Diverging Paths: Between Consolidating Democracy and Fortifying Autocracy
In West and Central Africa, political and economic developments are moving in diverging directions. In some countries, democratic initiatives succeed. More often, however, autocratic forces prevail while structural challenges and, in particular, the burdens of climate change are growing. At the same time, Russia is moving to fill a security vacuum in several countries as the United States, France and other Western powers pull back.
Recent political trajectories in West and Central Africa have been sharply uneven. On the one hand, we have seen military coups and the consolidation of authoritarian rule; on the other, incremental moves being made toward democracy. Across the region, we see a wide spectrum ranging from defective democracies to hard-line autocracies, with autocracies in the majority.
This spectrum is best illustrated by the downward trajectory of Niger. The 2023 coup brought a military junta to power that now governs autocratically. As a result, Niger lost its status as a defective democracy – a classification it had only recently gained in the last BTI assessment – and is now rated a hard-line autocracy, marking a drop of three categories. It is the latest in a string of coups across the Sahel that have installed military regimes closely aligned with one another and with autocracies, such as China, Russia and Türkiye. Burkina Faso and Mali have also seen further consolidation of authoritarian rule.
Across the region, economic trajectories are largely converging. The region’s countries fall into two clusters: Ghana, Benin, Gambia, Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon are classified as featuring a limited state of economic transformation. The region faces entrenched structural barriers that are being compounded by the effects of climate change. Still, the country reports suggest that the sharp downturn – exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic – may have bottomed out. In terms of governance quality, the variation mirrors the political landscape, ranging from good to failed governance. When the steep declines in Niger and Burkina Faso are factored out, the broader trend points decisively toward stagnation.
Political transformation
Support from authoritarian states
The BTI 2026 shows that many of the political trends seen in previous years have continued. These include both the consolidation of democratic systems and the mounting pressures they face, the entrenchment of authoritarian regimes, the proliferation of military governments, and the spread of jihadism. The average regional score has fallen to a record low of 4.44 points. This trajectory has been largely driven by the wave of autocratization sweeping the Sahel – especially in Niger, where a military junta led by Abdourahamane Tchiani seized power in July 2023. The junta capitalized on public frustration over the lack of tangible improvements in living conditions despite extensive foreign aid. It suspended the constitution, banned political parties, and brought the legislature and judiciary under its control. The prospect of free elections is as remote here as it is in Burkina Faso and Mali. In Chad, Mahamat Déby’s formal succession to his father’s position as president was overshadowed by a tainted vote.
Authoritarian regimes have also been consolidating their power beyond the Sahel – often with external backing, but also by tightening control at home. In the Central African Republic, (former) Wagner Group mercenaries continue to support the government. In Equatorial Guinea, Russia has assisted President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo in what appears to be a planned transfer of power to his son. The trajectory in Gabon has been somewhat different. A coup in July 2023 ended the Bongo dynasty, which had been in power since 1967. The military appointed Brice Oligui Nguema, a cousin of the ousted president, as transitional leader. In November 2024, a new constitution drafted through a supposedly inclusive “national dialogue” was approved in a referendum. Oligui went on to win the presidential election in April 2025.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, President Félix Tshisekedi secured reelection in December 2023, though the process appeared more a mechanism for legitimizing his rule than a genuinely competitive contest. Security in the country’s east remains volatile due to the M23 rebels, who are backed by neighboring Rwanda. Rapid improvements under the peace agreement brokered by Qatar and the United States in June 2025 appear unlikely. Perhaps the most persistent security challenge in the region remains transnational jihadism. Having gained a foothold in Mali and neighboring Sahel states, it has now taken root in Benin, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Togo.
In Senegal, after a period of turbulence, democratic forces now hold the upper hand. Since 2021, President Macky Sall’s bid to secure a third term – in violation of constitutional limits – had repeatedly triggered unrest. In 2024, the Constitutional Council forced an election, paving the way for Bassirou Diomaye Faye to succeed Sall. Faye appointed the popular opposition leader Ousmane Sonko, recently released from prison, as prime minister and dissolved parliament later that year. The elections in 2024 reinforced his party’s position.
In Ghana, by contrast, pressure on democratic governance is mounting. Ranking 19th globally in the BTI index on political transformation, the country continues to lead the regional rankings, though the country report highlights declines in freedom of assembly and public support for democracy. The December 2024 elections, which were won by the opposition on promises of economic renewal, were evaluated as free and fair in the BTI. Still, the six deaths, 46 injuries, and incidents of property damage reported by the Ghana Center for Democratic Development underscore the underlying potential for conflict in the country.
Economic transformation
Self-sufficiency, entrenchment and departure
Overall, the region’s economic outlook remains positive. Five countries posted only slight declines in their scores, eight were unchanged, and nine showed gains – some of them significant – compared with the BTI 2024. This is mirrored in steady per capita GDP growth, with 11 countries reporting rates above 2%. The downturn triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic appears to have receded, particularly in Ghana and Nigeria.
Despite his campaign promises, Ghana’s new president, John Dramani Mahama, has not reopened negotiations with the IMF. Instead, his administration has moved ahead with implementing the programs already agreed upon with the institution. These include measures to rein in inflation through higher interest rates and to narrow the fiscal deficit. Compared with 2024, the BTI highlights improvements in fiscal and monetary policy, the expansion of social safety nets, and stronger environmental-protection efforts.
In Nigeria, President Bola Tinubu’s administration has consolidated the country’s exchange-rate systems and allowed the naira to float. The government also lifted trade restrictions on certain products and further liberalized international trade. In line with long-standing recommendations from external advisers, it scrapped costly fuel subsidies, although some were later partially reinstated. In May 2023, the Dangote Refinery – the largest in Africa – was officially commissioned. The project, estimated to involve $20 billion in costs, is seen as a potential game changer, as it aims to transform Nigeria from an oil producer that exports crude oil for processing abroad into a self-sufficient refiner capable of meeting its own fuel needs.
Despite such positive trends, the structural hurdles facing countries in the region for the foreseeable future cannot be overstated. Chief among these is climate change, an increasingly formidable challenge that brought extreme drought and heatwaves during the review period. According to a 2024 report by the World Meteorological Organization, African countries lose 2% to 5% of GDP annually as a result of climate change. For sub-Saharan Africa, the estimated costs of climate adaptation over the next 10 years range from $30 billion to $50 billion a year – equivalent to 2% to 3% of regional GDP. Government responses to these environmental issues have been lackluster. The relevant BTI indicator has flatlined since 2014, slipping in the last two years from 3.83 to 3.77 points.
The decision by the military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) could carry serious economic repercussions, though the full impact remains to be seen. The withdrawal – announced in January 2024 and finalized a year later – was prompted by what the three governments called “inhumane sanctions” temporarily imposed by the bloc’s 12 other members. Their departure removes them from the ECOWAS customs union. The loss of access to key ports in Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal poses a particular risk to food security. Analysts see some potential to offset the damage through increased mineral exports, particularly gold. But even if that proves possible, the impact on the general population in each country is expected to be significant.
Governance
Fierce conflicts
Governance quality in the region has fallen to 4.41 points, which is the lowest level since the BTI began. This decline has mainly been driven by the sharp deteriorations recorded in Burkina Faso (-0.96 points) and Niger (-1.82). Burkina Faso’s security crisis deepened further in 2024. By year’s end, a million people were internally displaced. Vision of Humanity’s 2024 Global Terrorism Index ranked it as the world’s most terrorism-affected country. Reports of abuses by security forces and the vigilante Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) also mounted. The BTI’s conflict-intensity indicator for the country now stands at nine out of a maximum of 10 points.
Niger’s conflict-intensity rating reached seven points, which is its highest level in the history of BTI reporting. There are several fault lines: generational, economic and political – between advocates of a democratic civilian government and those willing to tolerate transitional military rule. During the review period, anti-democratic forces prevailed. Yet, unlike in the past, the 2023 coup sparked little public protest. Having turned their backs on Europe and ECOWAS, Niger and Burkina Faso have courted closer ties with China, Türkiye and, above all, Russia while aligning with neighboring juntas. Their credibility on the international stage has eroded, which is reflected in downgrades for Burkina Faso (-2 points) and Niger (-5).
In contrast, Senegal and Ghana remain outliers for their strong governance, respectively ranking 15th and 20th in the Governance Index. Senegal’s new administration under President Faye has pursued a strategy of productive continuity bolstered by strong public support for democracy. In both countries, reform-minded actors wield influence and international cooperation remains robust. In Nigeria, a modest improvement in governance has lifted the country into the category of moderately successful governments. The main drivers have been stronger policy prioritization and more consistent implementation, most notably the rollback of fuel and electricity subsidies and the consolidation of the naira’s exchange rate. Governance has also slightly improved in Gabon, where the country’s new constitution – drafted through a national dialogue – was approved in November 2024 with 92% support. As BTI experts state in the country report, “Rarely have members of civil society had such a direct impact on constitutional or electoral laws.”
Côte d’Ivoire, by contrast, having been downgraded, is now classified as featuring moderately successful governance in the BTI 2026. While the government and opposition both publicly affirm their commitment to democratization, skepticism is growing. Guinea’s government fares significantly worse, dropping 0.54 points, with particular criticism over its interference in the work of civil society. In February 2025, Abdul Sacko, head of the Forum des Forces Sociales de Guinée, a network of civil society groups, was abducted, detained and tortured.
At the bottom of the governance rankings is Chad, which remains one of the lowest-rated countries in the Governance Index (rank 127). The country’s chronic conflict has deepened since Mahamat Déby took power. The Black Thursday massacre, when security forces killed at least 128 protesters on October 20, 2022, continued to cast a shadow on developments during the review period.
Outlook
The gap left by the West
Reform-minded actors in West and Central Africa face stiff headwinds – both domestic and external. The election of Donald Trump in November 2024 dealt a particularly heavy blow. During his first term as president, Trump showed little interest in Africa, dismissing its nations as “shithole countries.” In his second term, he has brought his “America First” vision to Africa in full force. The effective end of U.S. development aid and democracy promotion marks a serious setback for both reform advocates and international organizations. Beyond the immediate loss of funding, the longer-term consequence will be the erosion of America’s standing as a model – contradictory as that role has often been during and after the Cold War. The current president shows no inclination to support the development of democratic institutions.
The United States is not alone in stepping back. For the foreseeable future, EU and NATO member states are likely to concentrate their priorities on defense. France – the last former colonial power with a significant military presence in West and Central Africa – is steadily scaling down its role, partly in response to pressure from local governments and rising public resentment across the region. This is not necessarily bad news in itself. But the security vacuum left behind is increasingly being filled by authoritarian regimes, above all Russia, which has identified West and Central Africa as its most important sphere of influence outside the former Soviet Union. In this shifting landscape, Senegal’s trajectory will be especially worth watching.