibouti’s case, gains were largely driven by growing economic stability and expanded cooperation with the IMF. South Africa, despite having the highest GDP in the region, has failed to act as a growth engine. Mismanagement, particularly under former President Zuma, has discouraged both domestic and foreign investment, stalling South Africa’s market transformation. Since the BTI 2006, the country has lost 1.53 points and, for the second time in a row, now ranks behind Kenya (5.86 points vs. South Africa’s 5.71), as the second largest economy in the region.
Kenya, with Nairobi as a key regional hub, continues to hold significant economic potential for eastern Africa. A relatively diversified private sector forms the backbone of its economy, though several key industries remain under state control. The country is well integrated into global supply chains and regional economic systems, such as the East African Community (EAC). Its banking sector meets high standards, and Kenya leads eastern Africa in environmental technology. Unlike most countries in the subregion, it has environmental regulations and a functioning social safety net. Macroeconomic indicators, such as steady growth (over 3%) and relatively low unemployment, reflect its strength. Yet these topline figures obscure significant structural challenges, as underemployment remains high, youth unemployment exceeds 10%, and persistently low wages continue to drive the expansion of the informal sector.
Mauritius remains the region’s only country classified as advanced in terms of its economic transformation. High levels of public investment in the welfare system, such as the introduction of a higher minimum wage, have contributed to a widening budget deficit. This, along with a weakened central bank and a largely toothless competition authority, has led to a slight downgrade in its score. Nevertheless, Mauritius continues to outperform globally, ranking 21st out of 137 economies, which makes it one of the strongest non-European economies in the index.
Governance
Between stagnation and structural dependence
Governance across Southern and Eastern Africa continues to be shaped – and strained – by a range of persistent structural challenges, such as widespread poverty and inequality; weak stateness; undiversified, resource-dependent economies; fragile civil societies; stark urban-rural divides; and worsening climate conditions. But these difficult circumstances cannot fully explain the poor quality of governance, particularly in the region’s autocracies. Anti-corruption efforts remain especially weak, averaging just 3.36 points, which trails the Middle East and North Africa and even neighboring West and Central Africa.
Lesotho is showing notable advances in political prioritization, policy learning and implementation. The government has launched a number of new programs, including SEBABATSO (“We Grow Together”), an initiative designed to connect young entrepreneurs with potential investors. Despite ongoing delays in execution, the current administration has demonstrated a greater willingness to learn than its predecessors and has made tangible progress in digitalization. However, the systematic use of empirical evidence in policy evaluation remains limited.
Ethiopia presents a mixed picture. The end of the northern conflict in 2022 and a relative easing of tensions in the Amhara and Oromia regions in 2024 have brought a degree of calm to the country. Still, Prime Minister Abiy’s administration, under increasing pressure to survive politically, has failed to address the country’s fundamental challenges. Political space continues to shrink, and critical topics, such as independent investigations into human rights abuses or questions of national security, can no longer be openly debated.
Throughout the region, rhetoric around reform abounds. Djibouti has launched its first comprehensive strategy for economic transformation, Vision 2035, which centers on infrastructure development, economic diversification and private-sector reform. Rwanda’s government is similarly ambitious, promoting its Vision 2050, which aims to elevate the country to middle-income status by 2035. These strategies incorporate the use of innovative practices that are partly rooted in traditional social values. But the approach remains embedded in an authoritarian framework that allows little room for public dissent or legitimate outlets for frustration. Tanzania, under President Suluhu, has signaled interest in reform but continues to fall short of expectations, particularly when it comes to implementation.
With the exception of Botswana and Mauritius, all countries in the region remain heavily dependent on bi- and multilateral development cooperation, loans and foreign investment. The European Union continues to be the largest donor, which made it more striking when many African countries abstained or were absent during critical votes on Ukraine at the United Nations General Assembly. Relations with the EU have grown more complicated in recent years, particularly after Kenya, Eswatini and Zambia were accused of human rights violations by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other regional governments rallied to their defense. Meanwhile, the looming withdrawal of U.S. development assistance is already having devastating effects. In countries like Eswatini, South Africa and Zimbabwe, the suspension of HIV/AIDS programs funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is already producing catastrophic outcomes.
Outlook
Challenging outlook
The outlook for Southern and Eastern Africa has become more challenging in the short to medium term. China and Russia are increasingly positioning themselves as alternative economic and security partners. It remains to be seen whether intergovernmental bodies, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU) or the BRICS group, can deepen cooperation. Domestically, dominant presidencies, personalist leadership styles and power struggles over term limits continue to fuel autocratization. Uganda offers a case in point. A key driver of democratic transformation remains electoral competition. For real progress to be made, opposition parties must do more than protest. They need to articulate coherent alternative visions for society, identify concrete policy failures and propose viable solutions. Despite growing repression, opposition actors in many countries have proven vulnerable to co-optation and have not always made strategic use of the opportunities available.
Whether the recent drop in inflation can provide momentum for broader structural transformation will be a key test in the years ahead. Among the region’s top priorities are the depoliticization of land and property rights – especially in conflict-prone settings – as well as the formalization of highly informal economies, regulatory simplification for investors, and the development of targeted, efficient social security systems. Youth unemployment, in particular, is not only an economic concern but also a factor in political stability and peacebuilding. Whether hybrid regimes can withstand external shocks, such as less favorable U.S. trade and aid policies under a second Trump administration, remains an open question. Much will depend on whether countries like South Africa or Mauritius can seize the opportunity to reinvigorate both economic and democratic transformation.