The period under review was marked by efforts of the ruling elite to end the transition period, retain power and legitimize their authority through elections. Most government actions focused on this objective. The process began with voter registration in August and September 2023. The varying time frames for organizing and holding the elections favored regions traditionally more supportive of the transitional regime and the Déby government.
The constitutional referendum in December 2023 only permitted a decision supporting the central government solution favored by the transitional government. Presidential elections in May 2024 and triple elections – parliamentary, provincial and local – in December 2024 concluded the transitional period. According to state electoral authorities, Mahamat Déby, (step-)son of longtime autocratic ruler Idriss Déby, won the presidential election with 61% of the vote. The former ruling party, the Movement patriotique du salut (MPS), secured 144 of the 188 seats in parliament. Like his father Idriss, Mahamat Déby can continue to govern without any parliamentary oversight or checks and balances.
The weak political opposition has either participated in or been eliminated during the transition process. Succès Masra, leader of the Les Transformateurs party, returned from a year in exile after the deaths of hundreds of demonstrators on “Black Thursday” in October 2022. He was appointed prime minister in January 2024, presumably as a reward for his support of the transitional authorities during the referendum. He also ran for president but finished second to Déby. For the first time in Chadian history, both a president and his prime minister competed for the same office.
Other political opponents did not survive their opposition to Déby: Yaya Dillo, a cousin of Déby and potential rival in the presidential elections, was shot and killed by security forces in February 2024.
The small opposition boycotted the triple elections in December 2024. Intimidation and repression of the opposition, journalists and CSOs continued.
External relations changed during the period under review. On one hand, Chad sought closer ties with Russia and the United Arab Emirates. On the other hand, it ended the long-standing French military presence at bases in Chad. The last French troops left Chad on January 31, 2025.
The arrival of more than 700,000 Sudanese refugees in eastern Chad since the civil war began in 2023 poses humanitarian and security risks for both the local population in the border regions and the vulnerable refugees.
Chad also continues to face security risks from armed group activities in the north at the border with Libya, as well as in the Lake Chad Basin, where the population continues to suffer from attacks by Boko Haram and its splinter factions. Banditry has also become more common, particularly in the southwest, where the number of cases of kidnapping for ransom rose significantly during the reporting period.
Most social and development indicators remained unchanged at very low levels. Chad is one of the poorest countries in the world. At the same time, the inflation rate has continued to rise, worsening the challenges faced by the population due to higher prices and a lack of purchasing power. As in 2022, widespread flooding during the 2024 rainy season affected different regions of Chad, including the north of the country and parts of the capital, N’Djamena. Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced and farmland was severely degraded. This has led to crop failures and an increased risk of hunger.
In the 1990s, Chad began its path toward economic and political transformation after a devastating civil war. However, conflict lines between the predominantly Muslim north and the predominantly Christian or Animist south continue to shape the country’s political landscape. Idriss Déby Itno, an ethnic Zaghawa and former army chief of staff, came to power through a coup d’état in 1990 and remained in office until his death in 2021. The Patriotic Salvation Movement (Mouvement Patriotique du Salut, MPS), Déby’s party, established dominance through multiparty parliamentary elections in 1997. Chad functioned as a presidential republic with minimal checks and balances. Political opposition to Déby’s rule remained weak, as many opponents were co-opted through promotions to high-ranking government and army positions.
Throughout his rule, Déby faced challenges from various politico-military movements seeking to overthrow his regime. French military support prevented major attacks by different coalitions of these groups. Déby died under circumstances that remain unknown. He was killed when the Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad (Chadian Front for Change and Concord) advanced on the capital in April 2021. The transitional military council seized power and unconstitutionally installed Déby’s (step-)son Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno as transitional president. Resistance to his rule was repeatedly and violently suppressed by security forces. On “Black Thursday” in October 2022, after a National Dialogue allowed Mahamat Déby to stand in future elections, security forces killed at least 128 civilian protesters. Mahamat Déby was elected president of Chad in May 2024. Parliamentary, provincial and local elections – the last parliamentary election had taken place in 2011 – ended the transition in December 2024.
In the lead-up to the 2021 presidential elections, a new alliance called Wakit Tamma emerged, uniting civil society, political opposition and trade unions. Wakit Tamma organized demonstrations against Déby’s sixth term, which security forces brutally suppressed. Les Transformateurs, a prominent party within Wakit Tamma led by Succès Masra, emerged as a fierce opponent of both Déby and his son and still has significant support in the south of the country.
In 2015, Chad experienced terrorist attacks from Boko Haram for the first time. In March 2020, the Chadian army suffered a major defeat attributed to Boko Haram. Déby carried out punitive actions against civilians in the Lake Chad region. Chad’s military actively participates in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria and joined the Joint Force of the Group of Five of the Sahel (G5 Sahel) to combat terrorism. By 2024, Chad was hosting more than a million refugees, internally displaced persons, returnees and asylum-seekers. As a result of the 2023 civil war in Sudan, the largest influx came from this neighboring country.
Chad began transitioning toward a market economy in the 1990s with the successful completion of an enhanced structural adjustment facility through the IMF. However, the country faced challenges due to its foreign debt, particularly the funds owed to Glencore, a commodities trading and mining company based in Switzerland. The execution of reforms, irregularities in arms purchases, corruption and the oil price shock hampered the implementation of development plans and limited the government’s commitment to market economy reforms.
Efforts to restore public finances and external accounts in Chad, a country plagued by corruption, have faced major challenges. Despite initial hopes for substantial socioeconomic improvement through the construction of the Chad–Cameroon pipeline, Chad has failed to achieve its long-term development goals, pro-poor spending targets or economic diversification objectives. The country has shifted from a dependence on agrarian commodities like cotton and cattle to a reliance on oil revenues. Meanwhile, widespread corruption has undermined the government revenue derived from customs fees and taxes.
Since Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno came to power in April 2021, the state’s monopoly on the use of force has faced less challenge from the so-called politico-military movements than it did under the late President Idriss Déby Itno. There are two reasons for this. First, the strongest movement, the Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad (FACT), was significantly weakened after the death of Idriss Déby. Second, many former political opponents, leaders of politico-military movements and family members of the Déby clan – such as the Erdimi brothers – returned to Chad after years of exile following the signing of the Doha peace agreement to take part in the National Dialogue in September 2022.
Nevertheless, attacks on military bases continue, particularly in the Lake Chad region. The Chadian government claims these are Boko Haram attacks and responds with brutal violence, including the killing of civilians, as seen in the so-called Operation Haskanite in November 2024. The origin of the attackers remains unclear. The background of an attack on the presidential palace in N’Djamena on January 8, 2025, and the true identities of the attackers are also unclear.
Monopoly on the use of force
Chadian citizenship and the concept of the nation-state have not yet been challenged by the main social groups or the political elite, despite the country’s ethnic and religious diversity. However, the controversial transition, the consolidation of power in the hands of the northern ruling elite and the use of violence by security forces appear to be fueling growing anger among members of some southern ethnic groups. Debates during the National Dialogue about stronger decentralization and a federal state revealed that different ethnic groups, mainly from the south, prefer more self-determination. Intellectuals in particular increasingly feel excluded.
The brief period with opposition leader Succès Masra as prime minister had no effect on the feeling of marginalization. Masra returned to Chad in November 2023 after a year in exile and was appointed prime minister on January 1, 2024. He resigned after running as a candidate in the presidential elections on May 6, 2024.
Citizenship and access to citizenship are not politically relevant issues. Aside from administrative shortcomings, there are few problems with access to citizenship. Formally, all citizens have the same civil rights.
State identity
Following the French example, Chad is a secular state based on the principle of laïcité, which has been enshrined in the first article of all its constitutions since independence. The new constitution of the current government, approved by referendum on December 17, 2023, also guarantees the separation of state and religion.
There are no official figures on the ratio of Muslims to Christians. Each religion claims to represent the majority of the population. However, Muslims dominate the transitional parliament and are also overrepresented among government officials.
Interreligious dialogue among the country’s religious leaders has occurred regularly in the past. The leaders of the three main religious communities – Muslims, Catholics and Protestants – have participated together in state ceremonies. However, there is a growing tendency for leaders of different religions to act independently.
Most Chadian Muslims follow the Sufi tradition of Tijaniya(h) (Tidjanie). Only a minority hold beliefs associated with Wahhabism or Salafism. Most Protestants are evangelical Christians.
Religious extremists have so far gained little political influence. However, religious beliefs still shape societal issues such as the role of women and the continued delay in adopting family law.
Since Mahamat Déby came to power, there has been a growing tendency among leading Muslim clerics to publicly approve the government’s decisions. During the period under review, this became particularly evident after the Chadian government declared in November 2024 that it would end military cooperation with France.
No interference of religious dogmas
A reorganization of the administrative areas was initiated in preparation for the parliamentary elections on December 29, 2024. Since July 2024, Chad has been divided administratively into 23 provinces, 120 départements and 454 communes. However, the fact of state representation in an area does not mean that services are actually delivered. Administrative structures are generally small, poorly funded and highly susceptible to corruption at the expense of the population, whether in rural areas or in the capital.
Communications, transport and other basic infrastructure are available in N’Djamena and provincial towns but not in rural areas. Roads are rapidly deteriorating, which is in turn slowing and complicating the transport of people and goods.
Communications such as telephone and internet are expensive, and often cut off by state authorities due to anti-government protests. In some remote areas they are nonexistent.
Basic infrastructure, especially access to sanitation and water, is extremely poor: In 2022, only 10.9% of the population had access to improved sanitation facilities and 12.9% to basic sanitation services. Just 6.2% had access to drinking water and 52% to basic water services. Electricity was available to only 11.7% of the population.
Basic health services are primarily found in larger towns. In remote areas, they are rare or nonexistent. During the rainy season (May to October), rural regions are often cut off from the outside world as roads become impassable. Villages can be completely isolated from health care and sanitary facilities for weeks, which often has fatal consequences. Maternity and infant mortality rates are among the highest in the world.
Basic schooling is provided, but especially in rural areas, it is often run and funded by parents themselves.
Basic administration
During the period under review, presidential, parliamentary, municipal and provincial elections were held, as well as a constitutional referendum. These elections marked the end of Chad’s transition phase since the death of Idriss Déby.
Following the decisions of the Dialogue national inclusif et souverain (National Dialogue) in 2022, Chadians were to decide whether the state should remain unitary or become federal. In July 2023, the Commission nationale chargée de l’organisation du référendum constitutionnel (CONOREC) announced that the vote on the future form of the state would be combined with the constitutional referendum. In practice, this meant that Chadians could not vote for a federal state. On December 17, 2023, they could only approve or reject the entire draft of the new constitution, which already established centralization.
According to the official electoral authority, the turnout rate was 63.7%. Of those who voted, 83.7% favored the new constitution and 13.7% opposed it.
The prelude to the presidential elections on May 6, 2024, which were supposed to end the transitional period, began in February 2024: Yaya Dillo Bétchi, Mahamat Déby’s cousin and a potential rival in the presidential elections, was shot by security forces during a siege of his party’s headquarters on February 28, 2024.
Déby’s candidacy was supported by the Coalition pour un Tchad Uni, which consisted of more than 200 political parties and over 1,117 CSOs. Ten of the 20 candidates who attempted to run were rejected by the electoral authority, L’Agence nationale de gestion des élections (ANGE). Members of ANGE, as well as those of the Constitutional Court responsible for validating the election results, were appointed by Déby on January 30, 2024, for terms of seven years. These bodies are composed of longtime allies of Idriss Déby.
ANGE declared Déby the winner with 61% of the vote just three days after the elections. This raised serious doubts about whether results from the provincial polling stations had actually reached the capital. Prime Minister Masra, who has strong support in the south of the country, won 18.5% and former Prime Minister Albert Pahimi Padacké received 16.9%. The other seven candidates each received less than 1%.
The elections took place amid a significant military presence. The use of live ammunition to celebrate Déby’s victory led to the deaths of 11 people. Human Rights Watch has called for an investigation.
The results of the December 2024 parliamentary elections were no surprise. As in previous elections, the Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) won the majority of seats, taking 124 out of 188. Rally of Chadian Nationalists/Awakening (RNDT-Le Réveil), led by Albert Pahimi Padacké, became the second-largest party with 12 seats, and the party of former opposition leader and current mediator Saleh Kebzabo took third with 11 seats. About 30 other parties are represented with one or two seats each. The official voter turnout rate was 51.56%, but observers believed the real figure was much lower. Many did not expect the elections to change the distribution of power and responded to the opposition’s call for a boycott.
Another shortcoming of all the elections and the referendum concerns voter registration, which was completed on August 6, 2023, in the south and on Sepember 16, 2023, in the north. Young Chadians who turned 18 after these dates could not vote and could only actively register in August 2024. The opposition parties, which have more support among the younger population but ultimately boycotted the elections, would have been deprived of a large number of potential votes.
Free and fair elections
Although elections were held during the reporting period, there were no democratic procedures or veto rights. Members of the transitional parliament, whose term expired at the end of December 2024, were chosen by Déby. The parliamentary elections were dominated by the well-established former ruling party MPS, founded by Idriss Déby. It has benefited from state resources and is the only party with a countrywide presence.
The voices of critical or dissenting actors have been silenced, as the assassination of opposition leader Yaya Dillo clearly demonstrated.
Since the beginning of the transition under the Transitional Military Council in 2021, made up of high-ranking generals and other influential figures in the security apparatus, the opposition has been continuously suppressed. Even after the dissolution of the Transitional Military Council in 2022, an inner circle around Mahamat Déby continues to function as an interest group with veto and steering power. Its main objective is to maintain its monopoly on power. This has manifested in attacks on the opposition and the arrest of key figures belonging to the Transformateurs, as well the events of “Black Thursday,” when more than 130 demonstrators were killed by security forces’ gunfire.
Effective power to govern
The current constitution provides for freedom of association and assembly. However, these rights have been repeatedly restricted. The events of “Black Thursday” in October 2022, when more than 130 demonstrators lost their lives due to security forces’ use of live ammunition, created a climate of fear and discouraged people from requesting and organizing public meetings and anti-government demonstrations. After the announcement of the end of military cooperation with France on Nov. 28, 2024, however, anti-French demonstrations were able to take place in Abéché and N’Djamena without incident.
Meetings were able to be held during the referendum and presidential election campaigns, including those organized by opposition politician Masra.
Association / assembly rights
Chad’s constitution guarantees the freedom of expression and freedom of the press. However, these freedoms are regularly curtailed, and there are persistent threats against those critical of the authorities.
Only journalists who can provide proof of journalistic training are allowed to register with the Supreme Media Authority and work as journalists.
Critical journalists, bloggers and other commentators continue to risk prosecution and imprisonment under the transitional authorities. The online journal Alwihda was banned for one week in August 2023 due to an article about Mahamat Déby that denounced his war-inciting language. One year later, also in August, the editor of the online magazine Tchadinfos was arrested but released a day later.
Ten newspapers are published regularly. Four private television stations broadcast in the capital, and about 60 radio stations operate nationwide. Private newspapers are struggling to survive in the face of high costs and declining advertising revenue.
Social media are increasingly taking over the role of news media, spreading information as well as unverified opinions. At the same time, access to the internet has been blocked during periods of tension, for instance following the assassination of Yaya Dillo.
Freedom of expression
The separation of powers is enshrined in the constitution. However, during the period under review, the separation of powers was nonexistent. Déby nominated all members of the relevant institutions before the constitution came into force. The members of the transitional parliament, nominated by Déby, did not fulfill their role of controlling the government. Moreover, even at the end of their term of office, they proved to be loyal supporters of Déby by proposing and accepting his appointment as marshal of Chad – a controversial title of honor previously held only by Idriss Déby.
A similar dynamic can be observed in the judiciary. Although Déby appointed former opposition leader Mahamat Ahmat Alhabo as minister of justice (2021 – 2023), the judiciary did not exercise critical oversight over the executive. Alhabo’s successors continued in the same direction. This is also the case with requests for central investigations into the repeated abuse of power by state security forces against the population.
In November 2023, those who had committed abuses during the Black Thursday events of October 2022 were granted amnesty, as were many former rebel leaders who had returned to the country during the transition.
Separation of powers
Under Idriss Déby, the judiciary suffered from executive interference, lack of resources and corruption. Judges who acted independently were often intimidated or dismissed. Although the constitution of December 2023 provides for an independent judiciary, this situation is likely to continue. During the transitional period, judicial power was exercised by the Supreme Court, the courts of appeal and the ordinary courts. The president appointed the members of the high state institutions, including judges. As a result, the judiciary is not institutionally or formally separate, and its decisions and doctrine are subordinate to the ruling power. The most notable signs were the controversial appointments of the presidents of the Constitutional Court and the National Election Management Agency (ANGE) in January 2024. Both had been loyal supporters of Idriss Déby in the past and were members of the MPS party. Their mandate is for seven years, renewable once. They will oversee another election campaign and legitimize Déby’s presidency.
Independent judiciary
Corruption occurs at all social levels. Services at every level of administration and within bureaucratic processes cannot be obtained without additional payments as incentives. Furthermore, public tenders are highly susceptible to corruption. The costs are typically vastly inflated, and the profit is shared among the parties involved.
The same pattern occurs at all political levels. Perpetrators face no lasting consequences. For example, Idriss Youssouf Boy was involved in embezzling large sums of money from the Chadian Hydrocarbons Company. He was removed from office in June 2022 and then appointed director of the presidency’s cabinet in January 2023, remaining in office until September 2024.
Prosecution of office abuse
The constitution guarantees citizens’ rights. Like all other constitutions since independence, it enshrines the secular and laic nature of the state (Article 1). It emphasizes the equality of men and women and prohibits propaganda of an ethnic, tribal, regional or religious nature. De facto, however, civil rights exist only on paper. Women’s rights are routinely violated. The authorities rarely investigate cases of abuse or domestic violence, leaving women with nowhere to turn for protection.
Homosexuality is generally regarded as incompatible with tradition and religion. The Criminal Code of December 12, 2016, reclassified homosexuality from a crime to a misdemeanor. The new penal code also prohibits underage marriage.
The death penalty was abolished in 2014 but was reinstated for terrorist offenses following the Boko Haram attacks in 2015. In 2020, parliament again abolished the death penalty.
In general, citizens are at the mercy of the authorities. Members of the opposition, civil society and trade unions fear arrest and detention without due process. The arbitrariness and persecution of the state do not stop at the clergy: In August 2024, a Catholic priest who criticized the new electoral constituencies was detained for a week without charge
Civil rights
The new constitution also enshrines the separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judiciary branches of government. Except for the cabinet and the new prime minister, Allamye Halina, many members of the institutions appointed by the president during the transition remain in office.
Democratic institutions such as the judiciary and the Conseil national de transition (CNT), which acted as a transitional parliament, were enshrined in the transitional constitution that was in force beginning in May 2021. This constitution was replaced by the new constitution after the December 2023 referendum. However, the CNT remained in office until the parliamentary elections of December 2024. The CNT was composed of representatives of political parties, civil society, religious leaders, traditional authorities, businesspersons, young people, women and former deputies of the previous legislature. Its members were appointed by Mahamat Déby and lacked any democratic legitimacy. Although the CNT was more diverse than the previous parliament under Idriss Déby, most of its members were close to and in favor of the transitional authorities. The opposition was too weakly represented to play a decisive role in the transitional parliament. In practice, this meant all legislation proposed by the transitional authorities was approved.
It is too early to assess the potential for future democratization of the newly elected institutions at the end of the review period in early 2025.
Performance of democratic institutions
After the National Dialogue in October 2022, the transitional authorities under Mahamat Déby presented themselves to the outside world as actors whose main interest was to complete the transition and restore constitutional order.
The presidential elections were crucial for this. A victory allowed Mahamat Déby to shed the title of transitional president and become president of Chad. For the first time, a president and his prime minister competed for the presidency. Opposition politician Succès Masra, who returned after a year in exile and was appointed prime minister, also took part in the elections.
Veto powers are almost nonexistent. The brutal repression of October 20, 2022, has silenced civil society organizations. The leaders of Wakit Tama have fled into exile. The political opposition was silenced with the assassination of Yaya Dillo on February 28, 2024. Since Dillo’s death, only a few small parties have remained in opposition. These parties are united in the Groupe de Concertation des Acteurs Politiques (GCAP). The GCAP coalition has decided to boycott the legislative elections, as did Les Transformateurs of Succès Masra. This means there will be hardly any opposition for the next five years.
Commitment to democratic institutions
The new constitution recognizes party plurality; the existing law on political parties continues to regulate the admission, legal recognition and financing of political parties. Exact figures are not available, but estimates suggest there are about 300 political parties.
Political distinctions have almost completely disappeared, and opposition is almost nonexistent. In the run-up to the presidential elections, a broad alliance of more than 200 political parties and over 1,000 CSOs formed the Coalition pour un Tchad uni (Coalition for a United Chad) under the leadership of the MPS. In January 2024, the coalition declared Mahamat Déby to be its presidential candidate. For the parties that joined this coalition, however, hopes of another electoral success and maintaining proximity to the power elite were not fulfilled. The MPS announced in October 2024 that it would leave the coalition and run alone in the legislative elections. It remains the only party that can operate at the national level; all others are regional or local. For many of them, the cost of fielding several candidates in the parliamentary and local elections was too high. They had to limit themselves, which gave the MPS a further advantage. In some constituencies, only the candidate of the MPS or a so-called satellite party – parties financed to give the appearance of party diversity but supported by the ruling elite – were on the ballot.
Most members of the former opposition under Idriss Déby have been co-opted into government positions. Longtime opposition figure Saleh Kebzabo, leader of the National Union for Development and Renewal (Union Nationale pour le Développement et le Renouveau), served as prime minister from October 2022 to the end of December 2023 and was appointed mediator of the republic after his resignation. Mahamat Ahmad Alhabo, general secretary of the Party for Liberty and Development (Parti pour les Libertés et le Développement), a well-recognized opposition party, has served as general secretary of the presidency since December 2023. Former fierce opposition politician Succès Masra, who has his power base in the south, decided to boycott the parliamentary elections, as did the Groupe de Concertation des Acteurs Politiques (GCAP) coalition.
Party system
Civil society is weak and fragmented. However, human rights organizations and NGOs focusing on peaceful coexistence or women’s and youth rights are doing important work. They are often the only witnesses and are at least partially able to bring human rights violations to international attention. A prominent example was the case against former Chadian President Hissène Habré, in which civil society and human rights organizations played a major role in collecting and archiving the evidence necessary to support the case before the Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal in 2016. This led to Habré’s conviction for crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture, including sexual violence and rape. At the same time, the state tries to undermine or sideline critical CSOs by creating and funding parallel institutions that are loyal to the government.
A lack of mutual trust and competition for scarce resources renders cooperation difficult. The suppressive effects of the Black Thursday events also continue to be felt. NGOs and trade unions are intimidated and fearful of the consequences of demonstrations.
Interest groups
Given the lack of representative survey data in the country, it is difficult to assess the population’s attitudes toward democracy in general or toward individual institutions. However, social media and the large turnouts at demonstrations at the beginning of the transition reflect a high level of frustration among the young population. Several Chadian online newspapers frequently criticize the undemocratic functioning of the state.
Afrobarometer does not conduct surveys in Chad. However, a survey conducted by the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute in five major cities in Chad in 2015 suggests a relatively high level of support for the idea of liberal democracy, despite the authoritarian nature of the regime. The survey found that 56% of respondents had overwhelmingly democratic attitudes, while 38% held partially undemocratic views and 5% held undemocratic views. This indicates that levels of public dissatisfaction with government policy are high. However, just over a third of respondents agreed with the statement that “the government would do the right thing.” In general, the population – and young people in particular – are angry about the political situation, especially the perpetuation of the power elite, their own increasing poverty and their daily struggle to survive.
One indicator of low levels of confidence in democracy could be eyewitness reports of low turnout in the referendum and elections. However, official figures paint a different picture, reporting turnout rates of up to 63.75% in the December 2023 referendum and around 51% in the December 2024 elections.
Approval of democracy
Most Chadians belong to one or more social groups. The degree of social self-organization is quite high. These groups may be formed for a short-term event, such as a wedding. However, most are cooperative groups with long-term objectives, such as savings groups – particularly popular with women because they allow them to save capital for investments or purchases – or parents’ associations. The latter provide most of teachers’ salaries in Chad. Church-based organizations provide knowledge and skills for income-generating activities.
However, this does not mean there is a high level of trust among the population. Trust is limited to a small circle of family members. In general, people organize along ethnic or religious lines.
The low level of trust is linked to Chad’s past, marked by violent intercultural and interreligious conflicts. More recently, poverty has also played a role, making it easier for the state to use young unemployed people as informants and leading to even more mistrust. Mistrust has been further exacerbated by rapidly increasing competition for resources, including land and water, which has led to deadly inter- and intracommunity violence in recent years, particularly in the south. As climate change progresses, these conflicts have become more frequent. The government’s failure to address the conflicts has deepened society’s divisions.
Social capital
Poverty and inequality are deeply rooted in Chadian society. The majority of the population relies on a subsistence economy. Most indicators show no signs of improvement in recent years.
Chad experienced a 34.5% increase in HDI between 2000 and 2021. However, it remains one of the least developed countries in the world, with a very low HDI score of 0.394 (2022), ranking 189th out of 193 countries – the same rank as Niger and just above CAR, South Sudan and Somalia – with no change since 2012. The overall loss in the country’s HDI score due to inequality was 39.6% in 2022, 5.3% less than in 2012.
All indicators confirm that a significant portion of Chad’s population faces high levels of poverty, which were further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the instability following the death of Idriss Déby in 2021. In 2022, 62.8% of the population lived on less than $3.65 a day.
The Multidimensional Poverty Index score is 0.517 (2024), with 84.2% of the population living in severe multidimensional poverty – an increase of 20% since 2022 – including dimensions such as health, sanitation, education, employment and social protection. The 2024 Global Hunger Index value of 36.4 reflects a steady decline in the prevalence of hunger since the 2000 score of 50.7, indicating a shift from an extreme to an alarming level. Chad is ranked 125th out of 127 countries. Rural areas are particularly affected by poverty and exposed to food insecurity. Rural populations and a portion of the urban population (24.37%) rely primarily on subsistence farming or livestock breeding. The northern population is predominantly pastoral, while the southern population is predominantly agricultural.
Chad’s Gini coefficient of 37.5 in 2022 highlights persistent income inequality, despite an improvement from 43.3 in 2011. State revenues tend to be concentrated in the hands of the ruling elite and are not used to reduce poverty.
A good example is Chad’s dependence on oil revenues, which have been extremely volatile over the years and have had significant environmental and social impacts. The latest Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (ITIE) report for 2021, published in 2024, highlights that there are no legal provisions (Law No. 006/PR/2007) or practical cases for social investment and/or of the return of resource-based revenues to communities, either by the state or extraction companies such as Esso.
The level of gender-based socioeconomic exclusion remains alarmingly high. With a score of 0.671, Chad ranks among the lowest countries in the world on the 2022 Gender Inequality Index and 144th out of 146 countries on the 2024 Global Gender Gap Index. In 2021, the primary school completion rate for girls was 38% and 49% for boys. Only 3.7% of girls, compared to 15% of boys, have some secondary education.
Socioeconomic barriers
The transitional authorities made no efforts to move toward a more market-oriented economy. As a result, market-based competition remains underdeveloped. The institutional framework is weak and inconsistent. Still, the Heritage Foundation’s 2024 Index of Economic Freedom ranked Chad 136th out of 176 countries, changing its status from “oppressed” to “largely unfree.” The World Bank reports highlight the weakness of public financial management and the business environment.
Even if factors such as climate change or regional conflicts have some influence on the failure to establish a market-based economy, most structural challenges are self-inflicted. Of particular concern is the overreliance on oil revenues and the failure of the ruling elite to use these revenues to promote broad-based growth. The economy relies heavily on the informal and subsistence agricultural sector, herding and fishing, which together account for almost 50% of GDP and employ approximately 70% of the population. The informal sector is the most important factor for daily survival.
As under Idriss Déby, the ruling elite remains the biggest obstacle to a market-based economy, as corrupt structures within the governing system deter sustainable investments. Other factors include poorly functioning public institutions, a lack of venture capital, an unwelcoming regulatory environment, widespread corruption and patronage, serious shortcomings in the rule of law, and the high costs of access to an energy system that is unreliable in any case. The ruling elite does not promote equal opportunities.
The privatization of state enterprises has shown some progress, but the state has also established new enterprises. State companies offer valuable opportunities for patronage and corruption that encourage their inefficiency. The private sector remains insufficient. The few private companies must contend with high taxes. Government contracts, such as those for construction work, are part of the patronage system and are awarded to individuals close to the ruling elite.
Chad supports foreign direct investment. Foreigners can own companies with up to $2.06 million in capital. However, in 2023, according to UNCTAD, FDI inflows decreased from $705 million to $614 million. The overall stock of FDI in 2023 amounted to $8.3 billion, which is about 70% of Chad’s GDP. The majority of FDI is directed toward oil exploration and infrastructure development. Investment by the main providers of FDI, including Nigeria, the U.K., France and South Korea, also went into the telecommunications and banking sectors.
Chad is a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique centrale, CEMAC). The six member states share a common central bank and a currency pegged to the euro.
Market organization
The Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) is not a member of the International Competition Network. As a member of CEMAC, Chad is part of an economic community promoting regional cooperation. This includes a regional competition agreement among its members. Operating according to a two-tiered model – as classified by the OECD – Chad has two separate levels of competition policy jurisdictions: the regional level, at which competition infringements with regional impact are investigated by the regional competition authority, and the national level, which concerns cases with a national dimension.
The 2014 law on competition included the creation of a council of competition to enforce antitrust policies. Its 15 members were not nominated until 2019. The government regulates the formation of monopolies and oligopolies inconsistently. State-owned companies benefit from lower taxes and easier access to land and raw materials than private sector companies. They also receive subsidies from the state budget. In 2022, the government established two special economic zones in N’Djamena and Moundou. Companies operating in these zones enjoy tax relief on imports of raw materials and equipment for 10 years.
Competition policy
Chad has been a member of the WTO since 1996 and of GATT since 1963. In principle, trade has been liberalized, but its participation in international trade remains limited in terms of both imports and exports. In 2022, the country ranked 138th in total exports and 177th in total imports.
Chad does not have protectionist measures, import quotas or export limitations defined by law. It was among the early adopters of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, which was ratified in 2018 and implemented in 2021.
The primary destination for exports in 2022 was China, followed by the United Arab Emirates, France, Germany and India. Similarly, imports mainly came from China, the United Arab Emirates, France, the United States and Belgium. According to the WTO (2023), the most-favored-nation weighted average tariff was 18.1% in 2022. The country’s exports exceeded its imports by about $2.2 billion in 2022.
The greatest challenge to fostering an open trade market in Chad is the burden of bureaucracy and pervasive corruption that affects import and export processes at all levels. The National Investment and Export Agency aims to simplify procedures and assist clients. Additionally, Chad has introduced measures such as a National Investment Charter, a Public-Private Dialogue Forum and fixed tariffs for creating, modifying or renewing business certificates.
The collection of import taxes at the Cameroon–Chadian border is largely ineffective, with the head of customs being someone close to the ruling elite. Import costs are high on imported goods. The IMF has recommended that the government lower tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and reduce the number of customs procedures. Difficult climate and road conditions contribute to rising trade costs for goods entering and leaving Chad. Being landlocked, Chad relies heavily on a limited number of predominantly poor-quality roads that are nearly impassable for part of the year. Infrastructure constraints, roadblocks, corruption and cumbersome bureaucracy further hinder trade.
Liberalization of foreign trade
The banking sector is limited in both size and available services. It is undercapitalized and characterized by a severe shortage of stable long-term resources. The sector is regulated by the Commission de Banque de l’Afrique Centrale, a regional banking agency. Ten commercial banks currently operate in Chad. Ecobank Chad also runs an Islamic department to provide Shariah-compliant products.
Credit is available from commercial banks on market terms, averaging 16% to 25% for short-term loans. However, most citizens rely on private entities outside the formal banking sector rather than banks. More than 90% of financial transactions by individuals and small enterprises occur outside the formal banking system. Information on access to credit has improved since Chad established a framework with CEMAC for licensing and operating credit bureaus.
The two systemic public banks, Commercial Bank Tchad and Banque Commerciale du Chari, have the greatest need for capitalization. The regional Central African Economic and Monetary Union, or CEMAC (Banque des États de l’Afrique Centrale), which is backed by the French treasury, serves as the central bank.
The CEMAC member states (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon) share the Central African franc (XAF) as a common currency, which is pegged to the euro.
The IMF stated in December 2024 that some vulnerabilities persist in the financial system, posing moderate financial stability risks. In 2018, banks were capitalized with a capital adequacy ratio of 19.1%. The majority of bank assets are held by foreign banks, such as Société Générale, UBA and Ecobank, and only a third by a government-controlled bank. In 2019, the bank capital-to-assets ratio declined to 2.8% and further to 1.6% in 2020. In 2022, it amounted to 4%. The share of non-performing loans increased from 22.9% in 2016 to 33% in 2024.
Banking system
The Bank of Central African States (Banque des États de l’Afrique Centrale, BEAC) is responsible for monetary policy in its member states. As a result, Chad cannot pursue independent policies regarding inflation, currency or foreign exchange rates. The regional currency, the Central African franc (XAF), is pegged to the euro. Despite occasional calls for an independent currency, the XAF remains in use. Senior Chadian civil servant and cousin of the late Idriss Déby, Abbas Mahamat Tolli, served as governor of the regional central bank from 2017 until February 2024. He is suspected of nepotism but is running for the presidency of the African Development Bank.
The BEAC’s policy to limit regional inflation was not achieved during the review period. Chad did not keep its inflation rate below the 3% tolerance target set in the CEMAC zone, with the rate rising instead to about 10.8%. Inflation has been highly volatile, fluctuating between -0.8% and nearly 11% over the past decade. Until 2020, inflation trends were primarily linked to the country’s dependence on the international oil market, economic recession and regional security issues. These factors have now been exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the civil war in Sudan and the arrival of Sudanese refugees, severe flooding during the 2024 rainy season, and the need for the regime to finance the political transition. Additionally, a rise in fuel prices in February 2024, along with the influx of refugees, contributed to intense pressure on food prices. International organizations are concerned about a long-term famine if harvests are not successful in the next rainy season.
Monetary stability
The economy relies heavily on the oil sector, which accounts for about 80% of exports. The nationalization of ExxonMobil in 2022 will reduce Chad’s oil production capacity in the long term, as new investments are not taking place. The government has neglected the diversification of the economy. The IMF and World Bank have repeatedly deplored this dependency. Falling oil prices could cause further shocks for the economy, which has still not recovered from recent crises. In particular, the oil price shock of 2014/15, the COVID-19 pandemic and the instability following the takeover of power by Mahamat Déby in 2021 have left the economy in distress.
Nominal GDP, which amounted to $14 billion in 2014, fell to $11.3 billion in 2019 and only recovered to $12.4 billion in 2022. The Economist Intelligence Unit expects it to reach $13.1 billion in 2023. The National Development Plan (2017 – 2021) emphasized strengthening non-oil sector recovery and the private sector, with no visible results. The National Development Plan (Vision 2030, 2022 – 2026) centers on improving access to basic social services, strengthening governance, and supporting infrastructure investments and the private sector.
The IMF continues to recommend improvements to fiscal stability such as ending public banks’ financing of the budget to reduce high levels of non-performing loans, improving banking sector liquidity and implementing anti-corruption measures. The ECF agreement approved in December 2021 expired on June 22, 2024, primarily due to fiscal slippages and delays in the implementation of structural reforms.
In November 2022, after two years of negotiations, Chad became the first country to reach an agreement with its creditors under the Group of 20 Common Framework that will result in a significant debt restructuring in 2024.
There is no transparency over state revenues or government spending, though available figures suggest that government spending amounted to 3.6% of GDP in 2018 and 4.7% in both 2020 and 2021. It declined to 4.1% in 2022 and 4.2% in 2023. In 2023, public debt amounted to 32.7% of GDP, down from 35.5% in 2022 and 42.4% in 2021. External debt rose from $3,216.2 million in 2019 to $3,471.0 million in 2022. Total debt service increased from $133.3 million in 2019 to $245.4 million in 2022, with the highest figure at $330.6 million in 2021. Total reserves amounted to $211.6 million in 2021, compared with $390.7 million in 2020. Data on the current account balance and lending and borrowing are not available.
Fiscal stability
Private property is enshrined in the constitution of December 2023 (Article 45) and is declared to be sacred. Expropriation is permitted only in the public interest, with compensation to be provided. However, as is often the case in the Chadian context, despite well-defined laws, their enforcement lacks coherence and political will. The existence of Islamic and customary law alongside official law further complicates legal matters. Owners cannot feel secure if members of the power elite are interested in their property. Most people outside the ruling elite avoid legal disputes.
Protection of property rights is weak. The 2024 International Property Rights Index ranked Chad at 121st out of 125 countries. The state and foreign investors dominate the few market sectors in Chad. The state owns the country’s only water and electricity companies and nationalized the former ExxonMobil oil company in December 2022.
Since the occupation of land for international oil companies and the construction of the Chad–Cameroon pipeline, it has become evident that the political will to seize land comes at the expense of the local population. Any notion of fair compensation is absent. This pattern persists in other sectors, such as the destruction of houses and shops in the capital in March 2024 or in other towns with little warning, presumably due to upgrades or street work, as well as land grabbing in rural regions by members of the ruling elite. In rural regions, customary law prevails and land titles are rare. De facto land expropriation is facilitated by alliances between individuals and powerful groups and by some corrupt members of the notary system.
Changing climate conditions and lack of access to scarce resources have aggravated land disputes and conflicts between farming and herding communities. In recent years, conflicts over access to land have cost the lives of many hundreds of people from the sedentary population. Transhumance routes continue to be contested, and farmland is affected by increasing livestock numbers and shrinking space for animals. Furthermore, the power elite invests in large herds of cattle that graze on unharvested farmland led by hired herdsmen. It is almost impossible for the farming population to claim their rights.
There is a lack of consistent legal dispute resolution, and conflicts are often handled at the local level. The power elite and other influential individuals hold significant stakes in the lucrative livestock market, which reduces their incentives to support sustainable solutions for both pastoralist and farming communities.
The security apparatus frequently seizes or destroys private property, such as cars or motorbikes, especially in cases of conflict with the opposition.
Property rights
The private sector is not fully functional; it is weak and underdeveloped. For Chadians not connected to the ruling elite, long-term investment in private companies is impossible. In addition to poor administration, nontransparent procedures and high levels of corruption, private sector development suffers from limited access to capital and high interest rates on loans for private investors, a lack of transport infrastructure and qualified labor, the absence of reliable access to electricity, inadequate contract enforcement, and unattractive tax rates. The Chadian government tries to attract foreign investors, but they face the same restrictions.
For young people, integrating into the labor market is almost impossible. The goal set by a group of Chadian investors in January 2022 – to establish 3,000 private enterprises over the subsequent years – has not been achieved.
In early 2025, the Chadian government launched several privatization processes for state-owned enterprises, including the textile company Nouvelle Société Textile du Tchad (NSTT), the national cement company (Sonacim) and the telecommunications company SOTEL. Experts were critical of the process, citing concerns about inclusiveness and transparency.
To date, the privatization of state-owned enterprises has ruined these companies, as the new owners have treated them as self-service opportunities for personal enrichment rather than investing in their long-term economic performance and function.
Private enterprise
Chad is among the least developed countries in the world. Its average life expectancy of 53 years is the second-lowest globally. Public health expenditure is also near the bottom at 0.9% of GDP. These figures reflect the absence of a public safety net for most of the population.
Only a small group of government, military and parastatal enterprise employees or the few working for development organizations benefit from social safety nets. Access to positions in these sectors is predominantly subject to patronage and corruption. Chad ratified the ILO Convention No. 102 on minimum standards of social security and No. 122 on employment policy in 2015. However, as the majority of the population is unemployed, the convention does not apply.
The World Bank stated in 2022 that the state should prioritize expanding existing programs nationwide, increasing coverage for the poor in safety net programs, extending retirement and old-age savings systems to most formal sector workers, and allowing informal workers access to the social protection system.
Two safety nets operate for some individuals: the national pension fund (Caisse Nationale des Retraités) and a form of unemployment fund (Caisse Nationale de Prévoyance Sociale). Requirements for receiving benefits are difficult to meet, and both funds are highly prone to corruption as well as the absence or disappearance of funds. Rightful beneficiaries rarely receive the full amount and must share it with corrupt officials after a lengthy wait.
Most of the population relies entirely on the informal sector, as well as clan and family structures, to survive. However, the social crisis precipitated by the substantial decline in oil prices, the COVID-19 pandemic, political instability and rising inflation has worsened conditions. As a result, the financial situations even of the few people in paid positions have become difficult. They are unable to fulfill their social obligations to their impoverished extended family members. The limited aid and financial measures the government offers, such as food distribution programs after the flooding in 2024 or tax reductions for imported goods, have done little to alleviate the suffering.
Health infrastructure and services are poorly developed, especially in rural areas. Hospitals across the country lack qualified medical staff. Where health facilities exist, the relatively high costs of services and medicines often hinder necessary treatment. Aid organizations step in, but they cannot compensate for the lack of public health care. A serious medical condition affecting a family member can devastate an entire family.
Social safety nets
The constitution guarantees equality before the law and forbids discrimination on ethnic, religious or gender-based grounds. Women’s equality is emphasized in the text. However, Chadian society is highly stratified, and power structures and supposed ethnic and religious affiliation are closely linked. These connections intensified after the power takeover by Déby’s son. Influential members of ethnic groups close to the ruling Déby clan – mainly from the president’s ethnic group (Zaghawa, especially the Bideyat clan, and also Chadian Arabs and Toubou) but increasingly from the Goran, the ethnic group of Mahamat Déby’s mother – enjoy distinct advantages compared to southerners and foreigners. As ethnic and religious affiliations are in most cases linked, Christians belonging to southern groups feel increasingly marginalized, especially regarding the limited opportunities in the public recruitment market.
Non-citizens are tolerated. Chadian society demonstrates a strong willingness to welcome refugees, as seen in its reception of Sudanese refugees.
Girls and women lack adequate access to educational institutions and public office. The poorly functioning education sector imposes high costs on parents for educating their children. The Chad Gender Inequality Index has slightly improved, declining from 0.688 in 2020 to 0.671 in 2022. Gender inequality is apparent from an early age. In 2022, the literacy rate was 18.9% for women and 35.8% for men, with an overall average of 27.3%. The Gender Parity Index, measuring the ratio of female to male enrollment in private and public schools, stands at 0.8 at the primary level, 0.6 at the secondary level and 0.4 at the tertiary level. About 91.8% of girls are enrolled in primary school, 25.2% in secondary school and just 4.5% at the tertiary level, representing a slight improvement. More than two out of three girls are married as children to adult men, although this is prohibited by law. As of January 2025, forced marriage is punishable by up to 10 years in prison.
Candidate list parity is required by a law passed in July 2024. However, the number of women in parliament increased only slightly, from 32.3% in 2021 to 34.4% in 2025. Women comprise less than half of the labor force, at a share of 40.5%. There are several female leaders in civil society.
Violence, including sexual violence, against women is widespread across the country and accepted in large parts of society. Although prohibited by law, girls are married underage and often leave school early. Socially, homosexuality is wholly unacceptable, and LGBTIQ+ people are stigmatized. Homosexuality is considered a Western invention and is legally classified as a minor offense.
Equal opportunity
Chad’s heavy dependence on oil production since 2003 has not positively impacted its economic performance. The oil price shock in 2014 is one of the main reasons for the decline in the country’s economic performance. After recovering from a low point in 2022, when Chad produced only 66,000 barrels per day, it has produced 128,000 barrels per day as of October 2024. Chad mainly exports to China, Germany, the Netherlands and France.
Moreover, the long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, heavy rainfall and flooding in large parts of the country, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the influx of Sudanese refugees are also weighing heavily on the country’s economic performance. Corruption at all levels and a lack of preparation for price shocks also play a negative role.
The economy remains heavily dependent on agriculture. It is classified as low-income and is financially fragile. Structural deficiencies, a rentier state mentality and high levels of corruption make Chad one of the least developed and most vulnerable economies in the world. Mahamat Déby’s promises to diversify the economy and create jobs ahead of the 2024 elections were largely lip service to the electorate and were also intended to reassure international donors. Inflation reached 10.8% in 2023, underscoring the hardship faced by the Chadian population during the years of political transition.
During the period under review, per capita GDP on a purchasing power parity basis was $1,969 in 2023, up from $1,585 in 2013, while total GDP rose slightly from $10.66 billion in 2014 to $10.96 billion in 2023. In 2023, GDP per capita growth was 1%, compared to 2% in 2013.
Foreign direct investment increased slightly from 6.0% of GDP in 2021 to 6.9% in 2023, while gross capital formation reached 25.8% of GDP in 2023 compared to 20.6% in 2020 and a peak of 33.8% in 2014. Unemployment stood at 1.1% in 2023 and showed some stability, except for 2020, when it rose to 1.7%. However, serious doubts remain about these figures, as few people outside the formal economy are included. The Chadian economy is based on a large informal sector and high rates of subsistence farming. Unemployment is particularly high among youth.
Output strength
Chad is experiencing environmental degradation and increasing desertification, along with flooding during the rainy season that has caused death and displacement in 2022 and 2024. The country is also facing dwindling fish stocks, the extinction of certain animal and plant species, and soil degradation. The volume of pollution from exhaust fumes and sand is rising, especially in urban centers.
Chad was ranked 153rd out of 180 countries in the 2024 Environmental Performance Index and 82nd in Ecosystem Vitality Policy. Its position in the Environmental Performance Index slightly improved from 2022 (165th place). In specific categories, however, it ranked among the bottom 10, such as in the area of climate change mitigation (172nd) and sanitation and drinking water (180th). For air pollution, it is ranked 135th.
A major environmental challenge continues to be the declining water level of Lake Chad. Over the past 50 years, its surface area has decreased from 20,000 to just 2,000 square kilometers. The Lake Chad Basin Commission, established in 1964 and composed of representatives from the five riparian states and headquartered in N’Djamena, is exploring ways to prevent further erosion and improve circulation.
Chad joined the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Water Convention) in 2018 and became the first African state to commit to the sustainable management of transboundary waters through the principles and rules of international law.
Chad signed the Paris Agreement in April 2016 and ratified it in January 2017. An environmental protection law was adopted in 1998, but no serious implementation followed.
The national development plan of 2017, Vision 2030, led to a UNDP project (2019 – 2023) focused on integrating climate change adaptation into medium- and long-term planning and budgeting processes, thus enabling the country to manage its sensitivity to climate change in the fields of agriculture, livestock, fisheries and water resources. Information collection and weather data as well as guidelines for monitoring and evaluation of adaptation are important components. In 2022, Chad submitted its first National Adaptation Plan to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Not all problems can be attributed to climate change. Despite some ecologically sensible policies, the government has never ensured adequate oversight of oil or other companies’ environmental impacts. It can be expected that environmental standards will not be complied with in the exploitation of raw materials in the future.
Because of power supply problems, the government is increasingly focusing on photovoltaic systems and needs international investors for financing. Individuals who can afford to do so are also installing photovoltaic systems.
Awareness of the environment is not deeply rooted. However, civil society and non-governmental organizations help sensitize the population to the impacts of climate change and possible responses. Local research institutions – including the University of N’Djamena – play a central role in developing innovative means to address the impacts of climate change, for instance through research on the cyanobacterium Spirulina platensis found around Lake Chad, which offers a possible solution to food insecurity.
Environmental policy
Chad’s education system ranks among the worst in the world. Several key indicators reflect its poor state. The U.N. Education Index of 2022 placed Chad fifth from the bottom, with a score of 0.304. Public spending on education in 2022 accounted for 2.5% of GDP, down from 2.9% in 2021. R&D expenditure was 0.3% in 2016, with no more recent figures available. The overall literacy rate in 2022 was 27.3%, continuing a slow decline since 2004, when it was 28.4%. In 2022, 90% of school-age children attended primary school. The primary school completion rate was 38% for girls and 49% for boys. The average duration of schooling in 2021 was 2.57 years. The adult literacy rate in 2022 was just under 27.3%. Strikes frequently interrupt classes at schools and universities, sometimes resulting in the loss of entire academic years. In August 2024, the minister of education pledged not to charge school fees for girls starting in the 2024/25 school year.
The Chadian education system follows the French three-level model: primary, secondary and higher education. The law on the education system, in effect since 2006, declares the right to education and training for everyone between ages 6 and 16 without discrimination of any kind.
Official languages of instruction are French and Arabic. Primary education, which lasts six years, is free and compulsory. However, parents must buy textbooks and school uniforms. Tuition fees must be paid in public schools. Parent associations, especially in rural regions, finance more than half of the teachers and schools. Secondary education lasts seven years. There are several private secondary institutions in N’Djamena and other towns. The Catholic Church operates its own schools, which are open to people of all denominations.
The University of N’Djamena was the first university in the country. The university has a total of four campuses. In most towns in Chad, smaller universities and colleges exist with a limited number of subjects. Meanwhile, there are 28,500 students in Chad either studying at one of the nine universities or at one of the four teacher training colleges (écoles normales supérieures). Doctoral studies only began in September 2019 at the University of N’Djamena, which now hosts a doctoral school in technical sciences and environment and one in humanities and social sciences. Parents who can afford it send their children to study abroad.
The Chadian education system is among the least well-funded in the world. International efforts have not led to improvements, a fact that may be partially explained by the diverse education systems and languages that donors represent and seek to disseminate. The education sector is also vulnerable to the country’s high level of corruption. The 10-year plan for the development of education and literacy, called PEDDEA 2023 – 2032, confirms primary education in Chad as a top priority.
Education / R&D policy
Landlocked Chad faces a number of structural constraints. Like other countries in the Sahel region with different climate zones, it is severely affected by droughts, irregular rainfall and floods as well as extreme heat. The rainy seasons of 2022 and 2024 were the most violent in decades. They caused flooding not only in the fertile southern regions but also in northern parts of the country, leading to displacement and homelessness. In 2024, 119 out of 125 departments and almost 2 million people were affected by the floods. A total of 575 people drowned. Climate change further increases the temperature of an already unbearably hot season.
However, these constraints are not the primary cause of the extreme poverty and suffering experienced by the population in Chad.
The infrastructure, particularly the overland road network, is poor. It is affected by the rainy season and by high levels of corruption during construction periods. The ruling elite are the primary beneficiaries of tenders and corrupt payments. Transporting goods that arrive at the ports of neighboring countries is time-consuming and costly.
Energy supply is another area that poses serious constraints. The advent of oil production in 2003 had the potential to ease the country’s economic situation, help diversify the economy and improve poor educational and health systems. However, oil supplies are declining due to limited reserves. After more than 20 years of producing oil, all indices are worse than before production started. Throughout this period, the government has shown no political will to fight poverty.
Diseases such as HIV/AIDS and recurring waves of other infectious diseases such as measles and malaria, as well as severe diarrhea, especially among children, are causing a heavy death toll.
Structural constraints
Although there are no deep-rooted civil society traditions, human rights organizations and NGOs focusing on peaceful cohabitation – particularly in cases of conflict between farmers and pastoral groups – as well as on women’s and youth rights and minority rights, do important work in the absence of the state. They are often the only voices raising concerns and have the capacity, although limited, to draw international attention to human rights abuses. For the most part, they rely on international funding. A prominent example was the legal case against former Chadian President Hissène Habré, in which civil society and human rights organizations played a primary role in collecting and archiving the necessary evidence to support the case at the Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal in 2016. This effort led to Hissène’s conviction for crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture, including sexual violence and rape. This was a major success for Chadian civil society and was life-changing for the victims of Hissène Habré’s regime. However, outspoken activists are vulnerable to government harassment, intimidation, arrest, ill-treatment and even death. Their safety depends on their international visibility.
To weaken and fragment civil society movements, Chadian authorities have created parallel civil society organizations. These groups are loyal to the government and compete equally for international recognition and funds. This was clearly demonstrated during the run-up to the 2024 presidential elections, when more than 1,000 CSOs joined the Tchad Uni coalition, which supported Mahamat Déby’s candidacy. This government-driven dilution of the civil society landscape in Chad made international engagement with these groups challenging. Careful navigation and assessment of organizations’ nature and objectives has become central to international cooperation.
Therefore, trust within civil society is extremely low and is largely limited to close family circles.
Succession and the integration of new leaders into CSOs is difficult. Long-serving leaders often remain in office or do not acknowledge their removal, and it can be impossible to find successors willing to make the same economic and personal sacrifices as their predecessors.
Civil society traditions
Everyday life in Chad is shaped by a range of experiences with (armed) violence and conflict. These include violence by security forces, indiscriminate violence by pro-government elements against individuals, intercommunal conflicts between sedentary and nomadic ethnic groups – such as farmers and pastoralists – armed violence by groups including Boko Haram and politico-military organizations, and everyday crime. The incidence of violence against women is also increasing. Kidnappings for ransom, often of children, are particularly widespread in the southwest of the country. In Tibesti, specifically the Miski region, conflicts occur between local self-defense groups and state security forces related to gold mining.
During the period under review, Chadian politics were marked by two particular conflicts. These conflicts are characteristic of the current tensions in Chad and should be understood in the context of the 2024 election year, in which Mahamat Déby was determined to remain in power after the end of the transition and to prove himself a legitimate and capable president.
One conflict was the murder of Yaya Dillo Bétchi by security forces on February 28, 2024, at the headquarters of his opposition party, the Party of Socialists without Borders (Party Socialiste sans Frontières), in N’Djamena. Dillo, a cousin of transition president Déby, was also one of his fiercest opponents, and had been determined to run in the presidential elections in May 2024. Following the killing, roadblocks, house searches and arbitrary arrests disrupted public life. The population, already paralyzed since the events of Black Thursday in October 2022, has been living in even greater fear ever since.
The second issue is the ongoing armed conflict in the Lake Chad Basin involving Boko Haram and its splinter groups Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’adati wal-Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). On October 27, 2024, an attack was carried out by armed elements on a Chadian military base, resulting in the deaths of 40 soldiers and injuries to about 37 others. The attack was officially attributed to Boko Haram, which, however, did not claim responsibility. In response, Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno launched the military Operation Haskanite, which he personally led and oversaw – similar to his father’s leadership during Operation “Colère de Boma.” Human rights organizations widely criticized Operation Boma for its indiscriminate actions, including the large-scale killing of village inhabitants without clear identification of Boko Haram affiliation. The same criticism has been leveled against Operation Haskanite.
Following the operation, Déby had himself appointed marshal of Chad on December 21, 2024 – an honorable military title that only the late Idriss Déby had previously held.
Conflict intensity
The period under review was marked by the so-called second phase of the transition. Parliamentary, provincial and local elections on December 28, 2024, ended the transition period of more than three years. The ruling elite around Mahamat Déby was focused on consolidating his long-term grip on power and the legitimization of his rule. The constitutional referendum in December 2023, the May 2024 presidential election and the triple elections in December served this specific objective.
The co-optation of political opponents continued during the review period. This was most notably demonstrated by the appointment of former opposition politician and leader of the party Les Transformateurs, Succès Masra, as prime minister in January 2024. Following the events of Black Thursday in October 2022, he spent a year in exile. As prime minister, he was unable to implement any reforms. After the presidential elections, in which Masra also ran as a candidate, he was replaced by Allamaye Halina. Halina had served as Idriss Déby’s chief of protocol for more than a decade and was not known for his strategic planning abilities.
Even though the members of the cabinet are officially proposed by the prime minister, it is clear they are at the mercy of the president. As was the case under Idriss Déby, cabinet reshuffles are frequent. As a result, long-term strategies and action plans – for example, for sustainable development and U.N. Security Council’s Women Peace and Security (WPS) and Youth Peace and Security Agenda (YPS) – and strategic prioritization are not possible due to the lack of continuous political leadership.
The administration functions poorly. No reforms are visible in this regard.
Prioritization
Chad’s political and economic implementation of both its own and donors’ policies was both weak and inefficient under Idriss Déby. Since 2010, the World Bank has repeatedly called for better governance, stronger public finance management, improved access to key social services and greater regional integration. Chad’s National Development Plan (2017 – 2021) focuses on economic diversification. Chad’s Vision 2030 and National Development Plan (2022 – 2026) focus on improving access to health and education, increasing productive capacity, promoting job creation, and strengthening good governance and the rule of law.
To date, Chad has consistently failed to achieve the objectives of these policy plans. A 2019 World Bank background document recommends that Chadian authorities improve the processes of budget preparation and public debt management, strengthen the reporting and monitoring of spending, limit the use of emergency spending, increase transparency and accountability in the oil sector, and intensify efforts to strengthen the anti-corruption framework to reduce corruption. Similar recommendations have repeatedly been made by the World Bank and IMF with little impact. Nevertheless, Chad became the first country to receive debt relief from the IMF in November 2022.
The president’s statements on his intentions for reform sound like a wish list addressed to the international community. From health care to infrastructure and education, there is a significant need for funding. At the same time, Chadians do not believe the promises to improve their living conditions.
Implementation
For more than 30 years, Chad’s political leadership has shown little willingness to learn with regard to developing a constitutional democracy and, to a lesser extent, a market economy. During the period under review, however, the current government and its president have tended to adopt some of the worst practices of Idriss Déby’s previous administration. One example is the co-optation of political opponents. More serious, though, is the treatment of political opponents who challenge the regime’s hold on power. There is a long tradition in Chad of eliminating dissent, especially from within the inner circle of power or even from one’s own family. Yaya Dillo, a cousin of Idriss Déby, narrowly escaped an assassination attempt by security forces in 2021. Ironically, Yaya Dillo was killed by security forces on the same day three years later, as he was preparing to run for president.
During Operation Haskanite, following an attack on a military base in the Lake Chad region, Déby used the same indiscriminate tactics as his father during the Colère de Boma operation in 2020. These actions cost the lives of individuals, including civilians, in villages around Lake Chad. Proclaimed a hero, Mahamat Déby was subsequently appointed marshal of Chad, as his father had been before him.
On the other hand, the Chadian government engaged in consultation on various political issues during the reporting period. Constitutional experts and political and electoral advisers, most of whom participated as part of the UNDP basket fund, worked on legislative texts. There is no evidence of any use or implementation of the advice or products that were provided.
Policy learning
Since reliable information on public finances is scarcely available, it is difficult to analyze the government’s resource efficiency. In the Open Budget Survey 2023, Chad ranked 114th out of 125 countries regarding public transparency over how the government raises and spends public resources. The survey rates the current situation as insufficient. Chad’s transparency performance declined slightly from a score of 14 in 2019 to 6 (out of 100) in 2021. In 2023, it remained at 6. This decline is attributed to a lack of information regarding the executive’s budget proposal for internal use. Most key budget documents, such as year-end or audit reports, are not produced. Chad dropped from 4 out of 100 in 2021 to 0 out of 100 for public participation in the budget process, which is also classified as insufficient. The country does not have an independent fiscal institution, an entity highly recommended by the Open Budget Survey. Among other recommendations, it advises involving the legislature in budget policy debates, submitting the budget proposal to legislative bodies at least two months before the budget year and strengthening the Chadian Chamber of Accounts.
Mahamat Déby continues to co-opt individuals with appointments to well-paid positions, but apparently he is trying to reduce costs: After the presidential elections in May 2024, the number of ministers and secretaries of state was cut to 27 (down from 44). The newly elected parliament now consists of 188 deputies, as it did during the late Idriss Déby era, compared to 197 in the transitional parliament.
Efficient use of assets
Since the unexpected death of Idriss Déby in April 2021 and the subsequent takeover of power by Mahamat Déby, the state’s sole political objective has been to consolidate Mahamat Déby’s rule and legitimize his position over the long term. All other considerations were subordinated to this goal, which has now been achieved. However, it is expected that in the future, as in the past under the late Idriss Déby, all policies will continue to be subordinated to the same objective.
The government does not coordinate conflicting objectives into a coherent policy but instead subordinates all other activities to its efforts to maintain its grip on power. The state has been captured by a small militarized and kleptocratic elite around the figure of Mahamat Déby. This leadership style leaves no room for balancing conflicting interests.
Policy coordination
Chad ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2018, becoming the 186th state to support the development of more effective anti-corruption measures. In January 2019, a road map for implementing the convention and assigning institutional responsibilities for the review mechanism was adopted. However, corruption in fact affects society at all levels. Anti-corruption laws are enforced only in exceptional cases. After the National Dialogue, the Inspection Général de l’Etat (General State Inspection), which served as the state anti-corruption authority, was dissolved and replaced by decree on August 1, 2023, with the (supposedly independent) Autorité Indépendante de Lutte contre la Corruption (Independent Authority against Corruption). In the past, mechanisms to stop corrupt practices failed because corruption continues to underpin a sophisticated patronage system that demands and guarantees loyalty.
Diversion of funds is a significant issue. According to international observers such as the Economist Intelligence Unit, the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the IMF, corruption is widespread at all levels. Projects and infrastructure initiatives are awarded to clan members, political allies or individuals close to the government, who use these opportunities for personal gain. As under Idriss Déby, reported cases of corruption are more likely to be seen as signs of diminished political power or loss of presidential favor. Convicted individuals often reemerge on the political scene after some time. For instance, Déby’s confidant General Idriss Youssouf Boy, who was dismissed in 2022 for corruption, went on to serve as Directeur du Cabinet Civil à la Présidence with the rank of minister from January 2023 to September 2024.
Corruption is tolerated at all levels. The population has little trust in state institutions and no effective means of protesting arbitrary administrative behavior. In most cases, state administration employees do not perform their duties without being incentivized – that is, administrative services generally must be bought.
Anti-corruption policy
Chad is one of the countries in the Sahel region that has recently experienced an unconstitutional change of government. It was the quickest to end its subsequent transition. However, there was no broad consensus between the political leadership and other social actors on reforms during the period under review. Consensus existed only between the ruling elite surrounding President Mahamat Déby and the former ruling party, the MPS, on a single objective: maintaining power. By strictly adhering to the road map announced by the National Dialogue in October 2022 and holding elections according to the established timetable, the political leadership was able to present an appearance of legitimacy to both the international and national communities. Political and economic power remained with the same individuals as before. Veto actors were too intimidated and too weak to be heard.
As far as economic reforms are concerned, there is broad consensus that drastic changes are needed to end poverty. However, there are serious doubts about the government’s willingness to prioritize development over political ambitions. Chad is heavily dependent on international donors, to whom the elections were addressed.
Consensus on goals
Reformers face significant challenges in Chad. This was already evident under Idriss Déby’s rule and has only worsened under Mahamat Déby. Until Black Thursday on October 20, 2022, when security forces killed hundreds of demonstrators, Wakit Tamma could be considered a reformer. Succès Masra, leader of Les Transformateurs, fled the country after that event. He was also seen by many as a reformer until he returned to Chad under a so-called amnesty deal negotiated by the Congolese president and was then co-opted as prime minister. Yaya Dillo, who was expected to make at least a respectable showing in the presidential elections, was assassinated by security forces in the run-up to the polls. Since Dillo’s death, only a few small parties and their courageous leaders can be considered as oppositional. They are united in the Groupe de Concertation des Acteurs Politiques (Concertation Group of Political Actors – GCAP). In protest against the election procedures, the GCAP boycotted the December 2024 election, and Les Transformateurs did not take part either.
Anti-democratic actors
Chad is characterized by a mix of structural causes of conflict. Although these have historical roots, they are exacerbated by the current political balance of power, international support for the governments of Idriss Déby and now Mahamat Déby, and Islamist terrorist groups in neighboring countries. The country is ethnically, religiously, politically and economically stratified. The power elite is dominated by groups from the north, predominantly Muslims. Because regional or ethnic affiliation is closely linked to political and economic power, conflicts can become explosive.
Under Idriss Déby’s rule, these conflicts existed as well, but he tried to avoid escalation. At least publicly, he sought to maintain a balance between Chad’s religious groups. The presence of extremist Islamic groups was not allowed. He usually appointed a person from the south as prime minister to create the illusion that power was balanced and that southern groups had political responsibility. Mahamat Déby continued this unwritten rule and nominated Allamaye Halina in May 2024. However, the pressure of the transition and Déby’s election victory have confirmed the fears of the Christian-dominated south that political and economic power will remain in the hands of the Muslim-dominated ethnic groups in the long term. There have been repeated calls from the south for the country to be divided. As of yet, the political leadership has not shown any constructive approaches to conflict management. This also applies to the conflicts between farmers and herders, which result in several hundred deaths every year, mostly among the sedentary population.
Cleavage / conflict management
Like the political parties, Chad’s civil society is divided. Idriss Déby had already co-opted civil society organizations or created new ones, and his son has successfully continued this practice. The most significant outcome was the support of more than 1,000 NGOs and several hundred political parties for the presidential candidacy of Mahamat Déby. These groups formed the Coalition pour un Tchad uni (Coalition for a United Chad). Despite their proximity to the government, these civil society actors are not consulted or involved in the political decision-making process. Political decisions are made by a small inner circle of power, about which virtually no information is disclosed. Only a few NGOs and their courageous members are able to remain independent and maintain their critical, distanced positions toward politics and society. They often receive funding from abroad.
Public consultation
Three issues are relevant to addressing the past and achieving reconciliation.
An American and a Chadian lawyer (Jacqueline Moudeina) fought hard to shed light on the crimes of the Habré era and to ensure that Habré was prosecuted for crimes against humanity. After 23 years in exile in Senegal, he was arrested in 2013 and sentenced to life imprisonment in 2016. The Extraordinary African Chambers in Dakar ordered him to pay substantial reparations to his victims, but he failed to do so. In February 2024, the Chadian government suddenly began compensating the victims with around XAF 920,000 – less than they had been entitled to. In the past, it had made no real effort to address the crimes of the years of dictatorship and civil war that preceded Déby’s regime or with Déby’s role as Habré’s close collaborator. By reassuring the victims, Mahamat Déby may be able to have Habré’s remains repatriated to Chad.
The circumstances surrounding Idriss Déby’s death remain unclear. Mahamat Déby has shown no interest in clarifying them. No commission has been established to investigate his father’s death.
As part of the Doha Peace Agreement of August 2022, the government and the political-military movements signed a nonaggression pact. Military leaders received compensation payments, which the government used to secure their loyalty to the National Dialogue. Some were given government posts, though not all remain in office. Some have left the country and returned to exile. The Inclusive National Dialogue, a key component of the political transition, was promised by authorities as an opportunity for national reconciliation to “bury the hatchet of war.” However, external observers criticized the dialogue as staged and non-inclusive, arguing that participants were preselected to support the ultimate goal of consolidating power under Mahamat Déby.
Reconciliation
Chad relies heavily on bilateral and multilateral donors and cooperation with the international community. Most funding supports humanitarian aid and poverty reduction. During the period under review, the Chadian government sought new partners because the funds not only keep the state budget afloat but also enable the power elite to engage in high levels of corruption and rent-seeking. In June 2023, Chad received a $1.5 billion loan from the United Arab Emirates.
The Ministry of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation is responsible for the National Development Plan (Plan National de Développement, PND), its implementation and evaluation (term: 2017 – 2021). The MPS political party and private sector partners with close ties to government participated in the planning process. The PND aligns with the goals of the U.N. 2030 Agenda and the African Union’s Agenda 2063, but it has not received the necessary funding due to inadequate monitoring and evaluation, and a lack of visible political will at the national level to implement reforms. The SDG Index (2024) reflects Chad’s poor performance: With a score of 45.07, it ranks 165th out of 167 countries, ahead of only the Central African Republic and South Sudan. The second five-year development plan (2022 – 2027) focuses on governance, increasing production capacity, developing human capital and reducing inequalities.
However, it is expected that, as in the past, these plans will remain donor wish lists that will not be implemented. Previous country reports by development banks and donor organizations indicate that corruption, low administrative capacity and lack of ownership in ministries, as well as insufficient diversification of the economy, are long-standing problems in Chad that the government has not seriously addressed.
Effective use of support
In its current constitution, Chad has pledged to honor all international agreements and conventions made by previous governments. It is too early to determine whether all these agreements will be respected.
However, the National Dialogue’s decision to allow Mahamat Déby to run for the presidency was clearly in breach of Article 25 of the AU Democracy Charter. Black Thursday and the shooting of demonstrators, as well as the assassination of Yaya Dillo in February 2024, violate international human rights standards.
It is feared that, as was the case under Idriss Déby, the authorities will be unwilling to implement international standards on their territory if these standards interfere with their objective of remaining in power. Mahamat Déby repeatedly emphasized Chad’s sovereignty on various occasions during the period under review.
Unexpectedly, Chad ended its military cooperation with France at the end of November 2024 and demanded the complete withdrawal of French troops by January 31, 2025.
Credibility
Chad is a member of several regional and subregional communities. The country has signed numerous international conventions. It is a member of the African Union; since 2017, Chadian Moussa Faki has served as chairperson of the AU Commission, and his term will end in February 2025. Chad is also a member of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). Chad is part of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), which came into force on Jan. 1, 2021.
Chad also participates in the G5 Sahel group (since 2014) and, together with Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, created the G5 Joint Force, which has been operating since 2017. Mali left the G5 Sahel group in 2022, and Niger and Burkina Faso withdrew in 2023. Chad has provided the majority of the 8,000 troops of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Lake Chad littoral states of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, and is carrying out most cross-border operations against Boko Haram. Following Operation Haskanite in November 2024 and allegations that Nigerian fishermen had been victims of the Chadian attack, Chadian President Déby threatened to limit the Chadian army’s operations to Chadian territory and to withdraw from the MNJTF, which would be a serious setback for the regional force.
The current Niger prime minister, Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine, is of Chadian descent and is considered a close ally of Déby. Relations with Sudan have been difficult since the outbreak of the Sudanese civil war in April 2023. Déby reportedly supports General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemeti, whose Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have committed atrocities in the Darfur region. Many Zaghawa living there have fled. The Chadian Zaghawa, the ethnic group of Idriss Déby, accuse Mahamat Déby of supporting Hemeti. Although the Chadian leadership denies it, arms supplies to the RSF appear to be passing through Chadian territory.
Regional cooperation
The period under review has shown that Chadian political leadership is capable of strategic planning when it comes to maintaining and legitimizing its own power. The continuity of power structures, from the ruling Movement Patriotique du Salut (MPS) party to the inner circle of power, raises doubts about the seriousness of the commitment to democracy and reform. It is therefore expected that authoritarian rule will continue to secure power in the long term, including by carrying out blatant human rights violations, as occurred during the transition. The already small space for political opposition is shrinking and will likely continue to do so.
The contested victory of the ruling party and its allies in December 2024’s tripartite elections, along with the opposition’s boycott, will prevent other political voices from being heard for the next five years and likely beyond. The disappearance of civil society and political debate poses a major threat to any future attempts at democratization.
International institutions face the challenge of accepting the choices of an authoritarian regime to avoid jeopardizing long-term cooperation with the government, while providing at least limited aid to the suffering population and refugees and continuing engagement with the goal of fostering some structural change.
Economic reforms, including economic diversification, are urgently needed in order to reduce dependence on the oil sector. However, the government is unlikely to have the capacity or political will to achieve this.
The need for reform is widespread. The education and health systems are inefficient, and the already deteriorated infrastructure – especially roads and bridges – has been almost completely destroyed by repeated floods.
Reconstruction funding is needed, but with administrative and power structures still intact, much of the funds are likely to be diverted from necessary measures. The risk of institutionalized corruption in all sectors of the state remains, especially in institutions that are unaccountable and whose members can be replaced at any time.
Given the already precarious economic situation and the crop failures caused by the 2024 floods, Chad needs international aid – both for its population and for refugees from Sudan and other neighboring countries. Like his father in 2004, Déby could use the latter as a negotiating chip to gain further international support for his policies and to receive foreign aid.
Mahamat Déby will continue seeking new allies to support his rule financially and militarily. Several visits to Moscow, Romania, the United Arab Emirates and China are evidence of this. He has broken with France only on military matters. France is likely to remain an important partner overall.
The security problem remains. On one hand, as in the past, there is a risk of internal attacks or political-military movements against the regime, which could provoke a violent change of power. On the other hand, wars and conflicts in neighboring countries and the resulting influx of refugees continue to pose challenges. Boko Haram remains active in neighboring countries such as Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria.
In short, Chad’s political and economic situation is not expected to change.
Regionally, Chad will remain an important player given its geographic position close to other conflict areas, including Sudan, Libya, Lake Chad and the Central African Republic. Déby’s threat to withdraw from the MNJTF would be a major setback for effective regional military cooperation. Greater efforts at integration with the Sahel Alliance and cooperation with Russia and the Arab Emirates could change the dynamic in the region.